

# Long live the Republic: The political consequences of revolutionary land redistribution

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## Abstract

To be politically viable, a Revolution needs the support of key interest groups that benefit from the survival of the new regime. The redistribution of clergy property during the French Revolution created a group –the new owners of clergy assets- whose wealth depended on the Revolution’s fate, thus increasing political support for the Revolution. This land redistribution policy had long-run consequences on political support for republicanism. Using data on elections during the beginning of the Third Republic, we show that the sale of clergy assets during the French Revolution substantially reduced support for anti-Republican candidates. Our results suggest that Republicans may not have prevailed in the 1870s without the liquidation of the Church’s wealth 80 years earlier. The sale of Church assets reduced Catholic worship, thus limiting the influence of priests. Predictably, Protestant worship increased as the cost of Catholic religious services rose. We use the presence of monasteries prior to the Reformation and the Commercial Revolution as an instrument to suggest our findings are causal. Finally, we rule out a reduction in landed inequality as the main channel explaining the effect of this revolutionary land redistribution on politics and ideology. Overall, interest group politics is key to understanding the political legacy of the Revolution.

**Keywords:** Political Economy, French Revolution, land reform, redistribution.

**JEL Codes:** D72, D74, N33, P16.

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Our whole Government is so completely null and insignificant that a Counter-Revolution should happen tomorrow if it weren't for the fact that at least half of the Republic's territory is in the hands of new proprietors who are interested in supporting and will continue to support the present order of things.

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Claude-Henry de Saint-Simon, August 1797.

As long as there remains an inch of the sacred soil under our soles, we will firmly hold the glorious flag of the French Revolution.

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Léon Gambetta, *Proclamation au peuple français*, October 30, 1870.

## 1 Introduction

In his novel, *Eugénie Grandet*, Balzac describes his fictional character, Père Grandet, as one of the veterans of the 1789 Revolution. As a buyer of church assets, he was perceived as a revolutionary: “The inhabitants of Saumur were so little revolutionary that they thought Père Grandet a bold man, a republican, and a patriot with a mind open to all the new ideas; though in point of fact it was open only to vineyards. He was appointed a member of the administration of Saumur, and his pacific influence made itself felt politically and commercially.” (p.7). By using the fictional character of Père Grandet, Balzac implicitly derides those who became “revolutionaries” by interest rather than by conviction. But Balzac also points to one of the most significant events of the Revolution: the redistribution of the Church's property following 1789.<sup>1</sup>

It took French Revolutionaries only a few years to completely transform the social fabric of their country. Where a feudal regime held sway over France for more than a thousand years, the 1789 revolutionaries proclaimed equality before the law, equal access to government employment, established a parliament, and abolished privileges. Yet the “most significant event of the Revolution,” as Lecarpentier (1908) called it, was the massive redistribution of church and

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<sup>1</sup>This event is a recurrent theme in Balzac (Butler, 2019). In his novel *Les Chouants*, he suggests Republican forces fought the Vendean insurgents enthusiastically as they wished to preserve their *biens nationaux*.

aristocratic land holdings. On the brink of bankruptcy, the new regime decided to nationalize all Church properties and auction them off to the public. Those national assets, or *biens nationaux* in French, were supposed to solve the acute fiscal crisis faced by the French State at the end of the *Ancien Régime*. Yet one other function of the *biens nationaux* was political rather than financial. The new revolutionary government needed supporters to fight against the entrenched interests of the monarchy, the clergy, and the aristocracy. When the National Assembly decided on November 2, 1789, that “all ecclesiastical properties are at the disposal of the Nation,” it sparked immense hope in the rural areas (Teyssier, 2000). The law of May 14, 1790, outlining the terms of the sales, affirmed that the objectives of these sales are “the proper organization of finances and the happy increase, especially among rural inhabitants, of the number of property owners.” With the redistribution of Church assets, a new Republican local elite developed and maintained its influence to varying degrees during the rest of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

While the economic effects of the *biens nationaux* have been amply covered in the historical literature,<sup>2</sup> and to a lesser extent by economists (Finley et al., 2021; Deseau, 2023), the long-term political impact of the sale of national assets has not received much attention. A notable exception is Hilaire (1977, p.145) who argues that during the early Third Republic (1870-1940), “The most faithful families to the liberal revolutionary and anticlerical tradition are the descendants of small buyers [of *biens nationaux*] because they feel threatened by the heirs of the former owners.”<sup>3</sup> Nor have the effects of the *biens nationaux* on religion been explored. While historians have pointed to the political polarization of Catholicism in 19<sup>th</sup> France, the mechanisms behind this phenomenon have not previously been identified (Dumons, 2013).<sup>4</sup>

This paper studies the persistent ideological and political consequences of the redistribu-

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<sup>2</sup>See the extensive bibliography in Bodinier & Teyssier (2000). On the effect of the Revolution on agriculture, see: Rosenthal (1992).

<sup>3</sup>See also: Charreyron (1990) and Pilbeam (1995, p.19, 71, and 86-88). However, Pilbeam (1995, p.270) acknowledges that “The relationship between permanent commitment to the Revolution and the purchase of *biens nationaux* is a very complex question and only the surface of it has been touched, despite extensive research.”


<sup>4</sup>The influence of the Revolution on the conservative attitudes of Catholics during the 19<sup>th</sup> century was first discussed by Siegfried (1913). For some historians, the Revolution polarized Catholicism politically (Langlois, 1974; Tackett, 1986). For others, the Revolution merely revealed pre-existing contrasts, which were hidden by Catholicism’s position as the official state religion (Pérouas, 1964; Lagrée, 1976).

tion of Church land during the French Revolution. We focus on the late 19<sup>th</sup> century as the conflict between the Church and the Third Republic was the defining political debate of this era. As Acemoglu et al. (2005) argue, shocks in the balance of power can lead to profound changes in political institutions. Such changes can be exacerbated if they change the distribution of resources in society. In our case, the confiscation of Church land during the Revolution redistributed resources away from the Church, a central institution of the *Ancien Régime*, to the bourgeoisie and peasantry. Around 10% of French households bought Church assets which represented approximately 6.5% of the French territory, (Bodinier & Teyssier, 2000, p.439). The new owners of *biens nationaux* became a key interest group that favored republicanism as they wished to reduce the risk of expropriation by former owners. Tullock (1971) first pointed out that the logic of interest groups makes public interest an unlikely motivation for fighting revolutions: public interest is a public good. Revolutions need to overcome this problem by providing selective incentives to their supporters, and by creating new constituencies, which improve the new regime's prospect for survival. The *biens nationaux* empowered an already influential number of notables and, by doing so, altered the French political landscape.

The First Republic (1792-1804) did not survive Napoléon's rule. As the Bourbon monarchy was restored in 1814, the counter-revolutionary threat intensified existing political cleavages. In that context, the redistribution of land earlier during the Revolution was remarkably effective at spurring republican and democratic ideals later on in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. We find that the redistribution of Church land was partly responsible for the success of the Republican coalition in the national elections of the late 1870s. Figure 1 shows the timeline of the events relevant to our paper. Church land was nationalized in 1789 and auctioned off, for the most part, in the following decade. We look at the effect of this policy on electoral outcomes during the Third Republic when universal suffrage finally became a lasting feature of French political life. Elections during the Third Republic are signaled in Figure 1 with green vertical lines.

We test our hypothesis that the redistribution of Church land republicanized France using data on the value of the *biens nationaux* we collected from the *Archives Parlementaires* as well

Figure 1: Timeline (1774 - 1900).



*Note:* The dark blue color refers to the Bourbon dynasty being on the throne. The purple and light blue colors refer, respectively, to the Bonapartist and Orléanist dynasties. Orange refers to periods with republican institutions. The shaded orange/blue area refers to the early years of the Revolution.

as data collected by Bodinier & Teyssier (2000) on the share of land covered by ecclesiastical properties. One concern is that the prevalence of Church land in 1789 is correlated with important factors, such as the structure of the local economy, affecting the political support for republicanism. In particular, the rapid secularization of French society during the 18<sup>th</sup> century (Blanc, 2021) as well as the protestant Reformation during the 16<sup>th</sup> century likely impacted the Church’s wealth and ideology.

We attempt to tackle this problem by adopting multiple strategies. First, we introduce fixed effects for the 13 modern regions in our favored regressions, thus showing that our results hold when accounting for region-specific factors influencing the political support for republicanism. Second, to further address endogeneity problems, we adopt an instrumental variable strategy. We use the presence of monasteries in the year 1200 (prior to the commercial revolution and the protestant Reformation) as a source of plausibly exogenous variation in Church wealth. Third, we develop other implications of our theory on religious behavior, which we test using novel historical data we collected on protestant places of worship in France before and after the 1789 Revolution. More specifically, the expropriation of Church assets reduced the supply of Catholic religious services. It also increased the cost of Catholic worship for the new owners of *biens nationaux* who wished to avoid the priests’ forceful attempts to regain their wealth at their expense. Those two changes implied an increased demand for substitutes for Catholicism. Con-

sistent with this insight, our difference-in-difference results suggest that the sale of the Catholic Church’s assets increased protestant religious activity. As it turns out, French protestants were also more liberal politically.

To understand the mechanisms behind our results, we investigate whether the sale of the *biens nationaux* led to a decline in religiosity, thus limiting the influence of anti-republican ideas. Confiscating church land may also have impacted politics through land inequality. Many revolutionaries argued that dividing Church land would further boost support for the Revolution and make it harder to reverse the expropriation of the Church’s wealth.<sup>5</sup> Even though the evidence about the impact of the *biens nationaux* on land inequality is hard to assess due to the lack of pre-Revolution data, we find that this potential channel is unlikely to account for a large fraction of the effect we identify.

Land reform has been a salient political issue, at least since the Gracchi brothers attempted to redistribute Roman public land to poor farmers in the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC.<sup>6</sup> From Ancient Greece (Fleck & Hanssen, 2006) to modern Mexico (De Janvry et al., 2014), land and policies regarding land have impacted political institutions and political attitudes. Land redistribution during the French Revolution was unique in its magnitude and consequences. Based on our estimates, a one standard deviation increase in the value of Church assets sold per capita reduced votes to anti-Republican candidates by between 15.7 and 26.3%, and religiosity by between 24.8 to 31.2% during the last decades of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

The results in our paper are consistent with the literature on the political consequences of land reform. For instance, De Janvry et al. (2014) found that strengthening property rights over land in Mexico increased votes for the pro-market party. Similarly, Di Tella et al. (2007) found that squatters who were granted property rights in the outskirts of Buenos Aires were more likely to vote for politicians favoring free-markets.<sup>7</sup> In the case of the French Third Republic,

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<sup>5</sup>Montalbo (2023) found that stronger landholding inequalities were associated with lower support for the Republicans during the Third Republic.

<sup>6</sup>During the Revolution, Robespierre was regularly compared to the Gracchi brothers by his enemies (Nippel, 2020).

<sup>7</sup>For similar evidence with respect to Peru, see: Albertus (2020).

“right-wing” politicians favored clericalism, monarchism, and, for some, a return to the *Ancien Régime*. Republicans —except for those supporting socialism— were usually economic liberals, meaning that they favored a market economy based on private property. The extension of private property by selling ecclesiastical assets worked in the Republicans’ favor. Furthermore, the owners of *biens nationaux* formed patronage networks amplifying their political influence. In that sense, our contribution is related to Caprettini et al. (2021)’s, who provide evidence the 1950 Italian land reform generated a patronage network favoring the Christian Democratic party.<sup>8</sup>

Land reforms can have substantial and lasting effects on economic activity. Helling et al. (2021) show that the dissolution of English Monasteries after 1535 set the ground for the Industrial Revolution. Goñi (2023) argues that landed inequality in 1870 England can be traced back to land redistribution following the 1066 Norman invasion, with higher land concentration reducing investment in public education. On the other hand, our paper focuses on the ideological consequences of land reform in the (not as) long run. Hence, our paper relates to the literature on the historical roots of ideology and culture. In some instances, those roots are centuries old. Shallow Christianity (Becker & Voth, 2023) and pogroms during the Black Death (Voigtländer & Voth, 2012) are related to the rise of the Nazi Party. American individualism today can be traced back to frontier culture during colonization (Bazzi et al., 2020). In some other cases, persistence involves much shorter time periods, as in Dippel & Hebllich (2021), Cagé et al. (2023), or Caprettini & Voth (2023), who link New Deal policies with increased patriotism during WWII. In still other instances, past events may have effects that are dormant until triggered by circumstances (Fouka & Voth, 2023; Ochsner & Roesel, 2024). In the case of this paper, the French Revolution remained politically contentious until the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. We provide evidence that the weakening of the Catholic Church strengthened republicanism 80 to 100 years later. By 1947, Church assets sold during the Revolution were still associated with lower religiosity.

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<sup>8</sup>Benson (2021) finds evidence for a “land political cycle” in Columbia with land allocations increasing during electoral years. Dower & Pfitze (2015) argues that more secured property rights limit voter suppression in Mexico.

## 2 Historical context

### 2.1 The redistribution of Church assets during the Revolution

The nationalization and auctioning off of Church property by the new revolutionary government had the twin objectives of addressing the financial crisis and challenging the power of the Church over French society. Until the establishment of the Constituent Assembly in 1789, State finances remained, in theory, the exclusive prerogative of the King. In practice, the King was severely constrained by nobles, venal officers, and the clergy, all of whom had acquired privileges they wished to preserve.<sup>9</sup> By 1789, public debt was equal to 4.941 billion pounds (Braesch, 1934), which corresponded to more than 10 times annual revenue.<sup>10</sup>

Faced with an impossible fiscal situation, King Louis XVI decided to summon the Estates Generals for the first time in more than 170 years. The Estates Generals consisted of the three estates of the realm: the First Estate (the Clergy), the Second Estate (the nobility), and the Third Estate (the commoners). On May 5, 1789, the finance minister, Jacques Necker, gave an alarmist opening speech about public debt. Yet, the Estates Generals quickly became bogged down in debates about which voting procedure should be followed, and this led the Third Estate to break away and form a “National Assembly” which the clergy and nobility later joined.

The new National Assembly inherited the “unpleasant fiscal arithmetic” (Sargent & Velde, 1995) of the *Ancien Régime*. A “war of attrition” among different interest groups seeking to avoid bearing the costs of fiscal adjustment followed (White, 1995). Dissensions between the high clergy (usually captured by aristocratic families) and the low clergy (which, politically, was closer to the Third Estate) made it impossible for the clergy to engage in successful collective action. As the weakest interest group in the National Assembly, it suffered disproportionately from the attempts to pay back the government’s creditors. Rapidly, members of the newly created National Assembly suggested that the assets owned by the Church should be seized.<sup>11</sup> On

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<sup>9</sup>On the role of the 13 regional parliaments in defending the interests of the privileged during the *ancien régime*, see: Jaaidane et al. (2022).

<sup>10</sup>This is accepting Necker’s (1789) estimation of public revenue, which he evaluated at 475 million pounds.

<sup>11</sup>In August 1789, the Marquis of Lacoste claimed that “The ecclesiastic assets belong to the Nation, whose duty



November 2, 1789, the Assembly voted in favor of the nationalization of ecclesiastic properties 568 votes to 346.

The redistribution of the Church's assets, referred to as national properties or, in French, *biens nationaux*, quickly became the most significant event of the French Revolution (Bodinier & Teyssier, 2000). In 1789, the Church was the largest landowner, with its land covering around 6.5% of the French territory and 10% of its agricultural landed area. The value of Church land redistributed during the Revolution represented roughly 48% of GDP.<sup>12</sup>

Although the main motivation for nationalizing Church property was to solve the fiscal crisis, the *biens nationaux* quickly started to fulfill the political goal of consolidating the Revolution. The law of May 14, 1790, outlining the terms of sales, already affirms that the objectives of these sales are “the proper organization of finances and the happy increase, especially among rural inhabitants, of the number of property owners.”

One recurrent policy implemented with limited success was to sell the *biens nationaux* in small plots to increase the number of landowners.<sup>13</sup> For instance, on January 9, 1793, Roland proposed selling national property in plots of less than six acres. “Both economy and politics desire it so; politics because it is important for the republican government to increase the number of property owners, as nothing attaches you more to the homeland, to respect for the laws, than property.”<sup>14</sup> In 1793, the assets of those (mostly nobles) who emigrated were seized and added to the “national assets.” Barrère, a prominent revolutionary, argued in front of the parliament:

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is to revendicate them.” Similarly, the Knight of Lameth told his peers: “I demand that we give the creditors of the State ecclesiastical goods as a guarantee of their debt.” (Mavidal & Laurent, 1875, p.369-370). Yet it was the initiative of Charles Maurice de Talleyrand, himself a bishop, that would prove decisive on October 10, 1789.

<sup>12</sup>Toutain (1987) estimates French GDP for the 1781-1790 decade at 5,941 million pounds. Using our data from the *Archives Parlementaires* (t.42, p.77), the estimated value of Church properties was equal to 2,866 million pounds. We exclude from this estimation the value of forestry and salt marshes which were sold usually long after the Revolution.

<sup>13</sup>For instance, the law of July 25, 1790, prescribed that land be divided “as much as the nature of the land allows it.” An instruction to local administrations in August 1790 reiterates that “One cannot too strongly recommend [...] to facilitate small acquisitions; *as this is one of the main objectives of the operation.*” [emphasis added] (Bournisien, 1908, p.256).

<sup>14</sup>*Archives Parlementaires*, v.56, p.688.

All our efforts must aim to multiply, as much as possible, the number of property owners, for when a person is attached to the land, they defend it. The division of the emigrants' properties is necessary for the stability of the new order of things. [...] [A] farmer, a poor man from the city who comes to cultivate a small plot of land made more accessible to him through your help, will defend his property as much as his life itself. Thus, the Revolution, consolidated by the interest of a multitude of small property owners, will be unshakable. (*Le Moniteur Universel*, March 20, 1793, n°79, p.741).<sup>15</sup>

Whether or not the *biens nationaux* reduced land inequality is open to debate. Yet, “the revolutionaries of 1789 understood that a new social order can only be established upon new interests.” (Cochut, 1848, p.821).<sup>16</sup>

To survive politically, revolutionaries have to convince a sufficiently large and prominent segment of the population to support the new regime. Redistributing land can be an efficient way of doing so, whereas giving direct cash subsidies to elicit support usually will not do, first because people will only pretend to be revolutionaries to receive money, and second, because once the money is spent, nothing binds the recipients to the new regime.<sup>17</sup> An implicit contract in which the public receives cash in exchange for support is difficult to enforce and, therefore, unlikely to arise. Surely, giving cash may elicit support in the short run, but it is unlikely to create a durable interest group upon which a new regime can rely. The same logic applies as to why redistributing resources whose value does not fundamentally depend on which political regime is in place (either because they can be easily consumed or hidden from the taxing authority) is unlikely to build political support. Land has the advantage of being both a durable and immovable asset.

Building support also supposes avoiding further alienating important groups that might lose from the government's policies (Peltzman, 1976). During the French Revolution, the privileged

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<sup>15</sup>Similarly, in September 1793, Roux-Fazillac, the representative in mission for the National Convention in Charente, proposed to the Committee of Public Safety to confiscate the property of anti-revolutionaries in order to create “an additional backing for our assignats and to interest, in spite of themselves, these bad citizens in the prosperity of the Republic.” The *assignats* were the revolutionary currency which was “backed” by the national assets. For more details, see: Cutsinger et al. (2023); Crouzet (1993).

<sup>16</sup>Other revolutionary policies, such as the widespread adoption of price controls favoring the urban population, can also be understood as attempts to form a coalition supporting the new revolutionary regime (Rouanet, 2022).

<sup>17</sup>On why regulation, as opposed to cash payments, is often preferred by interest groups, see: Stigler (1971).

orders were unlikely to ever favor enlightened and revolutionary ideas. Some clergymen (e.g., abbé Sieyès) and aristocrats (e.g., Lafayette) did support the Revolution early on, but the high clergy and nobility, who controlled vast resources, remained staunch absolutists. In that context, there was little support for the revolutionaries to lose from those groups. Still, attacking the aristocracy too virulently could have endangered the Revolution, as aristocrats controlled key positions in the military. Expropriating clergymen, in that sense, was politically less risky. Only in 1793 did the revolutionary government start expropriating nobles manifestly working against the Revolution. On the other hand, the Third Estate members' support was easier to secure but not guaranteed.<sup>18</sup> Here the *biens nationaux* played a key role.

While the political motivation behind land redistribution became more explicit as the Revolution radicalized, the sale of church lands from 1790 to 1792 had similar effects on ideology.<sup>19</sup> Owners of national properties not only had a stake in preventing the return of the *Ancien Régime* but also suffered from many priests' antagonistic behavior. Indeed, the refractory priests (i.e., those who did not swear allegiance to the new constitution) became hostile to the buyers of *biens nationaux* as they considered the latter stolen land. As a result, the buyers either followed "constitutional" priests or abandoned practicing religion altogether. In 1795, a former administrator of the Coiron district reported that refractory priests refused the last rites to buyers of national property: "Abbé Maurier demands, before confessing him (Dupré), that he renounce a portion of the Bousquet estate [...]. Dupré refuses and is not confessed." (Bodinier, 2005).

Similarly, during the Empire (1804-1814), attempts to provide resources to the Church led to conflicts with the owners of national properties. Some priests pressured their parishioners to

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<sup>18</sup>Ideology during the Revolution was fluid and often responded to circumstances (Tackett, 2015).

<sup>19</sup>We focus on "first-origin" national properties (expropriated Church assets) as opposed to "second-origin" national properties (those of emigrant nobles) for several reasons. First, all Church properties were confiscated without exceptions, unlike aristocratic properties. Both the decision by some nobles to emigrate and the decision to confiscate their assets were endogenous and depended particularly on the local administration's zeal. Emigrants and "second-origin" national properties seem particularly prominent in regions such as Vendée who revolted against the revolutionary government (Gain, 1929). Second, the redistribution of aristocratic landholdings was much more limited than that of Church land. Using data on 149 districts, Bodinier & Teyssier (2000, p.170) estimates they covered 3.2% of the territory —less than half the size of Church properties. Similarly, Gain (1929) estimated the specie value of second-origin national properties at 1.3 billion pounds, which is less than half the value of Church properties. See Appendix E for results consistent with our hypothesis using Bodinier & Teyssier's data on emigrants' properties.

bequeath the national properties they acquired to the Church or face damnation. Others would refuse absolution to the owners of national properties.<sup>20</sup>

Finally, the redistribution of church land also stimulated political support for Republicans by generating new networks that could help political mobilization.<sup>21</sup> By July 1791, at least 921 cities had a “Jacobin” club —i.e., a club supporting the Revolution. By 1794, several thousand were created across France (Kennedy, 1979). Brinton (1929, p.748) finds that in a sample of 13 cities, 21.4% of the members of the Jacobin’s clubs were buyers of *biens nationaux*. These Jacobins represented 48.3% of buyers and acquired 70.1% of the *biens nationaux* in terms of value.<sup>22</sup> While the Jacobin clubs disappeared after 1795, political clubs during the Directorial regime (1795-1799) were also influenced by the buyers of national properties. In the department of Côte-d’Or, Huguenev (1905, p.227) points out that in 1797, constitutional clubs were filled with “citizens who were for the most part public servants,” who, as owners of *biens nationaux*, would gather in groups to preserve their property.<sup>23</sup> Similarly, associations of national property owners were created in several cantons of this department. Those groups proposed the creation of an insurance fund to support those facing lawsuits. They threatened that, as a last resort, they would use their swords to defend their property (Huguenev, 1905).

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<sup>20</sup>For instance, during the Empire, a mayor in the Pas-de-Calais complained about a priest who, before the Concordat, “forced individuals who acquired national properties, as a form of penance, to pay their value into the hands of a custodian responsible for [giving the money] to the clergy and nuns.” (Chavanon & Saint-Yves, 1907, p.249). Similarly, Sageret (1911, p.15) points out with respect to the department of Morbihan that “In 1800, many national assets reverted to their former owners, and the revolutionaries complained bitterly that the Chouans and priests cooperated with their influence and threats. Indeed, the [refractory] ecclesiastics demanded, to absolve their penitents, the restitution of what they considered to be.” In 1804, the minister of police Fouché reported to Napoléon that some Vendean priests “induced farmers of national properties to stop paying rent to their owners.” (Hauterive, 1908, p.103). The central government under Napoléon tried, with the help of Bishops, to avoid priests questioning the legitimacy of national properties. (See: Hauterive 1908, p.123 and Hauterive 1963, p.105). In April 1805, Fouché reports that a vicar in the Côtes-du-Nord, “a list in his hands” refused the sacrament to owners of national properties, telling them: “You are an acquirer of national domains; I cannot admit you to celebrate your jubilee; it is forbidden to me.” (Hauterive, 1908, p.388). In May 1807, a priest in the department of Lys refused the last sacrament to a dying man because he bought some *biens nationaux* (Hauterive, 1922, p.240).

<sup>21</sup>On the theory behind how politicians design networks to garner support, see: Murphy & Shleifer (2004).

<sup>22</sup>For another sample: “517 members of clubs in Beauvais, Chablis, Dijon, Le Havre, Vermenton, and Villeneuve-sur-Yonne out of a total membership of 2160 made purchases of national property.” (Brinton, 1929, p.747).

<sup>23</sup>The most influential politicians in Paris’ city government often owned national assets (Andrews, 1974).

## 2.2 The *biens nationaux* from the Restoration to the Third Republic

After the tumultuous events that led to Napoléon's demise and the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy in 1815, the conflict between former and new owners shaped much of political life: "One sensed there would be a fight, and each thought of having a small treasure," observed Stendhal (1838, p.285). Rumors circulated through the countryside about returning the *biens nationaux* to their "rightful owners" and the re-establishment of tithes (Higgs, 2019; Gain, 1929). After all, Louis XVIII had argued only a few years earlier, as did his late brother Louis XVI before him, that he would never accept "his" clergy and nobility to suffer from what he considered revolutionary spoliations. The King's January 1, 1814 declaration further worried the owners of national properties, as it expressed his wish to "encourage any voluntary transactions between former and new owners." "Encouragements" could very well mean turning a blind eye when the former owners tried to pressure the legal owners of the *biens nationaux*. Yet the new regime could not ignore the "formidable coalition of interests" formed by the owners of national properties (Gain, 1929, p.92). Article 9 of the Charter of 1814 granted by Louis XVIII stipulates that "All properties are inviolable, without any exception, including those called national properties."

Although the King promised to protect the property rights of the new owners, he did so only reluctantly. "The King condemned himself, lamenting this measure, but he was determined to uphold it," argued Count Ferrand (Gain, 1929, p.94). Immediately following the Restoration, the market value of national properties fell by a third (Agulhon, 1992, p.26).<sup>24</sup> In addition, high officials of the Bourbon dynasty knew that owners of national properties were less likely to support the restoration of the monarchy. Ultraroyalists called for the dismissal of mayors and local officials on ideological grounds. In the region around Toulouse, Higgs (2019, p.105) found in the family archives of the Ultra politician Joseph de Villèle a "List of persons who ought to be brought to the attention of mayor, of recognized ability, being of good life and morals, devoted to

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<sup>24</sup>De Trumilly (1816, p.6) suggests in 1816 that "The assets of the clergy have a lower value compared to patrimonial assets, which can be evaluated, depending on the circumstances and localities, at 25, 20, 15, at least 12 per 100." Sarran (1821) and Nissan (1824) also mention that the *biens nationaux* sold at a lower price and were not accepted as collateral by lenders.

the family of the Bourbons by their conduct.” Members of this list were supposed to replace men described as “great fédéré brigands,” “owners of biens nationaux,” and those “faking royalism.” Similarly, when a royal ordinance on March 25, 1816 excluded sixteen members of the Royal Court of Toulouse, one of them, Rabaly, “was particularly excoriated for his substantial holdings of *biens nationaux*” (Higgs, 2019, p.128).<sup>25</sup>

Hilaire (1977) points out the political and social consequences of the *biens nationaux* after 1815 and argues that in the region around Arras, those most favorable to the revolutionary and anti-clerical tradition during the Third Republic (1870-1940) were the descendants of those who bought national properties during the Revolution. Given the prevalence of political repression under the restored Bourbon monarchy, liberals created secret societies where the Jacobin tradition continued (Bouton, 1966). By 1820, liberal politicians such as Lafayette and Benjamin Constant no longer believed they could access power through entirely legal means and traveled to Sarthe and Maine-et-Loire to incite the creation of “secret societies.” Those societies were composed, among others, of “many small owners worried about threats against national property buyers.” (Bouton, 1966, p.53). Those clubs would later, under the Third Republic, play an important role in Republican politics.

The religious intransigence of the regime after 1815 helped politicize Catholicism, and “Religion itself now appeared as an enemy, as it was being used as a political tool and associated with the passions and vengeance of the Royalists.” (Bouton, 1966, p.19). In that context, the ideological awareness of the owners of *biens nationaux* intensified, driving a wedge between them and the Bourbon monarchy. Liberal politicians used this key interest group to expand their political influence. Benjamin Constant summarizes the program of the liberal opposition when he exclaims, in 1815:

They threaten to attack us because we intend to protect the peasant from the tithe, the Protestant from intolerance, *the purchaser of national property from spoliation*, thought from censorship, the citizen from the lettres de cachet, the army from insult and misery, the plebeian from the outrages of the privileged [...]. [emphasis added].

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<sup>25</sup>See also: Higgs (2019, p.149).

(cited in: Constant 1978, p.189).

The political chasm between the owners of *biens nationaux* and the Bourbons further widened when, in 1825, King Charles X promulgated a law giving one billion francs to the *émigrés* whose property had been confiscated during the Revolution.

The July 1830 Revolution overthrew the Bourbon monarchy, and Louis-Philippe of Orléans became the “citizen King.” Louis-Philippe’s father had himself rallied to the First Republic after the 1789 Revolution, and the “July monarchy” was admittedly more liberal, both religiously and politically, than its predecessor. As a result, many bourgeoisie members felt perfectly comfortable supporting the new regime. As Tudesq (1956, p.393) argues, “In Haute-Garonne, the legitimists [those favoring the Bourbon dynasty] were very few in number [...] perhaps due to the presence of a wealthy land-owning bourgeoisie (land often acquired through the sale of national properties), who had rallied to the July Monarchy.”

Although religious questions remained pervasive throughout the 19<sup>th</sup> century, they were never as acute as after 1870. As religion became the most tendentious political issue, the divisions formed during the 1789 Revolution and the Restoration reappeared. In that context, the legacy of the *biens nationaux* was felt in ways that had not been experienced nearly as strongly before, especially during the Second Republic (1848-1852). As Fasel (1974, p.662) puts it, during 1848, “[M]onarchism rarely surfaced overtly. A restoration of either royal house seemed momentarily remote; notables and Orléanist *fonctionnaires* were quick to profess their allegiance to the republic, and dyed-in-the-wool monarchists ran as republicans in the April election.” In 1848, neither anti-clericalism nor the re-establishment of a monarchy were central to political debates—which, instead, focused on the increased prominence of the nascent socialist movement.<sup>26</sup>

In contrast, the birth of the Third Republic occurred in a context where the Catholic Church re-embraced traditionalism. In 1864, Pope Pius IX published his “Syllabus of Errors” denouncing

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<sup>26</sup>Some Republicans during the Second Republic blamed conservatism’s rise on the inability to do as the 1789 revolutionaries did with the *biens nationaux*. See, for instance, the article in: *Le Semeur*, t.19, n°24, June 12, 1850, p.188. Using data on the 1848 and 1849 legislative elections, we provide evidence in Appendix F that more *biens nationaux* sold during the French Revolution translated to a higher vote share for radical Republicans, who called themselves “*Montagnards*” in direct reference to the radical Jacobins during the French Revolution.

rationalism and liberalism. It argued against secular education and popular sovereignty as religious law should take precedence over civil law. As the Church rejected ideas that were cornerstones of republican ideology, French Republicans after 1870 were characterized by their strong opposition to religion. “Clericalism, that is the enemy,” quickly became the rallying cry of Republicans.<sup>27</sup>

In this morphed political landscape, the shadow of the French Revolution was cast wide over political debates of the Third Republic. In 1872, a legitimist propaganda leaflet printed in 10,000 copies still felt the need to deny the Republican slanders, according to which voting for Henry V meant voting “for the tithe, feudal rights, the restoration of national properties and confession tickets, the reign of the nobles and the priests.” (Anonymous, 1872, p.3).<sup>28</sup> In 1877, after losing the election to Republicans, the Duc de Broglie griped in front of the parliament: “Is there a commune in France where the conservative candidate has not been accused, in no uncertain terms, of wanting to reinstate the tithe, forced labor, feudal rights [...] and national properties!”<sup>29</sup> Still in 1888, as the exiled Count of Paris, claimant to the French throne, supported General Boulanger, some Republicans called for confiscating his assets and making them *biens nationaux*. In front of the parliament, Félix Pyat declared about all claimants to the throne “that the Third Republic should do like the first, that it should declare their property, national property.”<sup>30</sup> On the other hand, the clergy remained hostile to the Republic. As late as 1898, the dean of Laventie argues in reference to the *biens nationaux* that “Theft condemns many people [...] Often, a single injustice is enough to lead several generations to hell.” (Hilaire, 1977, p.144).

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<sup>27</sup>This sentence was pronounced by one of the most prominent Republican politicians, Léon Gambetta, in 1877. The Republicans tried most forcefully to eradicate the political and social influence of the Church. The 1881-1882 Jules Ferry laws made primary education mandatory and public schools free and secular, replacing religious education with moral and civic instruction. In 1880, Jesuits were expelled by Charles de Freycinet’s Republican government. Between 1901 and 1904, religious orders were prohibited from teaching in private schools, their assets were liquidated, and finally, a law on the Separation of Church and State was passed in 1905.

<sup>28</sup>Henry V, the Count of Chambord, was the legitimist claimant to the throne until 1883.

<sup>29</sup>*Journal officiel de la République Française*, n°314, November 16, 1877, p.7450.

<sup>30</sup>*Le Petit Parisien*, July 20, 1888.




## 3 Data

### 3.1 Data on the *biens nationaux*

The main challenge to assessing the political and ideological impact of the sale of the Church’s assets following the French Revolution is to find sufficiently good data on how much of those assets were redistributed. Bodinier & Teyssier (2000) synthesized the data collected in various publications on the *biens nationaux* over more than a century.<sup>31</sup> Overall Bodinier & Teyssier’s data measures the prevalence of the *biens nationaux* using the percentage of land surface area they covered. They compiled data related to the *biens nationaux* of first origin for only 216 districts —“first-origin” refers to the expropriated Church properties while “second-origin” refers to the confiscated assets of the emigrant nobles. Since there were 560 districts in 1793 (Nordman & Ozouf-Marignier, 1989), it means that Bodinier & Teyssier’s (2000) data covers only 38.6% of all French districts.<sup>32</sup>

Figure 2: Geographic distribution of the nationalized church assets.



*Notes:* The left panel represents the value per capita, in pounds, of the *biens nationaux*. The right panel represents the percentage of each district covered by the *biens nationaux*. Gray districts are missing observations.

<sup>31</sup>We wish to thank Bernard Bodinier for sending his most updated data.

<sup>32</sup>Districts were the second largest administrative unit after “Departments.” They were renamed “arrondissements” in 1800.

Thankfully, we could find data on the value (in pounds) of expropriated Church properties for 477 districts. Indeed, on April 18, 1792, a report was presented by Cambon in front of the Legislative Assembly, which summarized the estimated value of the confiscated Church assets per district.<sup>33</sup> The report, divided into chapters, looks at the value of the *biens nationaux* sold before November 1, 1791 (Chapter I),<sup>34</sup> the estimated value of the *biens nationaux* whose sales had been ordered (Chapter III),<sup>35</sup> and the estimated value of the *biens nationaux* whose sale had been delayed (Chapter VII). This is the category for which the most observations are missing, as 65 districts had not yet estimated the value of those assets.<sup>36</sup> We calculate the estimated value of the *biens nationaux* of first origin by summing up the values of the first, second, and third categories, which were equal to 1,450, 455, and 280 million pounds, respectively. In other words, about 66% of the estimated amount comes from the auction value of those *biens nationaux*.

Figure 2 maps our data as well as Bodinier & Teyssier’s (2000). To ensure that the two sources essentially corroborate each other, Figure 3 plots the value of confiscated Church properties per capita (using 1793 population data) and the percentage of land area covered by those same properties. The correlation coefficient between the two variables equals 0.752, suggesting that both variables are highly correlated.<sup>37</sup> To preserve the reader’s sanity, we relegate the fascinating details about data collection to Appendix A.

Finally, we use the number of abbeys per capita in the year 1200, which predates the commercial revolution and the Reformation,<sup>38</sup> as an instrument to proxy for the *biens nationaux*.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> *Archives Parlementaires*, v.42 p.70-114.

<sup>34</sup>The data in this first chapter also included the value of the productions of those *biens nationaux* appropriated by the Treasury. One limitation of this data is that we cannot know the sales timing. Before November 1791, the *assignats* depreciated relatively mildly but were nonetheless trading below par with species (122 pounds for 100 in species) (Crouzet, 1993). In Appendix D.1, we show that our results in Tables 1 and 4 are robust to adjusting this category for an effective depreciation of the *assignats* between 0 and 25%.

<sup>35</sup>The fourth chapter of this report estimates that the districts omitted 90 million pounds from the third chapter. Most of what was omitted were properties from the royal domain that were also nationalized, not Church properties.


<sup>36</sup>In Appendix D.2, we reproduce our results excluding this last category as the estimations seem more imprecise. Note that that last category accounts for only 12.8% of the total value of the *biens nationaux* estimated by this report.

<sup>37</sup>If we remove the outlier on the right of Figure 3 (Cambrai), then the correlation coefficient increases to 0.795.

<sup>38</sup>Roover (1942) and Spufford (2002) both refer to the commercial revolution of the 13<sup>th</sup> century. Duby (1973, p.300) claims that “Around 1180, in all of Europe, the era of businessmen starts.” The Renaissance is commonly described as the period between 1400 and 1700.

<sup>39</sup>Finley et al. (2021) use the distance of each district’s centroid from Bishoprics as an instrument. We do not use the distance to bishoprics as an instrument as it is highly correlated to urbanization.

Figure 3: Correlation between Cambon's data and Bodinier's data.



Bodinier & Teyssier (2000, p.338) argue that monasteries owned three-fifths of ecclesiastical land area in 1789.

Despite the lack of a reference catalog for monasteries in medieval France, we compiled a reliable list of 1,469 male and female monasteries based on the works of Beaunier (1726) and Cottineau (1935-1970). Beaunier edited the most reliable catalog of the monasteries active under the *Ancien Régime* (Deflou-Leca, 2008). This work was later continued and expanded. Unfortunately, not all French dioceses are covered, as 6 are still missing. To fill these gaps, we also consulted the work of Cottineau, who compiled a Europe-wide list of monasteries since the Middle Ages. Although shorter due to its geographical scope, Cottineau's list is currently the most comprehensive available. Both collections are based on the same framework, indicating the monastery's common name, its Latin designation, its evolution over the centuries, its location, and a mention of the context and the players involved in its foundation. The reader can find further discussions over the choice of those variables in section [4.3](#).

## 3.2 Data on electoral outcomes

To measure the prevalence of anti-republicanism in France in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, we use the data made available by Piketty & Cagé (2023) for the 1848, 1849, 1876, 1881, 1885, 1889, 1893, and 1898 elections. The first two elections occurred during the Second Republic (1848-1852), while the last five were during the Third Republic (1870-1940).<sup>40</sup>

One issue is that the electoral districts in the later part of the 19<sup>th</sup> century do not correspond to the 1793 administrative districts. Since the Piketty & Cagé's (2023) data are aggregated at the city level, we were able to re-aggregate the data at the 1793 district level. Figure 4 shows how the data was reconstructed using the region of Brittany as an example. Each black dot refers to a city. The red lines refer to the 1876 electoral district borders. The blue lines refer to the 1793 districts' borders. As the map shows, electoral constituencies sometimes have very similar borders to the 1793 districts, although some significant differences exist. The electoral district shapefiles were built by Gay (2020). We recreated the (approximate) borders of the 1793 districts using the *Projet Cassini* made available by EHESS.<sup>41</sup> This data gives information about the population of the almost 36,000 towns in France between 1793 and 2006, as well as their geolocalization. Each town is also matched to the administrative subdivisions it is part of. As a result, we could match each town to their 1793 district and calculate the anti-republican vote share at that level (Appendix A).


Calculating the anti-republican vote share also requires prior knowledge of political changes during the 19<sup>th</sup> century. As we have alluded to earlier, the political identity of particular groups changed over time. Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte argued he would be respectful of republican institutions in 1848 before becoming Emperor Napoléon III in 1852. By 1850, his party started

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<sup>40</sup>The data on the 1877 election was not collected by Piketty & Cagé (2023). The data on the 1871 election is very incomplete because the archives were partly damaged. In addition, the 1871 election occurred in the context of German occupation following the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. The Germans, who requested an election to be organized, were occupying 43 departments in which freedom of association was infringed. After Pope Léon XIII called for Catholics to rally the Republic in 1892, monarchism declined precipitously, and 1898 was the last time monarchist candidates earned more than 10% of the votes.

<sup>41</sup>Source: EHESS. "Des villages de Cassini aux communes d'aujourd'hui. Index par départements." [http://cassini.ehess.fr/cassini/fr/html/6\\_index.htm](http://cassini.ehess.fr/cassini/fr/html/6_index.htm) (last accessed December 12, 2023). We thank Cédric Chambru for sending us his web scrape of this data.

Figure 4: Example of re-aggregation of the data at the 1793 district level.



pursuing a pro-clerical policy. The Falloux Law of 1850 increased the influence of the Church on education, a policy that Alfred de Falloux (1888, p.209) himself summarized as “God in education. The Pope at the head of the Church. The Church at the head of civilization.” Since “during the first part of his reign, Napoleon III clearly sought to consolidate his power by promoting a true Christian monarchy” (Boudon, 2007, p.79), Bonapartism became pro-clerical, something it had not been during the Restoration.<sup>42</sup> Similarly, King Louis Philippe’s Orleanist regime did not have a good relationship with the Catholic Church in the 1840s. However, by the 1870s, Orleanists fully supported the “moral order” government of President Mac-Mahon. We, therefore, categorize candidates as anti-republicans if they are Legitimists (favoring the return of the Bourbon monarchy), Orleanists (favoring the House of Orléans), Bonapartists (favoring a return to the Empire), or “Boulangists” during the 1889 and 1893 elections.<sup>43</sup>

### 3.3 Data on religiosity and Protestantism

Measuring religiosity in contemporary France is a difficult task in the absence of detailed official statistics (Poulat, 1956). This shortcoming led to a collective survey initiated by Le Bras (1931)

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<sup>42</sup>Nor were Napoléon I and the First Empire (1804-1814) particularly pro-clerical. Indeed, Napoléon I is often considered as “finishing the Revolution.” Maurel (1975) contests that view.

<sup>43</sup>General Boulanger was a conservative political figure supported by the monarchists.

and directed by Boulard during the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century with the aim of measuring French religious practice. We use the original data published by Isambert et al. (1980); Boulard (1982); Boulard & Hilaire (1987); Boulard & Cholvy (1992) and Boulard & Delpal (2011). With the help of these sources, we get information about the share of *Pascalisants* in both the late 19<sup>th</sup> century and 1947. *Pascalisants* refers to Catholic devotees who attend Easter celebrations requiring prior confession. Using this measure of religiosity, we have data about 1,040 cantons (212 districts) in the late 19<sup>th</sup>. The data relating to 1947 is much more comprehensive. First, it distinguishes between men and women. Second, we have data for 1,928 cantons (362 districts) for men and 1,893 cantons (356 districts) for women.

We also collected data on Protestantism in France from the 16<sup>th</sup> century to 1900. Due to persecutions, estimating the French Protestant population is extremely tricky (Benedict, 1991; Chareyre, 2002). Nor is there a detailed account of Reformed worship in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, even though Protestant religious observance was officially legalized under the Concordat of 1802 (Dargent & Dutreuilh, 2009). To provide accurate, consistent data on the geographical distribution of Protestant churches over time, we use the data of Mours (1957a,b,c, 1958) and Robert (1961). Taking the work of these two authors together, we compiled percentage of towns (*communes*) with an active temple in the 16<sup>th</sup> century, during the 17<sup>th</sup> century under the Edict of Nantes (1604-1685) and in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. For each Protestant community in France, their work provides a date of foundation and a location of the temple where a regular pastor officiates. This work enabled us to map out the network of temples, which is a reliable indicator of the diffusion and extension of Protestantism in France.

### **3.4 Local characteristics**

In addition to the data described above, we collected district and canton-level data on four types of controls: geography, the economy, education, and ideology. Details are given in Appendix [A](#) and below when introducing our main results.

## 4 Evidence

### 4.1 Baseline results

Our data enables us to estimate the following equation for our baseline results:

$$M_{i,t} = \beta \times \log(\textit{biens nationaux}_i) + \mathbf{X}_{i,t} + \delta_t + \zeta_i + \epsilon_{i,t} \quad (1)$$

where  $M_{i,t}$  is the anti-republican vote share in district  $i$  for election at time  $t$ . Our main independent variable is the natural logarithm of the value of the national properties sold during the French Revolution.  $\mathbf{X}_i$  is a vector of control variables.  $\delta_t$  and  $\zeta_i$  are year and region fixed-effects.

Table 1 reports the results of 7 specifications for three different measures of the redistribution of church property during the Revolution. The coefficients of interest have the correct sign and are statistically significant at the 1% level in all but one case —for which the p-value is equal to 0.016. Standard errors for the rest of the paper are doubly clustered at the department year level unless specified.

For each regression, Table 1 also reports the mean of the dependent variable to account for changes in the size of the sample due to missing observations and the standardized beta coefficient. The effect of the sale of national assets on the political support of monarchists is large throughout. Using either the value of the *biens nationaux* per capita or its log yields similar results, with a one standard deviation increase in either of those two variables decreasing the vote share of monarchists between 8.7 and 17.5%. Using Bodinier & Teyssier’s (2000) data on the percentage of land surface area covered by the *biens nationaux* cuts the number of observations by more than half and yields somewhat smaller effects.

Each of the columns introduces different controls to account for other factors that likely play a role in explaining voting behavior and may be correlated to the redistribution of Church land. Columns 2-3 include three geographic controls: urbanization, wheat suitability, and average terrain ruggedness. The urbanization rate is probably one of the most recognized determinants

Table 1: The effect of land redistribution on anti-republican vote share (1876 to 1898)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>Log value of Biens nationaux per capita:</i>							
log(biens nationaux)	-3.27870*** (0.75110)	-5.96592*** (0.72179)	-5.77836*** (0.80872)	-4.86357*** (0.75503)	-4.89097*** (0.82283)	-4.90438*** (0.78712)	-4.44827*** (0.88942)
Observations	2783	2783	2783	2783	2783	2507	2507
R-squared	0.28	0.35	0.40	0.36	0.41	0.36	0.41
<i>Magnitude:</i>							
Standardized beta coefficients	-2.98	-5.43	-5.26	-4.43	-4.45	-4.48	-4.06
Mean of dependent variable	31	31	31	31	31	31.6	31.6
<i>Value of Biens nationaux per capita:</i>							
Biens nationaux	-0.040994*** (0.0087082)	-0.066288*** (0.0087908)	-0.070632*** (0.0092418)	-0.050086*** (0.0089189)	-0.060216*** (0.0088854)	-0.049798*** (0.0091912)	-0.054073*** (0.0092993)
Observations	2783	2783	2783	2783	2783	2507	2507
R-squared	0.28	0.34	0.39	0.35	0.41	0.35	0.41
<i>Magnitude:</i>							
Standardized beta coefficients	-2.71	-4.38	-4.67	-3.31	-3.98	-3.35	-3.64
Mean of dependent variable	31	31	31	31	31	31.6	31.6
<i>Percentage of land surface covered by the Biens Nationaux:</i>							
Biens Nationaux (% of land)	-0.32844** (0.13577)	-0.69484*** (0.14858)	-0.87050*** (0.16594)	-0.45477*** (0.13639)	-0.71465*** (0.15187)	-0.39023*** (0.13561)	-0.57053*** (0.15806)
Observations	1265	1265	1265	1265	1265	1157	1157
R-squared	0.27	0.34	0.40	0.37	0.42	0.37	0.41
<i>Magnitude:</i>							
Standardized beta coefficients	-1.82	-3.86	-4.83	-2.53	-3.97	-2.21	-3.22
Mean of dependent variable	30.97	30.97	30.97	30.97	30.97	31.16	31.16
Wheat suitability		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ruggedness		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Urbanisation rate		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sharecropping				✓	✓	✓	✓
Fallow land (%)				✓	✓	✓	✓
Industrial wage				✓	✓	✓	✓
Industrial workers				✓	✓	✓	✓
School per student						✓	✓
Bad schools (%)						✓	✓
Region F.E.			✓		✓		✓
Year F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1							

of anti-republicanism in 19<sup>th</sup>-century France. Cities were republican, while the rural population, scattered in small villages, usually voted for monarchist candidates. We define the urbanization rate as the percentage of the population living in a town of more than 2,000 inhabitants.<sup>44</sup> Ruggedness and wheat suitability may also impact electoral outcomes as they influence both institutions and the structure of the local economy. For instance, Rouanet & Piano (2023) found that the government conscripted fewer soldiers from more rugged regions during the Napoleonic Wars. As for Montalbo (2023), he argues that ruggedness impacted the size of agricultural

<sup>44</sup>Changing the definition of the urbanization rate using different population thresholds leaves the results unchanged. See: Appendix J.



landholdings and that larger landholdings were positively related to anti-republicanism during the Third Republic.

Columns 4-5 include the following economic controls: the prevalence of sharecropping, the percentage of agricultural land devoted to fallow, the industrial wage, and the percentage of the population working in industry. The prevalence of sharecropping and fallow land is usually seen as indicators of agricultural backwardness. Sharecropping especially was considered a feudal legacy (Finley et al., 2021). Finally, the rise of the industrial sector also had profound social impacts. Industrial workers were, by the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, largely de-Christianized and usually voted Republican.<sup>45</sup>

Human capital is also a significant determinant of voting behavior (Putnam, 1995). Human capital influences the opportunity cost of engaging in political activities.<sup>46</sup> Lipset et al. (1960) hypothesized that a better-educated population is more likely to support democratic governance based on trade and voting. At the international level, higher human capital is associated with institutional improvements (Glaeser et al., 2004). Columns 6-7 include educational variables, particularly the number of schools per student and the percentage of schools of poor quality.

Nevertheless, the redistribution of Church properties could be correlated to factors unaccounted for. As a first attempt to tackle this problem, we include fixed effects for the 13 modern regions in France (columns 3, 5, and 7). We thus show that the relationship between anti-republicanism and the *biens nationaux* holds within regions and is robust to accounting for region-specific factors.

**Spatial standard errors.** We run multiple tests attesting the robustness of our results. First, Kelly (2019) argues that not accounting for spatial correlation can lead to serious overestimate of standard errors. We report both Moran’s I and Conley (1999) standard errors for 11 thresholds going from 50km to 1,000km in Appendix B. The p-values for Moran’s I statistic on the

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<sup>45</sup>Siegfried (1913, p.443-444) argues industrial workers during this period can be divided between those too poor to form political opinions and better-off workers who engaged in collective action. The former were susceptible to the influence of their (usually moderate Republican) bosses, while the latter were more radical.

<sup>46</sup>The effect of additional education on political participation is likely stronger for individuals with low levels of human capital since human capital-rich individuals have to forgo more market income when engaging in political activities (Campante & Chor, 2012).

residuals suggest the presence of spatial dependence. Nonetheless, in all but one regression the coefficients using Conley standard errors at all different thresholds are statistically significant at the 10% and all but two pass the 5% significance test for all distance thresholds.

**Sensitivity analysis.** Second, we assess the sensitivity of our estimates to the presence of omitted variables by performing sensitivity analyses in Appendix C. Masten & Poirier (2023) recommend using a variety of methods for sensitivity analysis. We report the sensitivity tests suggested by Imbens (2003) and Harada (2013). The result of this test suggests that relative to our covariates, unobservables would have to be substantially more correlated to both our dependent and independent variables to reduce the statistical significance of our results below the 5% threshold. We also report Oster’s  $\delta$ , which measures how large the selection on unobservables relative to that on observables would have to be to have an effect of  $\beta = 0$  (Oster, 2019). However, as shown by Masten & Poirier (2023), Oster’s  $\delta$  and the sign change breakdown point can differ substantially. Thus we report the estimate of the sign change breakdown point. These methods suggest that the selection on unobservables would have to be substantially greater than the selection on observables to undo our results.

**Second-origin biens nationaux.** Third, despite data limitations, the effect of church properties remains when controlling for the sale of the emigrants’ properties during the Revolution (Appendix E). For regions that were not in open rebellion against the Revolution, more emigrant properties confiscated and sold were also correlated with a lower anti-republican vote share.

**Other robustness checks.** Finally, Appendix G reports the same regressions as in the first panel of Table 1 but taking each election as a separate sample. The results suggest that the effect of the *biens nationaux* on the anti-republican vote share was persistent throughout the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Appendix H shows that our results for the 1889 and 1893 elections are robust to excluding “boulangist” candidates from our measure of anti-republicanism. Appendix D adjusts our favored measure of the value of church land from the *Archives Parlementaires* for the depreciation of the revolutionary paper money (the *assignats*) and reruns the results excluding the *biens nationaux* whose sale had been delayed in 1792. To further ensure our results are

not driven by urbanization, Appendix J reproduces our regressions using alternative measures of urbanization while Appendix I excludes districts with an urbanization rate above one-third, thus cutting the number of observations by almost half. Our results are remarkably robust across all these appendices.

## 4.2 Controlling for ideology during the French Revolution

One worry with our results in Table 1 is that ideology after 1870 may be correlated with both ideology immediately before the 1789 French Revolution and the redistribution of ecclesiastical land. If regions with more church-land in 1789 were also more (less) influenced by the Enlightenment and liberal principles, then our results may reflect that correlation and not the effect of land redistribution on political support for the Republic. While district-level data on political ideology before the Revolution does not exist, we can use two events to proxy adherence to the Revolution: the prevalence of the Jacobin clubs and the oath of the clergy to the Constitution.

In July 1790, the legislative assembly decreed the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, extending the French government’s power over the Church. Among other things, it ordered clergymen to swear an oath of allegiance to the State. The taking of the oath started in January 1791. Tackett (1986) collected district-level data on the percentage of the French clergy who agreed to swear an oath to the Constitution from January to November 1791. As he points out, “the issue of the oath soon became a veritable obsession, unleashing emotional reactions and factional strife in parishes everywhere.” (Tackett, 1986, p.4). By 1791, the oath became “the central public event” (Tackett, 1986, p.5) and “became a sort of indirect referendum for or against the religious politics of revolutionaries” (Langlois et al., 1996, p.32) as clergymen often could not resist popular pressure.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>47</sup>The data on the oath could also shed light “on the inception of the ‘Two Frances’ —the clerical France and the anticlerical France— of modern times.” (Tackett, 1986, p.xvi). Blanc (2021) and Squicciarini (2020) both use the oath to measure religiosity. Although Tackett himself certainly did not argue that the oath *only* measured religiosity, he was much more measured than Bois (1960) who argued that “The oath [...] could be construed as a plebiscite, a popular referendum on the *non-religious* innovations of the Revolution as a whole.” [emphasis added] (Tackett, 1986, p.184). Tackett (1986, p.190-202) points out other (potentially) important secular determinants of the oath, such as resistance to centralization as well as tax reforms and the structure of landholdings. Overall, “That

Table 2: Controlling for adherence to the Revolution in the 1790s does not change our results.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
log(biens nationaux)	-4.37395*** (0.84967)	-3.38855*** (0.86369)	-3.18641*** (0.91343)	-5.54144*** (0.81007)	-4.65371*** (0.82748)	-4.12654*** (0.89342)	-5.74145*** (0.81022)	-4.86287*** (0.82470)	-4.31643*** (0.89728)
Clergy's Oath	-20.3845*** (2.85201)	-20.8753*** (2.82254)	-20.5106*** (2.90464)						
Jacobin Clubs				-14.1996*** (4.05313)	-13.7565*** (4.03787)	-18.8059*** (4.36316)			
Jacobin Clubs (< 1791)							-11.1808*** (3.72245)	-12.1417*** (4.15693)	-26.1886*** (6.52945)
Geographic controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Economic controls		✓	✓		✓	✓		✓	✓
Education controls			✓			✓			✓
Region F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	2579	2579	2327	2783	2783	2507	2783	2783	2507
R-squared	0.43	0.44	0.44	0.40	0.42	0.42	0.40	0.41	0.42
<i>Magnitude:</i>									
Standardized beta coefficients	-3.84	-2.97	-2.80	-5.04	-4.23	-3.77	-5.22	-4.42	-3.94
Mean of dependent variable	31.02	31.02	31.83	31	31	31.6	31	31	31.6

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Our second proxy for ideology is the percentage of municipalities with a Jacobin club during the Revolution. Those pro-Revolution political clubs played a major role in radicalizing it (Cochin, 1921, 1924; Rouanet, 2023), and reflect the political support for revolutionary principles.

Columns 1 to 6 in Table 2 run the main regressions from Table 1 while adding our two ideological proxies. The coefficients on our two proxies have the expected sign. For instance, a larger percentage of the clergy swearing an oath to the Constitution—which reflects higher adherence to the Revolution—is associated with lower voting shares for the anti-republicans during the Third Republic. Similarly, the greater prevalence of Jacobin clubs in the 1790s is correlated with lower political support for monarchism during the Third Republic. In all the columns, the coefficients on the log of the value of *biens nationaux* per capita remain economically large and statistically significant, which indicates our results are robust to controlling for ideology in the 1790s.

One problem nonetheless remains. The oath took place after the *biens nationaux* were nationalized and after many had already been sold. Similarly, most Jacobin clubs were created after 1792, when Church properties had, in large part, already been sold. As mentioned, buyers

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there was some kind of relationship between the various manifestations of counterrevolution and the geographic incidence of the oath seems scarcely to be denied.” (Tackett, 1986, p.203).

of *biens nationaux* were largely represented in the Jacobin clubs (Brinton, 1929). Similarly, Tackett (1986, p.183) explains that “in most departments the calendar for the auctioning of Church property closely coincided with the oath-taking crisis.” Since our proxies are likely influenced by the sale of the *biens nationaux*, using them as controls for ideology may lead us to underestimate the effect of land redistribution on the anti-republican vote share more than 70 years later. To address this issue, columns 7 to 9 use the percentage of towns where a Jacobin club was created in 1789 or 1790. Indeed, only a few *biens nationaux* were auctioned off before 1791. In the department of Gironde, the first Church properties were sold in November 1790, and only 141 out of 10,525 were sold for the rest of that year (Marion et al., 1911).

### 4.3 Instrumental variable


Our OLS estimates in Section 4.1 and 4.2 could be biased for various reasons. First and foremost, both the supply of *biens nationaux* and voting behavior could be correlated with unobserved characteristics. To the extent that the estimates of the value of national properties were subject to measurement error, our main results could also suffer from downward bias.

The main reason for using an instrument for the *biens nationaux* is that Church wealth was likely correlated to two important political and religious changes from the 16<sup>th</sup> to the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, whose effects are plausibly persistent. The first of those changes is the Protestant Reformation. The Catholic Church was likely poorer in more Protestant regions, first because its market share declined but also because religious wars led to the destruction of some monasteries and other Church assets.<sup>48</sup> Since Protestants were usually politically more liberal (see section 5.2), our OLS results may underestimate the political effect of the *biens nationaux*.

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<sup>48</sup>For instance, Cantoni et al. (2018) show that the Reformation redistributed resources from religious to secular purposes in Germany. The French state also forced monasteries to sell off estates to finance the Wars of Religion (Becquart, 1974; Michaud, 1982). According to Dinet (1999), monasteries lost an average of almost 15% of their assets during the 16<sup>th</sup> century, with considerable differences between regions where Protestantism was strong. In some regions, such as the Midi, losses were much higher. Sauzet (1979, p.355) studying the diocese of Nimes observes that the old regular monasteries were unable to reconstitute their estates despite their efforts and that this led to a loss of influence. For example, the Benedictine abbey of Cendras was closed by 1660 due to the persistent usurpation of its domain by the Protestants. The same applies to the abbeys of Sauve and Saint-Sauveur de la Font. What’s more, according to Michaud (1991, p.11-14), the clergy consented to a general reduction in their property holdings, as the monasteries’ landed wealth remained under attack.

Figure 5: Identification strategy




The second change was the rapid secularization of French society during the 18<sup>th</sup> century, a trend described as “a veritable flood” by Tackett (1986).<sup>49</sup> Irreligion in the 18<sup>th</sup> century likely impacted the Church’s wealth negatively, as well as religiosity in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Since Catholicism and political conservatism were closely related, our main OLS results may suffer from downward bias here as well.

To overcome those issues, we use the number of monasteries in the year 1200 per capita (using the 1793 population) as an instrument. Figure 5 summarizes graphically our identification strategy. The idea behind using this instrument is that monasteries operating before the Reformation and other major changes in the structure of the economy are unlikely to be correlated with political support for republicanism in the 19<sup>th</sup> or with a host of economic and social variables. The decision to establish and maintain a monastery still in operation in 1200 occurred before several major shocks to French society. These events include the commercial revolution, the Black Death, during which 40% of the European population perished (Jedwab et al., 2023), the Hundred Years’ War (1337-1453), and the discovery of the Americas in 1492.

Figure 6 shows that our instrument is much more balanced across many covariates than the (logged) value of *biens nationaux* in 1789. In the left panel, our main independent variable is correlated with important economic variables such as the prevalence of industry, the use of sharecropping and fallow land, the prevalence of poor quality schools, as well as urbanization. Oppositely, in the right panel, the number of monasteries per capita in 1200 is not systematically

<sup>49</sup>Blanc (2021) documents the rise of irreligion in 18<sup>th</sup> century France and its consequences on fertility.

Figure 6: Balance of covariates.



*Note.* Each coefficient in these panels represents a separate univariate regression where the independent variable is either “log(*biens nationaux*) or “Monasteries per capita (year 1200).” The dependent variables are normalized for simplicity of interpretation. The samples only use observations for which we have data on *biens nationaux* so as to make the results between the different figures comparable. Standard errors are clustered at the department level.

correlated with our covariates, with the important exception of the percentage of the clergy swearing an oath to the 1790 Constitution.<sup>50</sup> Yet this correlation may have more to do with the incentives faced by clergymen at the time than with systematic differences in religiosity. Indeed, when the regular orders were abolished in February 1790, monks and other members of the regular clergy had to choose between civilian life, emigration, or attempting to integrate the secular clergy. Those choosing to integrate the secular clergy were more likely to swear the oath.<sup>51</sup> For these reasons, as well as the reasons explained in section 4.2, we do not include our

<sup>50</sup>The number of monasteries per capita in 1200 seems to have a slight negative correlation with urbanization when defined using the 2,000 inhabitants threshold. However, since urbanization increased political support for republicanism, this would bias our results *against* our hypothesis if anything.

<sup>51</sup>Data by Tackett (1986, p.41) suggests that regulars were more likely to swear an oath than the rest of the clergy. A letter to the central administration by the Department of Var points to the many requests by regular clergymen enthusiastic at the idea of swearing an oath in exchange for a job as a priest or vicar (*Archives Nationales*, D/XIX/2122). Tackett (1986, p.38) excluded from his data monks “who flooded into the parish clergy after the spring of 1791 to take up posts vacated by the refractories.” Yet he notes that his data “includes a few former regulars or cathedral clergymen who had just left their convents to fill recently vacated positions of curés or vicaires.” (p.304).

“Oath” variable in our main IV results.<sup>52</sup>

Table 3: Reduced-form and instrumental variable estimates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
PANEL A: <i>Reduced-form:</i>							
Monasteries per capita (year 1200)	-61.7383*** (13.7701)	-82.3876*** (12.7156)	-63.2019*** (12.4980)	-70.0873*** (11.8138)	-59.1868*** (11.8907)	-64.8337*** (12.5342)	-42.9737*** (12.2488)
Observations	3239	3239	3239	3239	3239	2867	2867
R-squared	0.27	0.33	0.38	0.35	0.40	0.36	0.41
PANEL B: <i>Second stage:</i>							
log(biens nationaux)	-6.41086*** (1.34585)	-8.15980*** (1.39951)	-7.52893*** (1.61360)	-7.45822*** (1.47466)	-6.99986*** (1.57272)	-7.36540*** (1.62019)	-5.41525*** (1.76107)
<i>Magnitude:</i>							
Standardized beta coefficients	-5.83	-7.42	-6.85	-6.79	-6.37	-6.73	-4.95
Mean of dependent variable	31	31	31	31	31	31.6	31.6
AR p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.003
PANEL C: <i>First stage:</i>							
Monasteries per capita (year 1200)	10.3490*** (0.61206)	9.24066*** (0.56225)	7.99329*** (0.43044)	8.56519*** (0.46836)	7.92747*** (0.41532)	8.43419*** (0.47875)	7.51177*** (0.43082)
Geographic controls		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Economic controls				✓	✓	✓	✓
Education controls						✓	✓
Region F.E.			✓		✓		✓
Year F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	2783	2783	2783	2783	2783	2507	2507
Partial $R^2$	0.14	0.13	0.12	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.12
F-stat	285.90	270.11	344.85	334.44	364.34	310.36	304.02
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1							

Panel A in Table 3 presents the reduced form and Panel B reports the results of our IV strategy. The magnitude of the effect using our IV is similar, albeit slightly higher than for our baseline OLS regressions in Table 1. The coefficients are remarkably stable across specifications. The F-statistic is always larger than 270 and the Anderson-Rubin statistics always have  $p < 0.01$ , suggesting our instrument is relevant.<sup>53</sup> Appendix L.1 shows that our IV results do not depend on the choice of any particular date between 1100 and 1500 to calculate monasteries per capita.<sup>54</sup>

<sup>52</sup>While reproducing our instrumental variable results when including our “Oath” variable yields smaller estimates, they remain statistically significant in all but one column (Appendix M).

<sup>53</sup>Lee et al. (2022) show that  $\hat{F} > 104.7$  is required for a two-tailed t-test to reject the null at the correct rate. In the rest of the paper, we report the tF confidence intervals as recommended by Lee et al. (2022) whenever the F-statistic is below that threshold.

<sup>54</sup>Appendix L.2, shows our results remain intact when using a distance-weighted measure of proximity to monasteries to account for the possibility that abbeys owned properties in nearby districts. Using our different measures of *biens nationaux* as for Table 1 (Appendix K) or using the number of monasteries per district in 1200 instead of the per capita measure (Appendix L.3) gives similar estimates. Finally, our instrumental variable results are robust to excluding districts with an urbanization rate above one-third (Appendix I).



## 5 Mechanisms and implications

### 5.1 Religiosity

The reader may be interested to know that the evidence presented in this paper suggests that the French are not the simple product of ideologies, whether it be Rousseauism or absolute monarchism. They are, after all, human beings, and have been so for a long time. In their country as well, interest group politics plays a role and has far-reaching consequences.<sup>55</sup> The transfer of *biens nationaux* birthed a new class of landowners, whose economic interests were linked to republicanism. Certainly, voting behavior was not the only thing that changed with the redistribution of church land following the Revolution. Religion was also impacted by the *biens nationaux*.

On the demand side of the market for religion, as explained in Section 2, priests were often hostile to the 600 to 700 thousand who bought national properties (Bodinier & Teyssier, 2003), thus increasing the opportunity cost of Catholic worship. Those owners may also have become less religious as their investment conflicted with their faith. On the supply side, the Church's societal role was particularly weakened in regions where it was the wealthiest since that wealth was expropriated. As the Catholic Church was closely tied to political conservatism, lower religiosity meant higher political support for Republican and democratic ideas.

Catholicism would likely have been more robust without the heavy-handed state intervention weeding out progressive priests after 1800. Many priests had truthfully sworn allegiance to the Constitution during the Revolution. Some had even married. In other words, the supply on the religious market could have potentially adapted to accommodate the changes in religious demand. Yet, the supply of progressive religious services was thwarted first by the Empire and then during the Restoration, when “constitutional” priests were systematically marginalized. In 1808, sixteen thousand priests —more than a quarter of the survivors from 1790— had no priestly duties (Julia, 1988). In regions where a large portion of priests had taken the oath, many

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<sup>55</sup>As a means of contrast, Hayek (1980) focuses his emphasis on the “false” individualism of the French Revolutionaries as opposed to the “true” individualism of the British.

Table 4: The effect of land redistribution on religiosity in the late 19th century.

	District Level:			Canton Level:		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Log value of Biens nationaux per capita:</i>						
log(biens nationaux)	-13.1420*** (2.53184)	-8.25502*** (2.71252)	-8.33333*** (2.71223)	-15.9771*** (2.06165)	-9.99561*** (2.21299)	-9.72434*** (2.19833)
Clergy's Oath	-61.5848*** (8.30172)	-56.3026*** (10.1574)	-55.9986*** (11.4049)	-47.7810*** (6.82395)	-34.7888*** (6.02079)	-35.6453*** (5.87251)
Observations	168	168	168	883	883	883
R-squared	0.63	0.73	0.73	0.47	0.64	0.66
<i>Magnitude:</i>						
Standardized beta coefficients	-11.44	-7.18	-7.25	-13.78	-8.62	-8.39
Mean of dependent variable	52.72	52.72	52.72	54.72	54.72	54.72
<i>Value of Biens nationaux per capita:</i>						
Biens nationaux	-0.20423*** (0.029216)	-0.13230*** (0.028548)	-0.13406*** (0.029025)	-0.25932*** (0.033729)	-0.15860*** (0.024955)	-0.15185*** (0.026396)
Clergy's Oath	-65.2625*** (7.47755)	-58.5571*** (9.22109)	-58.1484*** (10.5490)	-52.0796*** (5.84744)	-36.9031*** (5.89759)	-37.6989*** (5.77497)
Observations	168	168	168	883	883	883
R-squared	0.63	0.74	0.74	0.49	0.65	0.67
<i>Magnitude:</i>						
Standardized beta coefficients	-11.26	-7.30	-7.39	-14.50	-8.87	-8.49
Mean of dependent variable	52.72	52.72	52.72	54.72	54.72	54.72
Wheat suitability		✓	✓		✓	✓
Ruggedness		✓	✓		✓	✓
Urbanisation rate		✓	✓			
Log(town size)					✓	✓
Sharecropping		✓	✓			
Fallow land (%)		✓	✓			
Industrial wage		✓	✓			
Industrial workers		✓	✓			
Region F.E.		✓	✓		✓	✓
Data type F.E.			✓			✓
Data decade F.E.			✓			✓

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

*Note:* Standard errors are clustered at the department level when using the district level data and at the district level when using the canton level data.

positions for vicars or parish priests remained vacant.

We test the hypothesis that greater sales of *biens nationaux* reduced religiosity in Table 4. To measure religiosity, we collected data at the canton level on “*pascalisants*” in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. *Pascalisants* refers to those who practiced their Easter religious duties —i.e., by going to communion and confessing when necessary. Each Bishopric sent representatives to

parishes measuring obedience to the Church law that practitioners make their Easter duty.<sup>56</sup> We re-aggregated the data to run regressions at the district (columns 1 to 3) and canton levels (columns 4 to 6).<sup>57</sup>

Our results suggest that the sale of *biens nationaux* reduced religious observance during the late 19<sup>th</sup> century regardless of whether we use canton or district-level data, and regardless of whether our main independent variable is logged or un-logged. In all regressions, we use the portion of the clergy who swore an oath to the Constitution as a proxy for religiosity during the Revolution.<sup>58</sup> In all regressions, the portion of oath-takers is negatively correlated to the percentage of Catholics fulfilling their Easter obligation. This suggests a certain persistence of religiosity over time.

In all regressions, the magnitude of the effect of national properties on religiosity is large, with a one standard deviation increase in the (logged or un-logged) value of *biens nationaux* sold reducing the proportion of Catholics practicing their Easter duty by between 13.6 and 27.5%. The results are robust to the introduction of a battery of controls, including region fixed-effects. At the canton level, we use the (logged) average town size within each canton, weighted by the town population in 1886, instead of the urbanization rate.<sup>59</sup> We also do not have as many controls at the canton level since many variables do not exist at that scale.

Since the data was collected in different years between 1870 and 1900, we include “Data decade” fixed-effects which control for the decade during which the data was collected (columns 3 and 6). The data was collected for the general population in most cantons, but sometimes, the surveyors distinguished between men and women. Columns 3 and 6 include a “Data type” dummy to control for those cases, where we took the average of men and women *pascalisation*

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<sup>56</sup>The percentage of *pascalisants* is widely used as a measure of religiosity by historians since the proposals of Le Bras (1931, 1937). See: Mornet (1934); Ferté (1962); Pérouas (1964); Marcilhacy (1964); Langlois (1974); Sauzet (1975), and Aulard (1925). This variable measures only adherence to Catholicism, especially as Protestants do not recognize compulsory confession (Orcibal, 1951, p.166).

<sup>57</sup>When re-aggregating the canton level data to the district level, we dropped the districts for which no data was assigned to more than 50% of the population.

<sup>58</sup>While using “oath” as a measure of religiosity comes with some problems as discussed in the previous section, we do not have access to alternative measures. The coefficients are larger when removing the “oath” variable.

<sup>59</sup>We do so because cantons are small units, which makes urbanization rates less informative. Our results are unchanged when using the urbanization rate. Those results are available upon request.

rates. Our results in columns 3 and 6 remain practically identical to those in columns 2 and 5. Our coefficients are slightly larger and even more stable when using our instrumental variable, with one standard deviation in the log of *biens nationaux* reducing the *pascalisants* rate by 24.8 to 31.2%. We relegate our instrumental variable results to Appendix N to avoid an endless flow of tables in the text.

Table 5: The effect of land redistribution on religiosity in 1947.

<i>Pascalisants</i> :	District Level:				Canton Level:			
	Men		Women		Men		Women	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Log value of Biens nationaux per capita:</i>								
log( <i>biens nationaux</i> )	-4.61776** (1.88495)	-5.65624*** (1.69640)	-5.57359*** (2.08154)	-5.18050*** (1.57799)	-6.37466*** (1.38424)	-2.37303 (1.61427)	-7.85102*** (1.28836)	-2.85615** (1.42800)
Clergy's Oath	-48.8055*** (7.34044)	-40.8737*** (7.32499)	-45.9249*** (6.88127)	-36.7905*** (6.40406)	-37.1430*** (4.33899)	-25.1840*** (4.65805)	-34.0064*** (4.12170)	-22.3527*** (4.06640)
Observations	286	286	281	281	1662	1662	1632	1632
R-squared	0.41	0.55	0.41	0.58	0.26	0.42	0.27	0.46
<i>Magnitude:</i>								
Standardized beta coefficients	-4.15	-5.09	-5.00	-4.65	-5.74	-2.14	-7.07	-2.57
Mean of dependent variable	29.85	29.85	49.24	49.24	31.83	31.83	51.47	51.47
<i>Value of Biens nationaux per capita:</i>								
<i>Biens nationaux</i>	-0.060243*** (0.019403)	-0.063195*** (0.021829)	-0.079452*** (0.019282)	-0.060581*** (0.020720)	-0.10292*** (0.016352)	-0.053576*** (0.016284)	-0.12605*** (0.016023)	-0.061648*** (0.015774)
Clergy's Oath	-49.8749*** (6.91451)	-43.3684*** (7.00493)	-46.8505*** (6.51239)	-38.9307*** (6.13558)	-37.9612*** (4.18651)	-24.7616*** (4.62883)	-35.0585*** (3.93298)	-21.8924*** (4.02771)
Observations	286	286	281	281	1662	1662	1632	1632
R-squared	0.41	0.54	0.41	0.57	0.27	0.43	0.29	0.46
<i>Magnitude:</i>								
Standardized beta coefficients	-3.94	-4.14	-5.22	-3.98	-6.34	-3.30	-7.81	-3.82
Mean of dependent variable	29.85	29.85	49.24	49.24	31.83	31.83	51.47	51.47
Wheat suitability		✓		✓		✓		✓
Ruggedness		✓		✓		✓		✓
Urbanisation rate		✓		✓		✓		✓
Log(town size)						✓		✓
Region F.E.		✓		✓		✓		✓

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

*Note:* Standard errors are clustered at the department level when using the district level data and at the district level when using the canton level data.

We then reproduce the same exercise as in Table 4 but using data from 1947, for which the number of missing observations is greatly reduced. Our data for 1947 also distinguishes between men and women —women being usually more religious. Our results, reported in Table 5, suggest that the effect of the *biens nationaux*, although smaller than in Table 4, persisted well into the 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>60</sup>

<sup>60</sup>Appendix O uses data on mass attendance instead and finds the same pattern.

## 5.2 Protestantism

An implication of our hypothesis that the confiscation of the Church's properties increased the cost of Catholic worship is that the demand for substitutes for Catholicism increased. Some of these substitutes are irreligious goods. As explained, the French became more secular with the *biens nationaux*. Another substitute is Protestantism. As Baubérot (1972, p.452) explains, 19<sup>th</sup> century evangelists attempted to take advantage of the non-theological anti-Catholicism of a segment of the French population to “bring them to the Gospel,” that is, to the Protestant faith. In addition, social pressures against Protestants were likely weaker in less religious communities, thus lowering the cost of Protestant worship.

After the Revolution, Protestants were a small but growing religious minority (Perrenoud, 1889). Around 1850, they were around 850,000 —2.35% of the population (Encrevé, 1986, p.64). French Protestants largely supported the Revolution, especially as it upheld the ideals of religious freedom.<sup>61</sup> They were also important purchasers of Church assets after 1789.<sup>62</sup> During the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Protestants were associated with political liberalism. They opposed the Bourbon monarchy and supported the Orleanist “July monarchy” between 1830 and 1848 (Pic, 1994). In the 1840s, the Revolution often represented a “bourgeois and Protestant promotion.” (Tudesq, 1956, p.398) in regions with a strong Protestant presence.<sup>63</sup>

To assess the effect of the *biens nationaux* on Protestantism, we collected data on Protestant

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<sup>61</sup>On the Protestants' attitudes toward the Revolution, see: Béthoux (1989); Bolle (1989); Poujol & Cabanel (1989). See also Encrevé (1986) for the period between 1848 and 1870.

<sup>62</sup>See Bodinier & Teyssier (2000) for a summary of the Protestant's role as buyers of national properties. In La Rochelle, protestants were over-represented among buyers of *biens nationaux* relative to their share of the population. 11.6% of the nationalized Church assets in La Rochelle were bought by protestants (Armand, 1984, p.501-502). On the other hand, for the *biens nationaux* of second-origin, that is, for the expropriated assets of the aristocrats who left France, that difference was only 7.7% (Armand, 1984). This may indicate that religious factors impacted the demand for the *biens nationaux*. Similarly, Béthoux (1989) points out that in the city of Le Mans, protestants tied their fate to that of the Revolution through the massive purchase of national assets and were panicked by a possible return to power of the Clergy. In Aubais, a city in the department of Gard, Pic (1994) notes that the redistribution of Church land often added to the conflicts between Catholics and Protestants, the latter group being usually supportive of the Revolution. Among the 103 members of the Jacobin Club in Aubais, 101 were protestants despite representing only 45% of the population on the eve of the Revolution. Controlling for Protestantism in the 16<sup>th</sup> century does not change our results in Tables 1, 3, 4, 5, and often makes them stronger.

<sup>63</sup>During the 1869 legislative election campaign, a mayor in *Haute-Loire* describes the Republican candidate, a Protestant opposed to the Bonapartist candidate, as a supporter of the Revolution, in order to disqualify him: “Victor Robert is a Protestant, a Red, a Republican,... he is a parent of Robespierre” (Charreyron, 1990, p.49).

temples (churches) from the 16<sup>th</sup> century to 1900 and calculated the percentage of communes with a Protestant church in each district.<sup>64</sup> We use a difference-in-difference strategy to test if the sale of the *biens nationaux* increased protestant activity:

$$P_{i,t} = \sum_{\tau} \beta_{\tau} \times \delta_{\tau} \times B_i + \sum_{\tau} \chi_{\tau} \times \delta_{\tau} \times P_i^{16th} + \mathbf{X}_{i,t} + \delta_t + d_i + \epsilon_{i,t} \quad (2)$$

where  $\tau \in \{17\text{th century}, 1780, \dots, 1900\}$  is the set of pre and post-treatment dates.  $B_i$  is the (continuous) treatment —i.e. the value of the *biens nationaux* sold in district  $i$  during the Revolution.  $P_{i,t}$  is the percentage of towns in a district with a protestant church at time  $t$ , and  $P_i^{16th}$  is the same variable for the 16<sup>th</sup> century.  $\mathbf{X}_{i,t}$  is a set of time-varying controls.  $\delta_t$  and  $d_i$  are time and district fixed effects respectively.

The reason for introducing  $P_i^{16th}$  interacted with time-dummies is that the French Revolution consisted of two different treatments with respect to Protestantism. The first was the sale of national properties. The second was the gradual legalization of organized Protestant worship. For most of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, Protestants lived their faith clandestinely.<sup>65</sup> It was not until the 1787 Edict of Tolerance that Protestants gained their civil rights, and until 1802 that they could seriously rebuild Churches and organize. The presence of Protestantism in the 17<sup>th</sup> or 16<sup>th</sup> century increased the probability that Protestant churches would be rebuilt in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. As Protestantism prior to the Revolution was negatively correlated to the distribution of the *biens nationaux*, not taking into account the initial prominence of Protestantism would lead to underestimating the effect of the *biens nationaux*.<sup>66</sup>

Our results, reported in Appendix P, Table 32, confirm the hypothesis that the sale of the

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<sup>64</sup>Demographic data on Protestants across France prior to the Revolution is nonexistent. Even in the second part of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, data on the Protestant population is notoriously unreliable (Dargent & Dutreuilh, 2009).

<sup>65</sup>While after the religious wars, the Edict of Nantes (1598) granted some rights to the Huguenots, it was repealed by Louis XIV in 1685, after which date Protestantism was essentially outlawed with only a few exceptions. The repeal of the edict was preceded by intense political persecution. Between 1661 and 1685, ordinances were passed such that protestants were no longer allowed to bury their dead during the day, temples that could not provide proof that they existed in 1596-97 were shut down, reformed schools were closed, Protestant children removed from their parents, etc. (Carbonnier-Burkard & Cabanel, 1998). In many cases, Protestants who stayed in France were forced to convert and exercised their faith clandestinely.

<sup>66</sup>The correlation coefficient between our measure of Protestantism in the 16<sup>th</sup> century and the value of national properties sold during the Revolution is -0.11.

*biens nationaux* was associated with stronger growth of Protestantism during the 19<sup>th</sup> century. In each case, we control for the dynamic effect of whether Protestant worship was forcibly forbidden before the revocation of the Nantes Edict in 1685. Columns 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, and 12 use population in 1793 as weights.<sup>67</sup> In columns 1 and 2, a one standard deviation increase in the value of *biens nationaux* sold is associated with a 0.38 to 0.47 percentage points increase in the proportion of towns with a Protestant church in 1900. Given that in 1900, the average percentage of towns with a Protestant church was 3.21% for the districts used in the regressions, the effect is fairly large.

While many French Protestants became German after 1871 with the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine, excluding those territories, if anything, increases our coefficients (Appendix Q). Our results are also robust to using alternative measures of the *biens nationaux* —namely the percentage of land surface area they covered or their logged value.<sup>68</sup> Appendix R operates a leave-one(two)-out confirmation routine to show that our results are not driven by outliers.<sup>69</sup>

Since there were no organized Protestant churches in 130 districts during the 16<sup>th</sup> century, and since many of those districts continued to have no Protestant presence until the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, we restrict our sample to districts that had reformed churches in the 16<sup>th</sup> century in half of our regressions (Table 32). In other words, the effect could be different at the intensive and extensive margins. Our results suggest that the effect of the *biens nationaux* was particularly pronounced on the intensive margin.<sup>70</sup> Figure 7 illustrates our results.

While religious freedom was proclaimed in 1789 and freedom of worship in 1791, the situation remained precarious, and few organized protestant churches were built in the 1790s (Bolle, 1989). Organized religion remained strictly controlled by the government after the Concordat (1801)

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
<sup>67</sup>Weighted regressions give more weight to larger districts, which are less susceptible to measurement error, especially as smaller districts can experience sudden changes in our measure of Protestantism when a church is built.

<sup>68</sup>Using the logged value of the *biens nationaux* (columns 5 to 8), the results are somewhat weaker, although the sign and magnitude of the coefficients are consistent with the results in other columns.

<sup>69</sup>We excluded Paris and Lyon from the regressions in Table 32 because they were clear outliers, as those two districts comprised only one municipality. Including those two observations would increase both the magnitude of the post-1800 coefficients and their magnitude. Those regressions are available on demand.

<sup>70</sup>As Encrevé (1985) points out, protestant missionaries avoided proselytism in wholly catholic regions.

Figure 7: Event study graphs of the effect of the *biens nationaux* on Protestantism (Table 32, column 2 & 4).



between Napoléon Bonaparte and Pope Pius VII. In 1802, the Napoleonic government added “Organic Articles” including 44 articles related to Protestantism. For the first time in French history, Protestantism had a legal status similar to that of Catholicism. This went further than the Edict of Nantes, which banned Protestant proselytism. The French government, however, strictly controlled doctrinal changes in protestant churches (Carbonnier-Burkard & Cabanel, 1998). Even though the Concordat did not allow Protestants to freely congregate, it allowed for the construction of some reformed churches. This, combined with the impetus to Reformed communities during the Revolution, paved the way for the *Réveil*, a revival movement underlying the rapid growth of Protestantism in France during the first part of the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Bouquin, 1982, p.795).

The re-establishment of the Bourbon monarchy in 1815 led to a “White Terror” against Protestants (Lewis, 1964). While protestants feared the government’s impediments to their religious freedom during the Restoration (Bonet-Maury, 1900), their influence grew, especially with the development of missionary societies in the 1820s (Léonard, 1964). The written history of Protestantism seems consistent with our results. The identified effect in Figure 7 seems to plateau between 1810 and 1820, that is, during the decade of the “White Terror.” The effect of the *biens nationaux* on Protestantism seems to have increased throughout the 19<sup>th</sup> century as



Protestants solidified or gained their religious liberties. Indeed, while the July Monarchy (1830-1848) proved fairly liberal in religious matters, the Second Empire (1852-1870) was not, and the freedom of proselytism was truly established only after 1870 (Carbonnier-Burkard & Cabanel, 1998, p.130).<sup>71</sup>

By the 1870s, and consistent with our hypotheses, Protestants had become a key Republican constituency. Protestants had long expressed Republican sympathies. Already in 1793, a Protestant pastor in the region of Hautes-Cévennes claimed that “Every Protestant must be a true Republican and a good patriot.” (Carbonnier-Burkard & Cabanel, 1998, p.114). Yet it was after 1848 that Protestants squarely aligned with political republicanism. While Republicans during the Third Republic adopted a vigorous anti-clerical stance, their attacks were directed toward the Catholic clergy. In 1878, a prominent Republican politician, Gambetta, declared that while “there is a clerical problem, neither the Protestants nor the Jews are responsible for it.” (Bouton, 1966, p.240).

### 5.3 Land inequality

A final potential mechanism we explore is landholding inequality. During and following the Third Republic, many historians, including Jaurès and “Robespierrists,” emphasized the Revolution’s “social” policies. Marxist historians analyzed the Revolution as a class struggle between the nascent bourgeoisie and the *sans-culottes* (Soboul, 1958). In contrast, our results suggest that interest group politics *à la* Olson (1965) and the waning influence of Catholicism, rather than aggregate inequality, are responsible for the political effects of the *biens nationaux*.

Despite the passage of some laws aimed at favoring small property owners during the Revolution, it is unlikely that neither the sale of first-origin national properties (church land) nor the sale of second-origin national properties (those of the emigrant nobles) reduced land inequality.<sup>72</sup> Indeed, church properties were usually sold without being divided, which meant there was

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<sup>71</sup>Protestant missions to evangelize France experienced some notable successes in the 1840s when the central administration usually cautioned on the side of religious freedom. However, local officials during the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century sometimes thwarted missionaries using police forces if needed (Encrevé, 1985, p.77-80).

<sup>72</sup>Deseau (2023) argues that the sale of the *biens nationaux* increased landowning inequality. However, without

no obvious decrease in land inequality following their sale. Already large landowners sometimes bought church land, and this would have increased land inequality. On the other hand, peasants sometimes formed “coalitions” so as to pool their savings and buy large church estates they could not afford individually. This likely had the opposite effect on inequality.<sup>73</sup> While higher inequality in land ownership seems to have favored anti-republican politicians during the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Montalbo, 2023), we show that this potential channel through which the redistribution of church land impacted electoral outcomes was at best quantitatively small. In addition, if the argument linking the prevalence of large estates to anti-republicanism is that aristocratic landlords could form patronage networks to influence voters, then the formation of large estates owned by the liberal or republican bourgeoisie should symmetrically have increased political support for republican institutions.<sup>74</sup>

A major problem we face when assessing the landowning inequality channel is the absence of data on this variable before the sale of the national properties. Table 6 controls for landowning inequality in 1852. Doing so increases the size of our main coefficients, as can be seen from comparing columns 1, 3, and 5 to columns 2, 4, and 6.

While landowning inequality is positively correlated with our *biens nationaux* variable, it is impossible to know if this correlation reflects a positive correlation between inequality and the *biens nationaux* prior to the Revolution or an increase in landowning inequality attributable to the expropriation of church property. The problem can be summarized simply in the following equation:

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data on land inequality prior to the Revolution, we cannot know with much confidence if that’s true.

<sup>73</sup>In the longer run, differences in fertility among social groups may have increased or decreased land concentration through inheritances. The clergy obviously had very low fertility, which partly explains why ecclesiastical orders could constitute large estates. As for nobles who saw some of their estates confiscated and redistributed, they too had a fairly low fertility rate (Henry & Lévy, 1960), as can be attested by the declining aristocratic population share in the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries (Deweever, 2017). On the other hand, the urban bourgeoisie partook largely in buying national assets, and the urban population usually had lower fertility than in the countryside. On the effect of the French Revolution on fertility, especially as it relates to changes in inheritance laws, see: Gay et al. (2023).

<sup>74</sup>Debates among historians about whether the bourgeoisie or peasants bought most of the *biens nationaux* were intense (see: Bodinier & Teyssier 2000, p.215-234). However, both the nobility and the clergy controlled a lower proportion of the land after the sale of the national assets.

Table 6: Accounting for landed inequality .

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
log(biens nationaux)	-3.27870*** (0.75110)	-6.31432*** (0.82699)	-4.89097*** (0.82283)	-5.51242*** (0.83784)	-4.44827*** (0.88942)	-5.43928*** (0.92100)
Landed inequality		26.7644*** (4.27002)		11.2043** (4.37417)		18.0681*** (4.63125)
Geographic controls			✓	✓	✓	✓
Economic controls			✓	✓	✓	✓
Education controls					✓	✓
Region F.E			✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	2783	2783	2783	2783	2507	2507
R-squared	0.28	0.30	0.41	0.41	0.41	0.42

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

$$M_{i,t} = \beta \times \log(B_i) + \beta_2 \underbrace{(I_{i,t}^C + \beta_h \times \log(B_i))}_{I_{i,t}} + \mathbf{X}_{i,t} + \delta_t + \zeta_i + \epsilon_{i,t} \quad (3)$$


Where  $M_{i,t}$  is the anti-republican vote share and  $B_i$  is our measure of national properties.  $I_{i,t}$  is our land inequality variable, and  $I_{i,t}^C$  is the counterfactual land inequality that would have prevailed without the sale of the Church's assets during the Revolution.  $\beta_h$  is the causal effect of the *biens nationaux* on landowning inequality such that  $I_{i,t} = I_{i,t}^C + \beta_h \times \log(B_i)$ .<sup>75</sup> While we can observe  $I_{i,t}$ , we cannot observe  $I_{i,t}^C$ , and since we do not have data on landowning inequality before the Revolution, we cannot identify  $\beta_h$ . In other words,  $\beta$  in equation 3 is likely misidentified when we use  $I_{i,t}$  as a control because it potentially captures both the persistence in landed inequality since the Revolution as well as the effect of the *biens nationaux* on landed inequality.

Since no consensus by historians exists about the effect of the *biens nationaux* on landed inequality, we hypothesize an effect ( $\beta_h$ ) at different thresholds to calculate a hypothetical counterfactual landed inequality measure ( $I_{i,t}^C$ ).<sup>76</sup> Using that hypothetical counterfactual, our effect

<sup>75</sup>The other variables were already defined in equation 1.

<sup>76</sup>Tocqueville (1856, p.56) first argued that the Revolution did not reduce inequality in landownership ("the effect of the Revolution was not to divide the soil, but to liberate it for a time"). Historians since disagree about the effect of the *biens nationaux* on the distribution of land ownership. For Lefebvre (1928), the French Revolution

Figure 8: Hypothetical portion of the total effect attributable to the land inequality channel.



in column 4 would be reduced twofold only if  $\beta_h = 0.246$ . Since the mean of our measure of landed inequality is equal to 32.3% and the difference between the 25th and 75th percentile of landed inequality is equal to 28.1%, this effect is unbelievably large. It would imply that an increase in the log of *biens nationaux* from the 25th to the 75th percentile would increase our measure of landed inequality by more than its mean.

On the other hand, if the *biens nationaux* reduced landed inequality, it would explain only a small fraction of the total effect for reasonable values of  $\beta_h$ . Figure 8 shows the log of *biens nationaux* coefficient for different hypothesized values of  $\beta_h$ . Even if  $\beta_h$  was -0.16, which is half of the mean of our landed inequality measure, less than 25% of the total effect would be attributable to the reduction in landed inequality caused by the *biens nationaux*. Hence inequality in landholdings is unlikely to have been the main channel through which the *biens nationaux* worked.

## 6 Conclusion


Would the Third Republic have survived without the *biens nationaux*? Answering this question is perilous. Our econometric exercise can point to relationship between the *biens nationaux*

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considerably increased the number of landowners. In some departments such as Meurthe and Moselle, the increase was spectacular (Marion, 1908), with the number of owners increasing by 23% and 37% respectively in the ten years following 1789. On the other hand, Loutchisky (1897, 1913) argues most buyers were already landowners, which would have increased the concentration of land ownership.

and voting behavior 90 years later, but it cannot elucidate how would the French Revolution have turned out without the nationalization of church land. Trying to assess what would have happened without one of the most consequential events of the French Revolution is naturally speculative.

Figure 9: Hypothetical counterfactual (1876).



*Notes:* The left panel represents the electoral districts in which the Monarchists received a majority of the votes in 1876 during the first round of the election. The right panel represents the electoral districts where we estimate a majority of voters would have voted in favor of the Monarchists during the first round of the election if no *biens nationaux* had been sold. We use the coefficient in column 7 of Table 3 in conjunction with our data on the log of *biens nationaux* to “predict” what the Monarchist vote share would have been without the redistribution of church land.

Figure 9 shows the districts in which Monarchists had a majority of the votes in 1876 and what this electoral map would have looked like using our main estimate and in the absence of the *biens nationaux*. In the left panel, Monarchists obtained the majority of votes in only 33% of districts. In the right panel, 70% of districts have a (predicted) Monarchist majority. This obviously assumes away the effect of the *biens nationaux* on republicanism at a national scale, yet the fate of the Third Republic was uncertain, especially until the constitutional crisis of May 1877, and our results suggest the legacy of *biens nationaux* helped solidify the Republic.

Across many specification and identification strategies, we find that the redistribution of church land following 1789 did not simply change the French economy but also its ideological and religious character. Somewhat contrary to how it is perceived today, late 19<sup>th</sup> century

France became the poster child of economic and political liberalism (Thesmar & Landier, 2010). Consistent with the literature on persistence and on the importance of interest groups in economic development, this unique political equilibrium was shaped by the radical overthrow of the *Ancien Régime* and the largest privatization program in French history: the liquidation of the Church's wealth.

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# Online Appendix

## A Data appendix

### A.1 District shapefiles

Some of our district-level variables were extracted using a shapefile of the 1793 districts we constructed. This shapefile was made using the data from the “*Projet Cassini*” kept available by EHESS.<sup>77</sup> This data gives the coordinates of the almost 36,000 municipalities in France as well as information about which district they belonged to in 1793. We created 35,836 Voronoi polygons around each municipality, which we then merged to approximate each district’s borders.<sup>78</sup>

We use our district polygons to calculate our “Ruggedness” and “Wheat suitability” variables. To calculate the Conley standard errors (Appendix B), we used the centroid of each polygon. Finally, some districts’ borders changed after 1793.<sup>79</sup> Those changes were usually minor but still could cause issues when using district-level data on agriculture (in 1852) or industry (in 1865). To minimize those issues, and since we have population data for each town, we re-aggregate variables at the 1793 district level by creating population-weighted variables:

$$V_{i,t} = \frac{\sum_c^N P_{i,c,t} \times V_{j,c,t}}{\sum_c^N P_{i,c,t}} \quad (4)$$

Where  $V_i$  is the variable of interest at time  $t$  in the 1793 district  $i$ .  $P_{i,c}$  is the population of town  $c$  in 1793 district  $i$  at time  $t$ . Hence  $\sum_c^N P_{i,c,t}$  is the population within the 1793 district borders at time  $t$ . Finally,  $V_{j,c,t}$  is the variable of interest at time  $t$  in district  $j$  whose borders

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<sup>77</sup>Source: EHEESS. “Des villages de Cassini aux communes d’aujourd’hui. Index par départements.” [http://cassini.ehess.fr/cassini/fr/html/6\\_index.htm](http://cassini.ehess.fr/cassini/fr/html/6_index.htm) (last accessed December 12, 2023).

<sup>78</sup>We transformed every spatial object using the “NTF (Paris) / Lambert zone II” projection (EPSG:27572). We visualized the data in QGIS to make sure that there were no egregious mistakes. We found five minor mistakes in the Cassini project data, with towns being assigned to the wrong district. Saint-Pierre-sur-Orthe was not in the “Ernée” district in 1793. A homonym existed in the same department, hence the mistake. In 1793, this town was in the district of “Evron.” Saint-Pierre-la-Cour was confused with Saint-Pierre-sur-Orthe. The district it belonged to in 1793 was “Ernée,” not “Evron.” In 1793, Saint-Jean-de-Marcel was part of the district of “Alby,” not that of “Castres.” Armouss-et-Cau and Scieurac-et-Flourés were part of the “Mirande” district, not the “Nogaro” district.

<sup>79</sup>Districts were referred to as *arrondissements* after 1801. We continue referring to them as districts.



are contemporaneous. Overall, the changes made by this procedure are minimal, and for many districts, no changes are made.

## **A.2 Data on electoral outcomes.**

We use data by Piketty & Cagé (2023) on electoral outcomes at the municipal level. The data includes the INSEE code, which we use in conjunction with the data from the *Projet Cassini* to get the geographical coordinates of each town. The categories used to build our “Anti-republican vote share” variable include candidates described as Clerical, Legitimist, Conservative, Monarchist, Bonapartist, Reactionary, or Boulangist. The data is explained in detail in the appendix of Piketty & Cagé (2023).

## **A.3 Data on monasteries.**

This appendix describes the references used to establish a catalog of abbeys in France during the Middle Ages. We start with a short presentation of the regular clergy and the abbeys of the Old Regime, together with the bibliography used to compile a repertoire of male and female abbeys before 1500.

**Regular clergy and abbeys in the Middle Ages.** Under the *Ancien Régime*, the Catholic Church’s land holdings were considerable. On the eve of the Revolution, Bodinier & Teyssier (2000) estimated they accounted for an average of 6% of the French landed territory. Among Church possessions, the estates held by the regular orders were predominant. The regular clergy, as opposed to secular clergy, was distinguishable by their adherence to a specific religious order, which set them apart from society. As members of the secular clergy, priests lived among the lay population under the authority of a bishop. Although a monk could be ordained a priest, regulars lived isolated from society in a monastery, devoting their lives to God and prayer. This helps to understand why many abbeys were located far from the towns, in the countryside. By the end of the Middle Ages, however, historians observed a decline in the observance of

monastic rules, leading to a questioning of their role within the Christian society of the time (Hours, 2018).<sup>80</sup>

Indeed, historians believe that the seclusion of the regulars explains why they benefited from more land donations than secular priests. During the Middle Ages, the Church developed its land holdings by specializing in administering the spiritual needs of medieval society.<sup>81</sup> Within the Church, regulars benefited from more donations than seculars, as they could privatize their intercession due to their isolation from society. By offering more land to regulars than to seculars, aristocratic lineages hoped to benefit from privileged intercession, as regulars committed themselves to praying on behalf of their donors (Rosenwein, 1989, p.48). Recurring gifts constituted assets for donors looking forward to gaining access to paradise.

Bodinier & Teyssier (2000, p.340) show that monasteries held around 60% of church land. Religious orders were governed by their agreement with the Church, as well as the constitutions governing relations between abbeys within the order. Monasteries could include dependencies, such as priories. Hence, abbeys often manage dispersed and extensive real estate holdings. Bodinier & Teyssier (2000) note, however, that their influence was mainly exercised in the district where they were located.<sup>82</sup> Our data covers only Abbeys and not their dependencies.

From the end of the Middle Ages onward, civil authorities in France were careful to regulate the monasteries' land holdings. As ecclesiastical possessions were legally inalienable under canon law, the State was deprived of the taxes on land transfers. Moreover, the French Crown could not tax these estates in the northern half of the kingdom, where the *taille* was "personal" -i.e. was attached to non-noble individuals as opposed to land. In August 1749, an edict on the *gens de main-morte* formally prohibited from making land donations to the Church. Previously,

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<sup>80</sup>Protestant Reformation as well as internal reform movements within the Catholic religious orders were responses to this crisis. See: Le Gall (2001).

<sup>81</sup>Duby (1973, p.68) explains that "the penetration of Christianity thus led to the establishment in society of a large group of specialists who took no part in working the land or in military plundering ventures, and who formed one of the most important sectors of the economic system. They produced nothing. They lived off the labor of others. In exchange for these services, they performed orations and other sacred gestures, for the benefit of the community of the people".

<sup>82</sup>Dinet (1999, p.260) and Nicolas (1978, p.139) confirm that the regulars orders' estates were only located in villages where an abbey had been founded as well as in their immediate periphery. As the distance grew, their influence steadily diminished, so that the regulars' estates in remoter villages were usually nonexistent.

the State had either attempted to regulate donations to the Church by issuing authorizations on a case-by-case basis or forced the Church to dispose of its possessions. Following the *Concordat de Bologne* (1516), the State increasingly regulated monastic orders.

**French abbeys in the Middle Ages.** Most abbeys were founded from the fall of the Roman Empire to the 11<sup>th</sup> or 12<sup>th</sup> centuries. Many had to be rebuilt following the destruction caused by the Viking-Saracen invasions in the 8<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> centuries. Catalogs compiled under the *Ancien Régime* provide information on abbeys, including the religious order to which they belonged, their legal status, and their total income.<sup>83</sup> The best-known catalog is Beaunier (1726), which described 750 male abbeys and 255 female abbeys across France. It also includes some abbeys located abroad in cross-border dioceses (Trier or Pamplona, for example). Royal or church almanacs subsequently updated the information for the most important abbeys up to 1789. Although it is the best-known of the *Ancien Régime* catalogs, Beaunier's compendium appears to follow an earlier work published by Le Pelletier (1690), which already listed the Kingdom's abbeys. Similar information can also be found in earlier publications, such as Anonymous (1626).<sup>84</sup> While monastery catalogs published during the *Ancien Régime* are valuable tools to study abbeys in the Middle Ages, we want to avoid omitting monasteries that previously existed but later shut down and are therefore likely ignored by those publications.

To compile a comprehensive list of medieval French abbeys (including those who have since disappeared), we first consulted the the book series *Abbayes et prieurés de l'ancienne France. Recueil historique des abbayes et prieurés de France* compiled between 1905 and 1989. We also benefited from the parallel work of Cottineau (1935-1970). These sources mainly list Benedictine, Cistercian, Augustinian, and Premonstratensian establishments. The first work, which now

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<sup>83</sup>More recently, a corpus project devoted to medieval French monasteries aims to build a comprehensive dataset (Deflou-Leca, 2008). Today, a website provides access to 633 establishment records, mainly for central-western France and Burgundy. However, vast geographical areas such as Brittany and southwest France are not yet covered: <https://monasteres.applirecherche.unilim.fr>. A German research project is also cataloging the women's monastic establishments: <https://femmodata.uni-goettingen.de>. Some thirty French monasteries are currently included in this dataset.

<sup>84</sup>According to Longnon (1904), this work reproduces almost word-for-word "manuscript 5218" from 1350 held by the *Bibliothèque nationale de France*.


includes 17 volumes, is based on Beaunier (1726), which it was intended to complete. However, Emery (1962) has shown that certain monasteries were not described. Not all Old Regime dioceses are covered either (notably the dioceses of Reims and several Burgundian dioceses, as well as the diocese of Besançon). Compared with this collection, Cottineau's work offers a complete coverage of France. It is a scholarly synthesis based on numerous other directories, notably the French *Pouillés* collection<sup>85</sup> and the historical research of the Benedictines of Saint-Maur. Still, it has the disadvantage given less information about each monastery due to the extent of its topographical coverage (it covers the whole of Europe, not just France) and the chronological scope of the work (there are gaps in most of the entries describing abbeys before the 10<sup>th</sup> century). We have made further use of Outardel (1947), published in 1947, and the earliest dictionary by Montrond & Migne (1856), published in 1856. Janauschek (1877) provides a list of male Cistercian abbeys for medieval Europe. Finally, Lecestre (1902) provides a list of regular establishments subject to the *Commission des Réguliers* in 1766, which closed 458 monasteries. Only pre-Counter-Reformation male establishments were targeted and enumerated. Of course, the list does not provide information on abbeys who had already disappeared earlier at the time of the Commission. Secularized establishments are not described either.

We supplemented the data from the literature described above with more recent and specific inventories. For the Benedictine abbeys in the Diocese of Reims, we have used the work of Poirier-Coutansais (1974), while for those located in the south-west of France, we used the list compiled by Gérard (1984, p.23–51). The Prémontré order benefits from a recent exhaustive catalog by Ardura (1993). We have also included in our database the Chartreux monasteries studied by Gruys (1976-1978). Despite the limited community life in these monasteries, the Chartreuses founded by St. Bruno were very similar to classical medieval abbeys in their legal organization. Finally, the publication by Marilier (1994), usefully fills the gap left by the volume XI of Beaunier's repertory for the dioceses of Autun, Chalon and Macon.

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<sup>85</sup>A *pouillé* is an enumeration of all ecclesiastical assets located within a given area, such as a province or diocese.

Figure 10: Monasteries in 1200 (green) and 1500 (blue).




**Our data.** Our database includes the location, creation date, and date of closure, if any, for each identified abbey. The order to which the abbey belonged is specified, as is the type of abbey and the income and number of monks or nuns, if known on the eve of the Revolution.

From the data collected from the sources described above, we are able to map the geography of monasteries in the years 1200 and 1500 (Figure 10). Figure 11 shows the correlation between the log of the value of *biens nationaux* per capita and the number of monasteries per capita in 1200 and 1500. We use the 1793 population figures from the *Projet Cassini* to compute those per capita measures.

#### A.4 Data on catholic worship.

This appendix presents the Boulard survey data used to assess the evolution of religiosity in France over the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. It first presents the context in which the survey was devised. It then describes the survey data used, especially regarding the evolution of the percentage of *Pascalisants*.

Figure 11: Correlation between the number of monasteries per capita and our main measure of the *biens nationaux*' value.



**The Boulard Survey.** Fernand Boulard was a French Catholic priest and sociologist (Sorrel, 2013). He conducted quantitative studies on the composition of the French clergy in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries and is considered a pioneer of religious sociology in France. Along with Gabriel Le Bras, he published the first map of religiosity for contemporary France (Le Bras & Boulard, 1947). Their work revealed strong regional contrasts between territories where religious practice is high and almost half of France, on a diagonal from the Landes to the Ardennes, which appears to be non-religious. The map also reveals strong inter-regional contrasts within the French national space, with regions that are indifferent to religious practice rubbing shoulders with others where religious practice is strong.

According to Julia (2006, p.404-407), Boulard's survey completed and extended earlier work by Le Bras (1931). The motivation for collecting this data was political, as those researchers wondered why Catholic voters were markedly more conservative.<sup>86</sup> Those researchers could not rely on French official statistics as they did not allow the measurement of the population's adherence to Catholicism (Poulat, 1956).<sup>87</sup>

Boulard (1945) had already worked on evangelization in contemporary times and set out

<sup>86</sup>Siegfried's (1913) pioneered French electoral studies and was Boulard's and Le Bras' main influence (Julia, 2006; Cuchet, 2018).

<sup>87</sup>Some census data based on baptism exist. Yet, since the overwhelming majority of Frenchmen were baptized, it does not properly measure religiosity.

to fill this gap. In the 1960s, he approached religious authorities to obtain reliable historical information about religious practices in France. This fieldwork enabled him to publish the 1947 map, now known as the Boulard map, which was subsequently refined and updated. With the agreement of the religious authorities, the data collected was later published by Isambert et al. (1980).<sup>88</sup> In the meantime, Boulard considerably broadened the historical scope of this original survey. Thanks to his networks, he directed research in the archives of every diocese in France, gathering first-hand data and exploiting all the bibliographies available at the time of publication. The results of these investigations have been published in four books (the *Matériaux*), providing the most extensive collection of detailed statistical data available on religious practice in France for modern times (Boulard, 1982; Boulard & Hilaire, 1987; Boulard & Cholvy, 1992; Boulard & Delpal, 2011). Each volume provides statistical data giving a precise idea of the population's adherence to the Catholic faith.<sup>89</sup>

**Measuring religious attendance.** These data and documents covered many aspects of the religious and social life for Catholics in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. For the 1947 map, priests in active service were invited to reply to a questionnaire. The rest of the data comes from priests' answers to the questions asked during the pastoral visits regularly carried out by Bishops or Deans in accordance with Rome's prescriptions.<sup>90</sup> Pastoral questionnaires, kept in diocesan archives, may differ as to their content. Continuous collections for most dioceses are rare

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
<sup>88</sup>Data tables were, however, attached to the offprints for the first edition in 1947. Successive corrections were made to the data originally collected by Boulard. The 1980 edition is the first to make these data readily available. The 1947 Boulard map is updated on p.535 of the first volume of the *Matériaux* published in 1982. Boulard died in 1977 after ordering the materials for this first collection.

<sup>89</sup>Each volume contains data for several dioceses: the first volume contains diocesan counts for the regions of Paris, Haute-Normandie, Pays de la Loire, and Centre; the second volume contains counts for the regions of Bretagne, Basse-Normandie, Nord-Pas-de-Calais, Picardie, Champagne, Lorraine, and Alsace; the third volume includes counts for Aunis, Saintonge, Angoumois, Limousin, Auvergne, Guyenne, Gascogne, Béarn, Pays de Foix, Roussillon and Languedoc; the latest volume, includes data for Burgundy, Franche-Comté, Lyonnais, Savoie, Dauphiné, Grand Midi and Algeria.

<sup>90</sup>Visits to the parishes of a diocese, known as pastoral, canonical or church visits, are attested in Europe as early as the High Middle Ages. The practice waned in the 11<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> centuries, before resuming during the 16<sup>th</sup> century, mostly due to the Protestant Reformation. Since then, pastoral visits have never ceased. Encouraged by Le Bras, historians have planned to compile directories of pastoral visits from the Middle Ages to the present day (Julia et al., 1969) To date, only one archival directory is available, covering the *Ancien Régime* (Venard & Julia, 1977).

(Boulard, 1982, p.14). Boulard homogenized the responses collected as part of his quantitative research. He also re-aggregated his data to the cantonal level using the 1954 cantons' borders. The aim of the survey was to be exhaustive. For all French dioceses, the *Matériaux* successively provide (1) a historical description of the diocese and (2) all the statistical data collected are presented in tabular form with an indication of sources and comments on any gaps or distinctive features identified during collection.

Figure 12: Pascalisants (%).





Among the historical documents presented by the *Matériaux*, we chose to use the data on the number of communicants active at the cantonal level, with a particular focus on the *Pascalisants*. During pastoral visits, diocesan authorities scrutinized attendance at religious services, particularly communion. The commemoration of the Last Supper was considered to be a good indicator of a parish's religious vitality, and our data systematically considered this indicator to provide a homogeneous measure of religiosity on a national scale. The data in the *Matériaux* distinguished three types of communicants: the *Messés*, the *Messalisants*, and the *Pascalisants*. The first term refers to those who attended Sunday mass during the visit of a surveyor. In turn, *Messalisants* are Catholics who regularly attend Sunday mass. Finally, *Pascalisant* refers to participants in the Easter communion service.<sup>91</sup> This Eucharistic celebration, the most important in the Catholic liturgy, implied that the communicant had previously gone to confession.

The latter indicator measures the social influence of Catholicism. A *Pascalisant* is a communicant who agrees to confess before celebrating communion at Easter Mass. This submission testifies to the voluntary acceptance of the Catholic Church's religious disciplinary principles and is, therefore, a valuable indicator of its influence within society. This indicator is also available in the data published by Isambert et al. (1980). Data are not available for Charente, Landes, and Var departments alone. For all other departments, the number of *Pascalisants* within a canton is recorded at least once during a visit in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The available data do not generally differentiate between the sexes of communicants, except for the departments of Ain, Bouches-du-Rhône, Cher, Creuse, Deux-Sèvres, Drôme, Gers, Haute-Loire, Haute-Vienne, Indre, Loiret, Lot-et-Garonne, Seine-et-Marne, and Vienne. Data published in the *Atlas* for the post-World War II years also distinguish between the sexes for this indicator.

**Our data.** While the 1947 data was collected all at the same time and distinguishes between genders, this is not the case for the 19<sup>th</sup> century data. There is no single data during which most of the diocese organized a survey, which means that we have the aggregate data from different years to build a comprehensive enough picture of religiosity during the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. Since

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<sup>91</sup>The expression is attested to as early as the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Boulard, 1982)

we are interested in effect of the *biens nationaux* on the ideological and religious landscape of the early Third Republic, we use the data from surveys made between 1870 and 1900.<sup>92</sup> When data for multiple dates are reported, we average them out. In the few cases the data was separated between men and women, we also took the average. Finally, for some districts, we have the data about some but not all cantons. When re-aggregating the data to the district level, we only kept the observations for which we have data for more than 50% of the district population.

## A.5 Data on Protestantism.

This appendix presents the data used to study the spread of Protestantism in France during the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Given the lack of data about the protestant population, we use the founding and disappearance dates of Protestant temples to map the establishment and extent of Protestantism in France under the *Ancien Régime* and during the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The first part of this appendix presents the statistical problems historians pointed to in their studies of Protestantism. The second part describes how historians reconstructed the network of Protestant temples used for the present study.

**Difficulties in quantifying Protestantism.** Studying the influence of Protestantism in France is challenging. Due to the early secularization of public statistics in the modern era, the religious affiliations of French citizens are mostly missing from census data. Only a few surveys, notably in 1851 and 1872, provided statistical data on Protestant membership, but only at the departmental level. A further point to note is that these surveys do not provide an accurate count of the Protestant population. For the 1851 survey, the under-registration of the French Protestants appears to be significant, reflecting the reluctance of the (previously persecuted) Protestant minority to reveal their religious affiliation to the authorities (Dargent & Dutreuilh, 2009). Willaime (2021) also considers the fundamental disapproval of statistical surveys, a position observed by

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<sup>92</sup>Here are the dates of the survey indicated in Boulard (1982); Boulard & Hilaire (1987); Boulard & Cholvy (1992); Boulard & Delpal (2011): 1871, 1871-1881, 1872-1880, 1873-1879, 1874, 1875, 1876, 1877-1878, 1877-1889, 1878-1880, 1880, 1881-1886, 1883, 1883-1884, 1885-1893, 1886-1890, 1887-1889, 1888-1890, 1889, 1890-1896, 1890, 1891, 1891-1895, 1893, 1893-1901, 1894-1896, 1896, 1898, 1899, and 1900.

Protestants since the 16<sup>th</sup>.

Under the *Ancien Régime*, historians agree on the uncertainty surrounding the composition and evolution of the French Protestant population (Benedict, 1991). For Chareyre (2002), the repression of Protestantism largely explains these gaps. For example, the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 was an attempt to wipe out the Protestant population. This explains why, despite the care taken by the State to count this minority, it has been impossible to establish accurate statistics due to persecutions. During the Wars of Religion, Protestant counts were mainly carried out by members of the community (Fornerod & Benedict, 2009). With their increasing numbers, the Protestant authorities hope to influence the balance of power with the State, so that their religion will be recognized. Between the Edict of Nantes and the reign of Louis XIV, while Protestantism was relatively tolerated, there was virtually no publicly available census of the Protestant population (Benedict, 1987). Although counts were made, they were never comprehensive (Chareyre, 2002). Moreover, detailed counts at the city level are rare. Available statistical results were usually aggregated at the diocesan or regional level (Orcibal, 1947). Similarly, the Huguenot Refuge database (Magdelaine, 2014), which provides the birth-places and places of residence of Protestants who left France during the 18<sup>th</sup> century, is difficult to interpret.<sup>93</sup> Indeed, the nature and extent of the pressure exerted by government authorities varied over the territory, which can skew the available data.

For the 19<sup>th</sup> century, there are also documentation problems. In 1802, the French government drew up an estimate of the number of Protestants at the department level. Robert (1961) provides an estimate of the number of Protestants by consistory around 1815, as does Encrevé (1985) in 1850 and 1883. Unfortunately, their aggregated results are difficult to interpret due to the mismatch between consistory and administrative jurisdictions, as well as tax considerations that prompted consistories to declare a greater or lesser number of worshippers for clerical staff remuneration purposes. The censuses of 1851, 1866, and 1872 published by the *Statistique Générale de la France* provide the number of Protestants at the department level. Léonard

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<sup>93</sup> Available at this address: <http://www.refuge-huguenot.fr>.


(1956, p.40) considers this data of relatively poor quality. Cholvy (1965), using the Hérault as an example, considers those censuses reliable, but only when referring to nominative census records, as Poulat (1956, p.26) also advises. Unfortunately, the failure of many departments to keep these archives, as well as the volume of documents to be processed, limits the potential use of this documentation.

**The French Protestant Temples network.** Our data on Protestantism is based primarily on the work of Samuel Mours, a pastor who compiled a chronological list of Protestant temples in France between the 16<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries (Mours, 1957a,b,c, 1958). His work provides a detailed cartography of French Protestant worship. During the 16<sup>th</sup> century, Mours counted 1,508 localities throughout France with a temple at one time or another. Although not all churches were in continuous activity, his count provides an accurate picture of the spread of Protestantism, as well as its political and social influence on the French population. Historians generally consider it to be reliable (Fornerod & Benedict, 2009).

Mours drew his information from all available documentation, principally from de Bèze (1580), the correspondence between the churches of France and Geneva, the acts of the provincial synods that have been preserved, and the documents published by the *Bulletin de la Société de l'histoire du protestantisme français*. For the 17<sup>th</sup> century, he relied mainly on the published acts of Protestant synods and the 19<sup>th</sup>-century documentation compiled by Haag & Haag (1846-1859). At that time, although the Protestant population remained relatively stable, the number of temples and the influence of Protestantism declined. Mours notes that this decline is reflected in the pastoral regrouping of communities under the combined effect of repression and the lack of sufficient resources. Thus, the closer we get to the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, the more the number of Reformed churches diminishes.

The pressure exerted on Protestants resulted in restrictions on the public practice of their religion, as well as the closure or even destruction of temples when the State noticed the cessation of worship. These closures also led to the relocation of pastors and the population. Mours

Figure 13: Geographic distribution of Protestant churches.



has indicated the churches whose worship was forbidden before 1685. Blet (1972) confirms most of these mentions and provides some additional data. In the 18<sup>th</sup> century, these pressures limited the possibility of an accurate population count. Krumenacker (2008), who established a reference prosopography of French pastors in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, notes that pastors were mobile and therefore had no fixed community. Robert (1961) confirms this analysis by studying the pastoral corps in 1789 and around 1800. A list of temples created under the Concordat of 1802 is provided by Mours and Robert. While Robert (1961) studies the network of temples reconstituted after the Revolution up to 1830, Mours completes this list up to the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Non-Concordat churches with permanent pastors are mentioned. We have included them in our database. The reconstruction of the network of Protestant temples thus provides localized and consistent data for analyzing the diffusion and extension of Protestant worship between the

*Ancien Régime* and modern times.

Figure 13 shows the geographic distribution of Protestant temples in France. Using the *Projet Cassini*'s information about the number of municipalities, including old municipalities that have since disappeared, we calculate the percentage of municipalities with a Protestant temple at different dates for each district.

## A.6 Geographic controls.

**Ruggedness.** We extracted the average terrain rugged for each district (canton) polygon using Nunn & Puga's (2012).

**Wheat suitability.** We extracted the average wheat suitability for each district (canton) polygon using the following data: FAO, GAEZ v3.0. Crop suitability index (class) for intermediate input level rain-fed wheat.

**Urbanization rate.** All of our population figures are calculated using the data in the *Projet Cassini*. Our default measure of urbanization is the percentage of a district's population living in a town of more than 2,000 inhabitants.

## A.7 Economic controls.

**Sharecropping.** Sharecroppers as a percentage of the total population. The data comes from the 1852 *Enquête agricole*, which was made available online by Marin & Marraud (2011).

**Landed inequality.** Our measure of landed inequality is the percentage of large landlords (both absent and on-site) as a percentage of the total number of landowners. The data comes from the 1852 *Enquête agricole*.

**Fallow land.** Fallow land as a percentage of cultivated area. The data comes from the 1852 *Enquête agricole*.

**Industrial wage.** The average industrial wage in each district. We take the average of the wage for men, women, and children ponderated by the number of workers in each of those categories. The data, collected by Chanut et al. (2000), comes from the *Enquête industrielle* of 1860-1865.

**Industrial workers.** Industrial workers as a percentage of the total population. The data, collected by Chanut et al. (2000), comes from the *Enquête industrielle* of 1860-1865.

## **A.8 Education controls.**

**School per student.** This variable was collected by Squicciarini (2020) from archival sources and measures the “total number of students over the total number of schools” in 1873. We re-aggregated the data from the canton to the district level and only kept the observations for which we have data for more than 50% of the district population.

**Bad school (%).** This variable was collected by Squicciarini (2020) from archival sources and measures the “Share of building in bad conditions, computed as the number of school buildings in bad condition over the total number of school buildings” in 1873. We re-aggregated the data from the canton to the district level and only kept the observations for which we have data for more than 50% of the district population.

## **A.9 Variables on ideology**

**Oath.** We use the data reported by Tackett (1986) on the percentage of clergymen who swore an oath the the constitution in 1791. Whenever the data was given for several months, we averaged the number of priests who swore an oath.

**Jacobin Clubs.** We measure the percentage of municipalities, including those that have disappeared since 1793, which had a Jacobin’s club during the French Revolution. The data was collected from Boutier & Boutry (1992).

## A.10 Summary statistics

	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	p25	p50	p75
<i>District level data:</i>								
Anti-republican vote share	3245	30.307	25.859	0.000	100.000	0.046	33.349	49.518
Anti-republican vote share (1876)	540	39.915	24.257	0.000	100.000	24.391	41.736	54.348
Anti-republican vote share (1881)	541	24.069	24.341	0.000	100.000	0.000	20.833	45.427
Anti-republican vote share (1885)	541	45.187	15.629	0.000	84.279	37.869	46.733	54.602
Anti-republican vote share (1889)	541	44.125	22.690	0.000	100.000	34.588	45.840	53.466
Anti-republican vote share (1893)	541	16.396	23.440	0.000	100.000	0.000	0.501	31.982
Anti-republican vote share (1898)	541	12.168	21.465	0.000	100.000	0.000	0.000	18.676
Bad schools (%)	4008	0.064	0.065	0.000	0.377	0.014	0.045	0.096
Biens nationaux	3816	76.937	65.918	1.200	514.786	29.387	59.840	101.885
Biens Nationaux (% of land)	1728	5.636	5.619	0.300	40.100	1.900	3.900	7.150
Biens nationaux (2 <sup>nd</sup> Origin)	1192	3.662	2.819	0.100	27.700	1.900	3.600	5.300
Clergy's Oath	3952	0.553	0.274	0.000	1.000	0.343	0.590	0.789
Fallow land (%)	4448	0.208	0.102	0.000	0.493	0.136	0.211	0.274
Distance to Bishopric (km)	4448	35.548	20.216	0.603	113.109	22.149	33.700	48.664
Female mass attendance in % (1946)	3608	39.155	20.496	4.456	91.595	22.266	36.069	52.662
Female pascalisans in % (1946)	3432	48.548	23.267	5.440	95.098	28.085	47.792	65.443
Industrial wage	4448	100.317	55.739	0.000	294.016	59.346	99.535	138.629
Industrial workers	4448	0.034	0.034	0.001	0.305	0.012	0.021	0.047
Jacobin Clubs	4448	0.158	0.181	0.000	1.000	0.060	0.105	0.169
Jacobin Clubs (< 1791)	4448	0.012	0.062	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.012
Landed inequality	4448	0.323	0.177	0.000	0.863	0.179	0.302	0.459
Log of distance to Bishopric	4448	3.314	0.870	-0.506	4.728	3.098	3.517	3.885
log(biens nationaux)	3816	3.986	0.904	0.182	6.244	3.381	4.092	4.624
Male mass attendance in % (1946)	3608	21.715	18.802	0.395	82.320	7.355	14.496	29.730
Male pascalisans in % (1946)	3496	29.290	23.271	0.441	89.132	10.553	22.291	42.870
Monasteries per capita (year 1200)	4448	0.039	0.034	0.000	0.224	0.013	0.034	0.060
Monasteries per capita (year 1500)	4448	0.071	0.050	0.000	0.302	0.034	0.065	0.101
Montagne's vote share	1080	28.693	18.379	0.000	93.725	15.031	25.745	40.641
Number of monasteries (year 1200)	4448	1.876	1.631	0.000	9.000	1.000	2.000	3.000
Number of monasteries (year 1500)	4448	3.552	2.858	0.000	14.000	1.000	3.000	5.000
Parti de l'Ordre's vote share	1080	47.151	18.167	2.222	99.703	34.885	49.389	59.268
Pascalisans in % (Late 19th century)	2056	54.308	28.720	2.700	99.464	31.501	52.500	81.846
Protestants (16th century)	4448	5.381	10.095	0.000	100.000	0.000	2.326	5.556
Protestants (17th century)	4448	4.237	9.556	0.000	100.000	0.000	1.429	3.704
Proximity to monasteries	4448	2.155	1.001	0.000	8.368	1.596	1.987	2.646
Ruggedness	4448	0.936	1.142	0.065	6.844	0.331	0.526	0.939
School per student	4008	62.638	22.981	0.300	162.779	48.718	60.072	76.934
Sharecropping	4448	0.011	0.014	0.000	0.066	0.001	0.006	0.016
Urbanization rate	4448	0.343	0.204	0.000	1.000	0.189	0.309	0.460
Urbanization rate (>5,000h)	4448	0.159	0.183	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.122	0.239
Urbanization rate (>10,000h)	4448	0.100	0.177	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.175
Urbanization rate (>20,000h)	4448	0.064	0.164	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Vendean West	4448	0.146	0.353	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Wage (fed men workers) (1852)	4448	0.782	0.249	0.000	1.500	0.620	0.806	0.970
Wheat suitability	4448	3.779	1.162	1.214	8.000	2.937	3.631	4.458
<i>Canton level data:</i>								
Log(town size) in 1885	2798	7.411	0.945	5.602	14.668	6.800	7.272	7.747
Pascalisans in % (Late 19th century)	1040	56.278	29.576	1.000	100.000	33.000	56.100	86.825
Log(town size) in 1946	2798	7.305	1.168	4.928	14.818	6.532	7.062	7.793
Female mass attendance in % (1946)	1957	41.477	21.888	1.000	98.000	24.000	38.000	56.000
Female pascalisans in % (1946)	1893	51.138	24.999	3.000	99.000	30.000	49.000	71.000
Male mass attendance in % (1946)	1957	23.357	20.335	0.000	95.000	8.000	16.000	33.000
Male pascalisans in % (1946)	1928	31.246	25.337	0.000	100.000	11.000	23.000	48.000
Ruggedness	2798	1.049	1.318	0.004	8.824	0.328	0.558	1.108
Wheat suitability	2798	3.861	1.395	1.000	8.000	3.000	3.750	4.667



## B Spatial standard errors

Table 7: Spatial standard errors.

	Dep. var.: Anti-Republican vote share (1876 to 1898).							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Spatial standard errors.</i>								
log(biens nationaux)	-3.27870	-5.77836	-4.89097	-4.44827				
Clustered s.e.	(0.75110)***	(0.80872)***	(0.82283)***	(0.88942)***				
Cutoff:50km	[1.09898]***	[1.12132]***	[1.15899]***	[1.26186]***				
Cutoff:100km	[1.55672]**	[1.39168]***	[1.42249]***	[1.54043]***				
Cutoff:200km	[1.91954]*	[1.58738]***	[1.63688]***	[1.70683]***				
Cutoff:300km	[1.84921]*	[1.58369]***	[1.63726]***	[1.58131]***				
Cutoff:400km	[1.74469]*	[1.52919]***	[1.59470]***	[1.48828]***				
Cutoff:500km	[1.61095]**	[1.37817]***	[1.43218]***	[1.30417]***				
Cutoff:600km	[1.49913]**	[1.20567]***	[1.21571]***	[1.09344]***				
Cutoff:700km	[1.47201]**	[1.09755]***	[1.07674]***	[0.98531]***				
Cutoff:800km	[1.45204]**	[1.03633]***	[0.99548]***	[0.91497]***				
Cutoff:900km	[1.40355]**	[0.98668]***	[0.94076]***	[0.86039]***				
Cutoff:1,000km	[1.34706]**	[0.94369]***	[0.89670]***	[0.81622]***				
Biens Nationaux (% of land)					-0.32844	-0.87050	-0.71465	-0.57053
Clustered s.e.					(0.13577)**	(0.16594)***	(0.15187)***	(0.15806)***
Cutoff:50km					[0.17956]*	[0.23230]***	[0.20838]***	[0.19828]***
Cutoff:100km					[0.23059]	[0.27241]***	[0.23563]***	[0.22418]**
Cutoff:200km					[0.26957]	[0.32578]***	[0.26561]***	[0.25075]**
Cutoff:300km					[0.27311]	[0.33146]***	[0.24720]***	[0.22016]***
Cutoff:400km					[0.27494]	[0.33812]**	[0.23398]***	[0.20185]***
Cutoff:500km					[0.27532]	[0.33992]**	[0.22538]***	[0.19539]***
Cutoff:600km					[0.26974]	[0.32319]***	[0.21136]***	[0.18703]***
Cutoff:700km					[0.26452]	[0.30503]***	[0.19867]***	[0.17906]***
Cutoff:800km					[0.25351]	[0.28833]***	[0.18576]***	[0.16687]***
Cutoff:900km					[0.24253]	[0.27340]***	[0.17628]**	[0.15830]***
Cutoff:1,000km					[0.23103]	[0.25941]***	[0.16726]***	[0.15021]***
Geographic controls		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Economic controls			✓	✓			✓	✓
Education controls				✓				✓
Region F.E		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
<i>Panel B: Moran's I.</i>								
Observations	2783	2783	2783	2507	1265	1265	1265	1157
R-squared	0.28250	0.39940	0.41095	0.41307	0.27308	0.39711	0.41784	0.41186
Cutoff:50km	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
Cutoff:100km	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
Cutoff:200km	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
Cutoff:300km	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
Cutoff:400km	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
Cutoff:500km	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
Cutoff:600km	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
Cutoff:700km	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
Cutoff:800km	0.00000	0.00032	0.00577	0.00149	0.00000	0.00000	0.00017	0.00029
Cutoff:900km	0.00000	0.06880	0.09636	0.06952	0.00000	0.16165	0.60633	0.58492
Cutoff:1000km	0.00000	0.18953	0.31811	0.59502	.	.	.	1.00000
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1								

*Note:* This table investigates whether our main results are robust to spatial auto-correlation. Panel A reports clustered standard errors at the department-election year level and Conley (1999) standard errors correcting for spatial auto-correlation. Conley standard errors are presented under the coefficient estimates and assume correlation ranges of 50km, 100km, 200km, ... , 900km, and 1,000km with a linearly declining spatial weighing kernel. Panel B shows the p-values for Moran's I statistic for different cutoff values. The null hypothesis is the absence of spatial auto-correlation in the residuals from the regressions in Panel A. The p-values for Moran's I are not given when neighbors within the cutoff value consist of all observations.

Table 8: Spatial standard errors (Late 19<sup>th</sup> century religiosity).

	Dep. var.: Pascalisants (Late 19 <sup>th</sup> century.)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: Spatial standard errors.</i>						
log(biens nationaux)	-13.1420	-8.25502	-8.33333			
Clustered s.e.	(2.53184)***	(2.71252)***	(2.71223)***			
Cutoff:50km	[2.03944]***	[1.96903]***	[1.93462]***			
Cutoff:100km	[2.39214]***	[2.07918]***	[2.08324]***			
Cutoff:200km	[2.70519]***	[1.88693]***	[1.93801]***			
Cutoff:300km	[2.83948]***	[1.97686]***	[2.00938]***			
Cutoff:400km	[2.86707]***	[1.93795]***	[1.97418]***			
Cutoff:500km	[2.67660]***	[1.89478]***	[1.91097]***			
Cutoff:600km	[2.37860]***	[1.77222]***	[1.77698]***			
Cutoff:700km	[2.15418]***	[1.65773]***	[1.66318]***			
Cutoff:800km	[2.00374]***	[1.55617]***	[1.55707]***			
Cutoff:900km	[1.90741]***	[1.45914]***	[1.45378]***			
Cutoff:1000km	[1.81023]***	[1.38344]***	[1.37809]***			
Biens nationaux				-0.20423	-0.13230	-0.13406
Clustered s.e.				(0.029216)***	(0.028548)***	(0.029025)***
Cutoff:50km				[0.025698]***	[0.024681]***	[0.025198]***
Cutoff:100km				[0.028007]***	[0.024185]***	[0.024872]***
Cutoff:200km				[0.029489]***	[0.021251]***	[0.023555]***
Cutoff:300km				[0.027600]***	[0.020435]***	[0.023352]***
Cutoff:400km				[0.024327]***	[0.017654]***	[0.021088]***
Cutoff:500km				[0.019700]***	[0.017316]***	[0.020660]***
Cutoff:600km				[0.015592]***	[0.017076]***	[0.020355]***
Cutoff:700km				[0.014845]***	[0.015418]***	[0.018578]***
Cutoff:800km				[0.014410]***	[0.013773]***	[0.016730]***
Cutoff:900km				[0.013817]***	[0.012805]***	[0.015537]***
Cutoff:1000km				[0.013116]***	[0.012148]***	[0.014739]***
Oath	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographic controls		✓	✓		✓	✓
Economic controls		✓	✓		✓	✓
Region F.E.		✓	✓		✓	✓
Data type F.E.			✓			✓
Data decade F.E.			✓			✓
Region F.E		✓	✓		✓	✓
<i>Panel B: Moran's I.</i>						
Observations	168	168	168	168	168	168
R-squared	0.63374	0.72901	0.73291	0.63370	0.73518	0.73977
Cutoff:50km	.	.	.	.	.	.
Cutoff:100km	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
Cutoff:200km	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
Cutoff:300km	0.00002	0.38917	0.06816	0.00000	0.26473	0.03804
Cutoff:400km	0.00006	0.93604	0.46472	0.00000	0.91824	0.36745
Cutoff:500km	0.00009	0.04588	0.02983	0.00002	0.03010	0.01442
Cutoff:600km	0.47509	0.01067	0.00376	0.01285	0.03385	0.00703
Cutoff:700km	0.52768	0.22439	0.08138	0.00652	0.40775	0.13162
Cutoff:800km	0.02586	0.00000	0.00000	0.21149	0.00000	0.00000
Cutoff:900km	0.06986	0.00239	0.00122	0.02104	0.00010	0.00003
Cutoff:1000km	.	.	.	.	.	.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1						

*Note:* This table investigates whether our main results are robust to spatial auto-correlation. Panel A reports clustered standard errors at the department level and Conley (1999) standard errors correcting for spatial auto-correlation. Conley standard errors are presented under the coefficient estimates and assume correlation ranges of 50km, 100km, 200km, ... , 900km and 1,000km with a linearly declining spatial weighing kernel. Panel B shows the p-values for Moran's I statistic for different cutoff values. The null hypothesis is the absence of spatial auto-correlation in the residuals from the regressions in Panel A. The p-values for Moran's I are not given when: a) for all observations, neighbors within the cutoff value consist of the entire sample, b) when some observations do not have any neighbors within the cutoff.

Table 9: Spatial standard errors, religiosity in 1947).

	Dep. var.: Pascalisants (1947).							
	Men		Women		Men		Women	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Spatial standard errors.</i>								
log(biens nationaux)	-4.61776	-5.65624	-5.57359	-5.18050				
Clustered s.e.	(1.88495)**	(1.69640)***	(2.08154)***	(1.57799)***				
Cutoff:50km	[1.54055]***	[1.54137]***	[1.58662]***	[1.36200]***				
Cutoff:100km	[1.90799]**	[1.71457]***	[2.07346]***	[1.48896]***				
Cutoff:200km	[2.23885]**	[1.76201]***	[2.52882]**	[1.57389]***				
Cutoff:300km	[2.37016]*	[1.96537]***	[2.69225]**	[1.79221]***				
Cutoff:400km	[2.37306]*	[2.04181]***	[2.64076]**	[1.95299]***				
Cutoff:500km	[2.19518]**	[2.07247]***	[2.37850]**	[2.05123]**				
Cutoff:600km	[1.93043]**	[2.03612]***	[2.08189]**	[2.06671]**				
Cutoff:700km	[1.71899]***	[1.92754]***	[1.87539]***	[2.00099]***				
Cutoff:800km	[1.62249]***	[1.81186]***	[1.76614]***	[1.90049]***				
Cutoff:900km	[1.53209]***	[1.71006]***	[1.66340]***	[1.79539]***				
Cutoff:1000km	[1.45464]***	[1.62166]***	[1.57845]***	[1.70224]***				
Biens nationaux					-0.060243	-0.063195	-0.079452	-0.060581
Clustered s.e.					(0.019403)***	(0.021829)***	(0.019282)***	(0.020720)***
Cutoff:50km					[0.016278]***	[0.019207]***	[0.016422]***	[0.017910]***
Cutoff:100km					[0.019603]***	[0.021891]***	[0.019557]***	[0.019826]***
Cutoff:200km					[0.021528]***	[0.024528]***	[0.022764]***	[0.022394]***
Cutoff:300km					[0.021483]***	[0.025860]**	[0.023892]***	[0.024197]**
Cutoff:400km					[0.019795]***	[0.024499]***	[0.022486]***	[0.024071]**
Cutoff:500km					[0.017603]***	[0.021996]***	[0.019726]***	[0.022643]***
Cutoff:600km					[0.014401]***	[0.020047]***	[0.016228]***	[0.021151]***
Cutoff:700km					[0.012070]***	[0.017956]***	[0.013965]***	[0.019530]***
Cutoff:800km					[0.011580]***	[0.016468]***	[0.013077]***	[0.018132]***
Cutoff:900km					[0.010941]***	[0.015420]***	[0.012287]***	[0.016991]***
Cutoff:1000km					[0.010404]***	[0.014615]***	[0.011669]***	[0.016095]***
Oath	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographic controls		✓		✓		✓		✓
Region F.E.		✓		✓		✓		✓
Region F.E.		✓		✓		✓		✓
<i>Panel B: Moran's I.</i>								
Observations	286	286	281	281	286	286	281	281
R-squared	0.41162	0.54707	0.40877	0.57813	0.40959	0.53769	0.41418	0.57165
Cutoff:50km								
Cutoff:100km	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
Cutoff:200km	0.00000	0.03399	0.00000	0.00430	0.00000	0.00114	0.00000	0.00006
Cutoff:300km	0.54939	0.38087	0.00000	0.01845	0.25122	0.02620	0.00000	0.00040
Cutoff:400km	0.00000	0.37674	0.00003	0.13417	0.00000	0.75943	0.00011	0.39244
Cutoff:500km	0.00165	0.17775	0.00000	0.00037	0.00262	0.73726	0.00000	0.00223
Cutoff:600km	0.04493	0.00363	0.11232	0.60607	0.05280	0.00082	0.02374	0.35305
Cutoff:700km	0.01903	0.08114	0.00163	0.40906	0.01616	0.23059	0.00034	0.78618
Cutoff:800km	0.45585	0.64039	0.49331	0.86989	0.82790	0.97348	0.67303	0.88972
Cutoff:900km	0.82048	0.75319	0.75085	0.74123	0.81209	0.92583	0.99742	0.89945
Cutoff:1000km	0.03700	0.13718	0.20987	0.05862	0.02127	0.10859	0.13552	0.03698
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1								

*Note:* This table investigates whether our main results are robust to spatial auto-correlation. Panel A reports clustered standard errors at the department level and Conley (1999) standard errors correcting for spatial auto-correlation. Conley standard errors are presented under the coefficient estimates and assume correlation ranges of 50km, 100km, 200km, ... , 900km and 1,000km with a linearly declining spatial weighing kernel. Panel B shows the p-values for Moran's I statistic for different cutoff values. The null hypothesis is the absence of spatial auto-correlation in the residuals from the regressions in Panel A. The p-values for Moran's I are not given when: a) for all observations, neighbors within the cutoff value consist of the entire sample, b) when some observations do not have any neighbors within the cutoff.

## C Sensitivity to the selection of observables

### C.1 Generalized sensitivity analysis

To understand how much of our results' magnitude and statistical significance could be driven by omitted factors, we use the generalized sensitivity analysis developed by Imbens (2003) and Harada (2013). Figures 14, 15, and 16 show how correlated an unobservable would need to be in order to decrease the significance of our main results below the 5% significance level.

The covariates in the figures are plotted with respect to their partial correlation with both the dependent variable (y-axis) and our main independent variable (x-axis). The points through which the lines are fitted are generated pseudo-unobservables. The blue lines represent the frontier beyond which unobserved covariates would have to be to reduce statistical significance below the 5% level.

Figure 14 displays three panels for the three variants of our main independent variables in Table 1. In all cases, the included covariates are much less correlated to both the anti-republican vote share and our measure of the *biens nationaux* than an unobservable would have to be in order to undo the statistical significance of our results at the 5% level.

Figure 15 reproduces the same analysis but for table 4 in which we look at the effect of the *biens nationaux* on the percentage of the population doing their Easter religious duty during the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. When using the log of *biens nationaux* as our main independent variable (left panel), both our "Ruggedness" and "Oath" are very close to the frontier, suggesting that unobservables whose partial correlations were similar to that of those two variables could reduce the statistical significance of our results below the 5% threshold. Yet that our "Oath" variable has a large effect on religiosity during the late 19<sup>th</sup> century is far from surprising since that variable was used to control for pre-Revolution religiosity. In addition, when using the unlogged version of our measure of *biens nationaux*, the partial correlations of the included covariates are very far from what they would have to be for unobservables to reduce the statistical significance of our results substantially.

Finally, Figure 16 reproduces the same analysis but for table 5 in which we look at the effect of the *biens nationaux* on the percentage of the population doing their Easter religious duty in 1947. Here as well, to reduce significance below the 5% level, an unobservable would have to explain a substantially larger portion of the variation than most of our controls. The only substantial exception is our “Oath” variable —which again is unsurprising since it proxies for pre-Revolution religiosity.

Figure 14: Sensitivity analysis (Table 1).





Figure 15: Sensitivity analysis (Table 4).





Figure 16: Sensitivity analysis (Table 5).



## C.2 Selection of unobservables sensitivity analysis *à la* Oster (2019)

To further check for whether our results are robust to potential selection on unobservables, we report Oster’s  $\delta$  for our main results in Tables 10, 11, and 12. Oster’s (2019) sensitivity analysis offers us a way to assess the robustness of our results to omitted variables. Oster’s  $\delta$  is a ratio of how much the selection of unobservables would have to be compared to the selection of observables to get a zero effect —i.e.  $\beta = 0$  in equation 1. For all of the estimates in Tables 10, 11, and 12, we use Oster’s (2019) proposed rule of thumb that  $R^2_{long} = 1.3 \times R^2_{med}$ , which means that we assume that  $R^2$  would rise by a maximum of 30% when controlling for all unobservables.

Masten & Poirier (2023) point out that Oster’s  $\delta$  (the  $\beta = 0$  “breakdown point”) is different from the sign change breakdown point. Since our hypothesis is that the redistribution of Churchland *reduced* the political primacy of anti-republicanism, not that  $\beta \neq 0$ , we also report the results from Masten & Poirier’s (2023) sensitivity analysis which tells us how much selection on unobservables would have to be relative to the selection on observables for our results to have the opposite sign.

Masten & Poirier (2023) define  $\beta_{med}$  as the coefficient of interest when including observed covariates and  $\beta_{long}$  the coefficient of interest when including both observed and unobserved covariates. They also define the largest difference between  $\beta_{med}$  and  $\beta_{long}$  as  $M$ . That is  $M = |\beta_{long} - \beta_{med}|$ . If  $M = 0$ , then obviously, no selection on unobservables can reverse the sign of our coefficient of interest. If  $M$  is set large enough, then it will not affect the results of our sensitivity analysis as the restriction will not bind. In the absence of a restriction on the value of  $M$ , the value of the sign change breakdown point estimate is always below 1 (Masten & Poirier, 2023). If we assume an upper bound on omitted variable bias, on the other hand, then the sign change breakdown point estimates can rise above unity. In the tables below, we restrict  $M$  to 5, 10, and 20 times  $\beta_{med}$ .

In Table 10, we report the estimates of Oster’s  $\delta$  and of the sign change breakdown point for different thresholds of  $M$ . The observable covariates included are those of Table 1, column 7. The first column of Table 10 suggests that the selection on unobservables would have to

Table 10: Sensitivity analysis for Table 1.

	Oster (2019)		Masten & Poirier (2023)		
	$\delta$ (1)	$+\infty$ (2)	$5 \times \beta_{med}$ (3)	$10 \times \beta_{med}$ (4)	$20 \times \beta_{med}$ (5)
log(biens nationaux)	19.6244	0.9867	13.3983	3.2159	1.4183
Biens nationaux	10.0841	0.9997	1.0007	0.9998	0.9997
Biens nationaux (% of land)	5.1749	1.0000	1.6053	1.2165	1.0817

be between 5.2 and 19.6 times larger than the selection on observables for the effect of *biens nationaux* on the anti-republican vote share to vanish. Column 2 reports the sign change breakdown point without any restriction on the magnitude of omitted variable bias. The values in column 2 are very close to 1, which is the maximum value this estimate can take. This suggests selection on unobservable is unlikely to change the sign of our main result. When restricting the magnitude of omitted variable bias, as in columns 3 to 5, the selection on unobservables needed to change the sign is significantly larger than the selection on observables. The only exception is when using our unlogged measure of the value of the *biens nationaux* whose (restricted) sign change breakdown point remains extremely close to 1.

Table 11: Sensitivity analysis for Table 4.

	Oster (2019)		Masten & Poirier (2023)		
	$\delta$ (1)	$+\infty$ (2)	$5 \times \beta_{med}$ (3)	$10 \times \beta_{med}$ (4)	$20 \times \beta_{med}$ (5)
log(biens nationaux)	1.4941	1.0000		1.7726	1.7726
Biens nationaux	2.3608	1.0000	1.0587	1.0267	1.0127

Tables 11 and 12 reproduce the same exercise but for our results on religiosity. In all cases, Oster's  $\delta$  is significantly above 1, while all restricted sign change breakdown points are above one.



Table 12: Sensitivity analysis for Table 5.

	Oster (2019)	Masten & Poirier (2023)			
	$\delta$	$+\infty$	$5 \times \beta_{med}$	$10 \times \beta_{med}$	$20 \times \beta_{med}$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Women pascalisans:</i>					
log(biens nationaux)	2.1460	1.0000	1.9872	1.9872	1.9872
Biens nationaux	5.0032	1.0000	1.0286	1.0120	1.0054
<i>Men pascalisans:</i>					
log(biens nationaux)	1.6053	1.0000	1.5168	1.5168	1.5168
Biens nationaux	5.0032	1.0000	1.0286	1.0120	1.0054

## D How robust is the measure of the *biens nationaux* from the *Archives Parlementaires*?

### D.1 Accounting for the depreciation of the *assignats*


One potential issue with our main measure of the *biens nationaux* taken from the *Archives Parlementaires* is that it mixes the auctioned value of the Church assets already sold by November 1791 and the estimated value of the unsold Church assets —the estimated price being equal to 22 times the 1790 income of the asset. Since the revolutionary paper currency was already depreciating —although mildly— in 1790 and 1791, we check if our results are sensitive to adjusting the auctioned value part of our measure by hypothetical depreciation rates of the *assignats*.<sup>94</sup> Since by November 1791, the *assignats* had depreciated by 18%, we recalculated the hypothetical real value of the auctioned Church assets prior to that date, assuming a depreciation rate between 0 and 25%.<sup>95</sup>

Figure 17 and 18 graph our results, which are virtually unchanged for all *assignat* depreciation thresholds compared to our results in Table 1 and 4.

<sup>94</sup>They are hypothetical because we do not know the timing of the sales before November 1791.


<sup>95</sup>In other words our alternative measure of the *biens nationaux* is equal to (Auctioned  $\times$   $A$  + Estimated)/1793 Population, where  $A \in (0.75, 1)$  is the price of one *assignat* in specie.

Figure 17: Accounting for the depreciation of the *assignats*. (Table 1, column 7).



*Note:* These two figures graph the distribution of 25 coefficients on our recalculated  $\log(\text{biens nationaux})$  variable as well as their t-statistics.

Figure 18: Accounting for the depreciation of the *assignats*. (Table 4, column 3).



*Note:* These two figures graph the distribution of 25 coefficients on our recalculated  $\log(\text{biens nationaux})$  variable as well as their t-statistics.

## D.2 Using a different measure from the *Archives Parlementaires*

We build a new measure of the *biens nationaux* from the *Archives Parlementaires* that we use in this subsection. The new measure excludes the estimates of the value of the *biens nationaux* whose sale had been delayed in 1792. This is the category for which the most observations are missing, as 65 districts had not yet estimated the value of those assets. This category accounts for only 12.8% of the total value of the *biens nationaux* estimated by this report from the *Archives Parlementaires* we use.

Table 13: Results from Table 1 using a modified measure of *biens nationaux*.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>Log value of Biens nationaux per capita:</i>							
log(biens nationaux)	-2.90142*** (0.74708)	-5.70913*** (0.70399)	-5.48738*** (0.78483)	-4.61195*** (0.73680)	-4.63677*** (0.80412)	-4.50743*** (0.78303)	-4.08994*** (0.88065)
Observations	3083	3083	3083	3083	3083	2765	2765
R-squared	0.28	0.35	0.40	0.36	0.41	0.36	0.42
<i>Magnitude:</i>							
Standardized beta coefficients	-2.76	-5.43	-5.22	-4.39	-4.41	-4.26	-3.87
Mean of dependent variable	30.81	30.81	30.81	30.81	30.81	31.59	31.59
<i>Value of Biens nationaux per capita:</i>							
Biens nationaux	-0.040333*** (0.0098139)	-0.073480*** (0.0099229)	-0.078178*** (0.010423)	-0.054377*** (0.0099615)	-0.066434*** (0.010003)	-0.052707*** (0.010732)	-0.058413*** (0.011043)
Same controls as Table 1	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	3083	3083	3083	3083	3083	2765	2765
R-squared	0.27	0.34	0.39	0.35	0.41	0.36	0.41
<i>Magnitude:</i>							
Standardized beta coefficients	-2.36	-4.30	-4.58	-3.19	-3.89	-3.08	-3.41
Mean of dependent variable	30.81	30.81	30.81	30.81	30.81	31.59	31.59
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1							

Table 14: Results from Table 3 using a modified measure of *biens nationaux*.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
PANEL A: <i>Second stage:</i>							
log(biens nationaux)	-5.90468*** (1.19864)	-8.24736*** (1.20689)	-7.87289*** (1.42050)	-7.65025*** (1.26873)	-7.42741*** (1.37990)	-7.17518*** (1.43263)	-5.63955*** (1.57746)
<i>Magnitude:</i>							
Standardized beta coefficients	-5.62	-7.85	-7.49	-7.28	-7.07	-6.79	-5.34
Mean of dependent variable	30.81	30.81	30.81	30.81	30.81	31.59	31.59
AR p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
PANEL B: <i>First stage:</i>							
Monasteries per capita (year 1200)	11.5967*** (0.64006)	10.3014*** (0.58940)	8.74473*** (0.45858)	9.45224*** (0.48801)	8.65118*** (0.44268)	9.12452*** (0.49271)	8.10304*** (0.45837)
Same controls as Table 3	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	3083	3083	3083	3083	3083	2765	2765
Partial R <sup>2</sup>	0.17	0.15	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.12
F-stat	328.27	305.47	363.63	375.16	381.92	342.95	312.51
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1							

## E Second-origin *biens nationaux*

The Revolution led to the exodus more than 100,000 individuals, most of whom were aristocrats (Greer, 1951). Some of those emigrant nobles joined the ranks of the enemy, creating their own armies across the Rhine to fight the new regime. Yet other emigrant nobles joined the insurgency in the western regions surrounding Vendea. With the oath of the clergy, the problem of emigration became one of the most salient political issues of the Revolution (Tackett, 2015).

The Legislative Assembly started discussing the fate of *émigrés*' properties in January 1792. Yet it was only after the war against Austria was declared that their expropriation was seriously considered. Ordered by a decree on July 27, 1792, their sale was to make those responsible for the war pay for it. On August 14, the principle of parceling out these properties was adopted as legislators feared peasant riots. By the end of the summer, the sale of emigrants' properties was suspended. It was only resumed with the laws of June 3 and July 25, 1793. From that date onwards, the emigrants' properties were referred to as "second-origin properties," while the Church's assets were referred to as "first-origin properties."


Other than the need for public funds, Revolutionaries favored the expropriation of the emigrants' properties on the ground that it would bind the many buyers of those assets to the fate of the Republic. This motivation was particularly obvious in the Ventôse decrees (February 26 and March 3, 1794), inspired by Saint-Just, which ordered the free distribution of both emigrants' and suspects' properties to patriots. Saint-Just thought that "To reform morals, one must begin by satisfying needs and interests; everyone must have some land." (Saint-Just, 1908, p.513). The Revolution should be steered, Saint-Just argued, "to the benefit of those who support it and to the ruin of those who oppose it." (Mathiez, 1928, p.203). According to Albert Mathiez (1928), the three main players in the Committee of Public Safety, Robespierre, Saint-Just, and Couthon, were convinced that they could only establish the Republic by creating a new social class from scratch that would owe its existence to it.<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>96</sup>Most of the policies aimed at redistributing land to the poor were quickly repealed and never implemented (Bodinier, 2005). While the legislature ordered "second-origin properties" to be split into parcels to favor accession to property, many buyers bought all parcels to keep the properties intact. See the many examples of second-origin

One potential worry with our results in the body of the article is that confiscated emigrant properties are correlated with both the confiscated Church properties and political outcomes. Figure 6 shows that there is no apparent correlation between the *biens nationaux* of first and second origins. We used Bodinier & Teyssier’s (2000) data about emigrants’ properties for 149 districts —around 27% of their total number. As can be seen in Figure 19 with the many (grey) missing observations, the data on the second-origin *biens nationaux* is much more incomplete.

Figure 19: Second origin *biens nationaux* according to Bodinier & Teyssier (2000) (% of land).



*Notes:* For the map, but the econometric results, we excluded one district in the department of Sarthe where second origin *biens nationaux* covered more than 27% of the land surface area. The red border represents the Vendean West as described by Hargenvilliers (Vallée, 1937). Grey cells represent missing observations.

Yet incompleteness of the data is not the only reason why we do not use the expropriated emigrants’ assets in our main analysis. Another problem is that while the expropriation of the Church was a comprehensive national policy, the expropriation of nobles varied based on: a) whether nobles opposed the Revolution enough to leave and b) the acts of the local *biens nationaux* in Marion et al. (1911).

administration. As Tackett (2015, p.76) points out, for the prosecution of emigrants, “local authorities might drag their feet or devise policies of their own for political or ideological reasons.” Regions in open revolt against the Republic naturally had more emigrants and were likely to vote Republican later on in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Thus, the endogeneity of emigration likely leads to understating the effect of the second-origin national properties on the building of a Republican coalition.

This problem is particularly acute when it comes to the region around Vendée. Here, many nobles joined the rebellion, and more second-origin national assets likely reflected greater anti-Republicanism. So great was the potential for an insurgency that still in 1804, the “Vendean West” (signaled by the red border in Figure 19) still benefited from partial exemptions to conscription (Vallée, 1937; Piano & Rouanet, 2020).<sup>97</sup> On average, second-origin *biens nationaux* covered 5.8% of the territory in the Vendean West versus 3.1% in the rest of France.<sup>98</sup>

Using this distinction between the Vendean West and the rest of France, we show in Table 15 that, as expected, there is a *positive* relationship between the anti-republican vote share and the amount of emigrant land expropriated and sold in the Vendean West, but a *negative* and statistically significant relationship for the rest of France. We include our different measures of expropriated Church assets in columns 3, 5, 7, 8, and 9. Despite the data limitations, all of the coefficients on those measures are negative, and only one coefficient in column 7 fails the traditional significance thresholds.<sup>99</sup>

Finally, while the magnitude of the second-origin *biens nationaux* relative to those of first-origin seems greater in columns 3, 5, and 7, one should keep in mind that the standard deviation is 3 times greater for the latter than for the former in non-Vendean France. Similarly, in columns 8 and 9, a one standard deviation increase in “log(biens nationaux)” or “Biens nationaux” reduces the anti-republican vote share by more than twice as much as a one standard deviation

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<sup>97</sup>The head of the conscription division during Napoléon’s rule, Hargenvilliers, made this distinction between the Vendean West and the rest of France based on the conscription statistics he compiled.

<sup>98</sup>On the other hand, in our data, expropriated Church assets covered on average 4.9% of the territory in the Vendean West and 5.8% for the rest of France.

<sup>99</sup>Note that the coefficient in column 7 would be significant ( $p = 0.02$ ) if we excluded the Vendean West from the sample.

increase in our measure of second-origin national properties. Overall, our results are robust to accounting for the sale of emigrants’ properties.

Table 15: Our results are robust to accounting for second origin *biens nationaux*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
2 <sup>nd</sup> Origin × Not Vendean West	-0.064354 (0.42781)	-1.97834*** (0.43208)	-1.93095*** (0.44184)	-1.86049*** (0.42972)	-1.84944*** (0.43941)	-1.94189*** (0.42949)	-2.04313*** (0.44440)	-1.01515** (0.51501)	-0.94467* (0.50902)	-2.06841** (0.44812)	-1.46095*** (0.44785)
2 <sup>nd</sup> Origin × Vendean West	0.63906** (0.30671)	0.91419*** (0.23829)	0.92486*** (0.22315)	0.99018*** (0.24380)	0.98939*** (0.23055)	1.16094*** (0.29072)	1.19403*** (0.28496)	1.16164*** (0.28284)	1.08194*** (0.28048)	1.12737*** (0.29064)	6.17683** (2.53952)
Vendean West	18.2457*** (3.86264)	12.6904*** (4.35344)	12.4446*** (4.22195)	11.1200** (4.52991)	11.2468** (4.39461)	9.69644** (4.56413)	10.4595** (4.50895)	12.1196** (4.90443)	8.07017* (4.70740)	10.1400** (4.51690)	-16.2596 (11.3022)
Biens Nationaux (% of land)			-0.37089*** (0.12475)		-0.37989*** (0.12466)		-0.18114 (0.14142)				
Biens nationaux								-0.049337*** (0.011954)			
log(biens nationaux)									-5.16396*** (0.99757)		
Jacobin Clubs										5.67370 (4.53902)	
Clergy’s Oath											-14.9682*** (3.52778)
Geographic controls		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Economic controls				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Education controls					✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Region F.E.		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	863	863	827	863	827	809	773	719	719	809	749
R-squared	0.38	0.50	0.51	0.50	0.52	0.51	0.52	0.51	0.51	0.51	0.55

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## F What about the Second Republic (1848-1852)?

Under Louis-Philippe (1830-1848), relations between the Church and the government had been strained. In 1848, many clerics joined with Republicans in welcoming the King’s flight and the Second Republic’s advent (Cobban, 1942; Duroselle, 1948; Lalouette, 2004). Priests blessed “liberty trees” planted all across France. It seemed that royalism had been vanquished. On February 27, 1848, a prominent clerical newspaper, *L’Univers*, asked, “Who is thinking today in France of supporting the Monarchy?” (Cobban, 1942, p.334).

Following the 1848 Revolution, almost all religious authorities rallied to the Republic. For example, on February 27, 1848, the Archbishop of Lyon enjoined priests to give “the faithful the example of obedience and submission to the Republic. You have often vowed to enjoy the freedom that makes our brothers in the United States so happy: this freedom you shall have. If the authorities wish to display the flag of the nation on religious buildings, lend yourselves

with alacrity to the desire of the authorities. The flag of the Republic will always be a protective flag for religion.” Likewise, the ecclesiastical authorities relayed the appeal of the provisional government which, on February 29, requested that priests call “for divine blessing on the work of the people” by reciting a *Domine, salvam fac Republicam* at the end of the Sunday mass. In addition, the 1848 Constitution starts with: “In the presence of God and in the name of the French People...” which breaks with the anti-religiousness of the Jacobin First Republic.<sup>100</sup>

In a context where neither anti-clericalism nor the re-establishment of a monarchy were central to political debates —which, instead, focused on the increased prominence of the nascent socialist movement— we should expect the sale of the *biens nationaux* half a century earlier to have a weaker effect on electoral outcomes in 1848 and 1849.<sup>101</sup>

Table 16: The effect of land redistribution on the 1848 and 1849 legislative elections.

	<i>Montagne's vote share</i>					<i>Parti de l'Ordre's vote share</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
log(biens nationaux)	0.21024 (0.87996)	2.21358** (1.04534)	2.40344** (1.08860)	2.38408** (1.06743)	2.35448** (1.04880)	0.92505 (1.07089)	-0.28499 (0.83385)	-1.28724 (1.00379)	-1.27574 (1.00448)	-1.56570 (1.04698)
Jacobin Clubs				18.7725*** (5.56600)					-11.1431*** (4.08363)	
Clergy's Oath					13.2382*** (3.52413)					7.78555** (3.05809)
Wheat suitability		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
Ruggedness		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
Urbanisation rate		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
Sharecropping			✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓
Fallow land (%)			✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓
Wage (fed men workers)			✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓
Region F.E.		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
Year F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	944	944	944	944	876	944	944	944	944	876
R-squared	0.05	0.22	0.24	0.26	0.32	0.02	0.36	0.38	0.39	0.40
<i>Magnitude:</i>										
Standardized beta coefficients	0.19	2.01	2.18	2.16	2.06	0.84	-0.26	-1.17	-1.16	-1.37
Mean of dependent variable	28.4	28.4	28.4	28.4	27.83	47.71	47.71	47.71	47.71	47.76

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

During the Second Republic, the conservative *Parti de l'Ordre* was a patchwork of Bonapartists, Legitimists, Orleanists, and conservative Republicans (such as Alexis de Tocqueville). In 1849, more than 60% of conservative deputies were Orleanists, who, as explained above, supported a regime with strained relationships with the Catholic Church (Chevallier, 2021). During

<sup>100</sup>Christophe (1998) gives numerous other examples of the clergy's support to the Republic right up to the elections of April 23 and 24, 1848.

<sup>101</sup>As Lalouette (2004) puts it, “[R]eligious affairs of the nation were clearly not considered a priority.”



the 1848 election, Louis Napoléon Bonaparte, future emperor Napoléon III, presented himself as a republican, respectful of institutions (Encrevé, 2004). As Fasel (1974, p.662) puts it, during 1848, “[M]onarchism rarely surfaced overtly. A restoration of either royal house seemed momentarily remote; notables and Orléanist *fonctionnaires* were quick to profess their allegiance to the republic, and dyed-in-the-wool monarchists ran as republicans in the April election.”

Table 17: Reduced-form and instrumental variable estimates

	<i>Montagne's vote share</i>					<i>Parti de l'Ordre's vote share</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
PANEL A: <i>Reduced-form:</i>										
Monasteries per capita (year 1200)	38.0990* (19.8394)	61.8461*** (18.0871)	51.1611*** (17.2314)	52.2798*** (17.5676)	45.1668*** (16.6816)	34.5319* (20.7290)	-1.68416 (14.4352)	-7.34154 (14.4120)	-8.12012 (14.7664)	-15.5385 (14.5770)
Observations	1078	1078	1078	1078	978	1078	1078	1078	1078	978
R-squared	0.05	0.22	0.25	0.28	0.31	0.02	0.40	0.42	0.43	0.42
PANEL B: <i>Second stage:</i>										
log(biens nationaux)	1.58237 (1.68147)	5.34918** (2.12558)	4.97258* (2.65287)	5.26324* (2.68775)	5.06290* (2.66358)	4.85441*** (1.64882)	-0.14476 (1.73471)	-0.96467 (2.12172)	-1.13797 (2.13318)	-2.02265 (2.29204)
<i>Magnitude:</i>										
Standardized beta coefficients	1.43	4.85	4.51	4.77	4.42	4.40	-0.13	-0.87	-1.03	-1.77
Mean of dependent variable	28.4	28.4	28.4	28.4	27.83	47.71	47.71	47.71	47.71	47.76
AR p-value	0.344	0.011	0.053	0.044	0.049	0.006	0.934	0.653	0.598	0.380
tF adjusted 95% CI	[-1.7;4.9]	[1.2;9.5]	[-0.2;10.2]	[0.0;10.5]	[-0.2;10.3]	[1.6;8.1]	[-3.5;3.3]	[-5.1;3.2]	[-5.3;3.0]	[-6.5;2.5]
PANEL C: <i>First stage:</i>										
Monasteries per capita (year 1200)	10.2916*** (1.05317)	7.68057*** (0.68193)	6.40949*** (0.57903)	6.41633*** (0.58200)	5.96973*** (0.57186)	10.2916*** (1.05317)	7.68057*** (0.68193)	6.40949*** (0.57903)	6.41633*** (0.58200)	5.96973*** (0.57186)
Same controls as Table 16	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	944	944	944	944	876	944	944	944	944	876
Partial R <sup>2</sup>	0.14	0.12	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.14	0.12	0.10	0.10	0.10
F-stat	95.49	126.85	122.53	121.54	108.97	95.49	126.85	122.53	121.54	108.97

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Our results in Tables 16 and 17 confirm that while the *biens nationaux* had an effect on electoral outcomes, this effect was smaller than for the Third Republic. Table 16 gives the baseline OLS results for the Second Republic’s 1848 and 1849 elections. A one standard deviation increase in the (logged) value of *biens nationaux* per capita is associated with a less than 8% increase in the proportion of votes for radical Republicans (the *Montagnards*). Other than for the univariate regression, the effect of the *biens nationaux* on the votes for the conservative *Parti de l'Ordre* has the expected sign but is not statistically significant. Our instrumental variable results (Table 17), are somewhat stronger for the *Montagnards*. The absence of a significant negative effect of the *biens nationaux* on the *Parti de l'Ordre's* vote share is also consistent to the historical accounts of the Second Republic according to which neither monarchism nor clericalism were campaigned on during the legislative elections of 1848 and 1849.

## G Regressions for each election taken separately

Table 18: The effect of land redistribution in each election from 1876 to 1898.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>1876 election:</i>							
log(biens nationaux)	-7.18109*** (1.70630)	-9.97556*** (1.78599)	-7.52773*** (1.89355)	-7.97208*** (1.73520)	-5.96361*** (1.94862)	-6.88314*** (1.84108)	-4.69203** (2.09449)
Observations	463	463	463	463	463	417	417
R-squared	0.07	0.13	0.25	0.17	0.28	0.17	0.28
<i>Magnitude:</i>							
Standardized beta coefficients	-6.51	-9.04	-6.82	-7.23	-5.41	-6.26	-4.27
Mean of dependent variable	40.12	40.12	40.12	40.12	40.12	41.67	41.67
<i>1881 election:</i>							
log(biens nationaux)	-3.53372* (2.01721)	-6.63390*** (1.77031)	-6.69113*** (2.09666)	-5.47743*** (1.94209)	-5.81180*** (2.13039)	-5.54506*** (2.01218)	-5.23584** (2.33650)
Observations	464	464	464	464	464	418	418
R-squared	0.02	0.13	0.20	0.15	0.22	0.14	0.21
<i>Magnitude:</i>							
Standardized beta coefficients	-3.22	-6.05	-6.10	-4.99	-5.30	-5.08	-4.79
Mean of dependent variable	24.75	24.75	24.75	24.75	24.75	25.32	25.32
<i>1885 election:</i>							
log(biens nationaux)	-0.60729 (1.41955)	-3.05165** (1.34836)	-3.87219** (1.51715)	-3.24569** (1.32546)	-3.86416*** (1.45249)	-2.97871** (1.37539)	-3.40144** (1.64127)
Observations	464	464	464	464	464	418	418
R-squared	0.00	0.14	0.27	0.16	0.30	0.12	0.27
<i>Magnitude:</i>							
Standardized beta coefficients	-0.55	-2.78	-3.53	-2.96	-3.52	-2.73	-3.11
Mean of dependent variable	46.07	46.07	46.07	46.07	46.07	46.24	46.24
<i>1889 election:</i>							
log(biens nationaux)	-1.98698 (1.70116)	-5.51795*** (1.49635)	-6.40693*** (1.62981)	-4.81081*** (1.56175)	-5.61017*** (1.70402)	-4.83700*** (1.63118)	-5.00968** (1.90898)
Observations	464	464	464	464	464	418	418
R-squared	0.01	0.14	0.22	0.15	0.24	0.14	0.22
<i>Magnitude:</i>							
Standardized beta coefficients	-1.81	-5.03	-5.84	-4.39	-5.11	-4.43	-4.59
Mean of dependent variable	45.2	45.2	45.2	45.2	45.2	46.07	46.07
<i>1893 election:</i>							
log(biens nationaux)	-2.98582 (2.18526)	-5.13520** (2.08967)	-5.46983** (2.40031)	-3.67085* (2.20475)	-4.24877* (2.41274)	-4.06992* (2.26939)	-3.88493 (2.62742)
Observations	464	464	464	464	464	418	418
R-squared	0.01	0.09	0.21	0.11	0.23	0.12	0.24
<i>Magnitude:</i>							
Standardized beta coefficients	-2.72	-4.68	-4.99	-3.35	-3.87	-3.73	-3.56
Mean of dependent variable	17.33	17.33	17.33	17.33	17.33	17.47	17.47
<i>1898 election:</i>							
log(biens nationaux)	-3.42935* (1.83558)	-5.72881*** (1.74930)	-4.91253** (2.07065)	-4.24032** (1.90713)	-4.03416* (2.11028)	-5.26390*** (1.89559)	-4.58522** (2.13463)
Geographic controls		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Economic controls				✓	✓	✓	✓
Education controls						✓	✓
Region F.E.			✓		✓		✓
Observations	464	464	464	464	464	418	418
R-squared	0.02	0.11	0.22	0.14	0.24	0.16	0.25
<i>Magnitude:</i>							
Standardized beta coefficients	-3.13	-5.22	-4.48	-3.87	-3.68	-4.82	-4.20
Mean of dependent variable	12.58	12.58	12.58	12.58	12.58	12.85	12.85

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## H Results excluding Boulangist candidates from the monarchist vote count

Table 19: Results excluding the Boulangist candidates.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>1889 election:</i>							
log(biens nationaux)	-2.67392 (1.87949)	-6.32398*** (1.69529)	-6.88232*** (1.95215)	-4.99331*** (1.82555)	-5.85606*** (2.04080)	-4.72992** (1.89871)	-4.88424** (2.34518)
Observations	464	464	464	464	464	418	418
R-squared	0.01	0.13	0.23	0.15	0.25	0.12	0.22
<i>Magnitude:</i>							
Standardized beta coefficients	-2.44	-5.76	-6.27	-4.55	-5.34	-4.33	-4.47
Mean of dependent variable	39.42	39.42	39.42	39.42	39.42	40.35	40.35
<i>1893 election:</i>							
log(biens nationaux)	-3.65265* (2.18594)	-6.01185*** (2.02451)	-6.24338*** (2.32084)	-4.36209** (2.13634)	-4.95716** (2.34040)	-4.71107** (2.21224)	-4.47258* (2.57960)
Geographic controls		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Economic controls				✓	✓	✓	✓
Education controls						✓	✓
Region F.E			✓		✓		✓
Observations	464	464	464	464	464	418	418
R-squared	0.02	0.12	0.22	0.14	0.25	0.14	0.25
<i>Magnitude:</i>							
Standardized beta coefficients	-3.33	-5.48	-5.69	-3.98	-4.52	-4.31	-4.09
Mean of dependent variable	16.74	16.74	16.74	16.74	16.74	17.06	17.06
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1							

*Note:* This table reproduces the results in Table 18 for the election years 1889 and 1893 but excluding the candidates from from our measure of anti-republicanism.

# I Results excluding districts with an urbanization rate above one-third

Table 20: Results from Table 1 excluding districts with an urbanization rate above or equal to one third.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>Log value of Biens nationaux per capita:</i>							
log(biens nationaux)	-1.15622 (0.72327)	-4.54273*** (0.76205)	-3.66658*** (0.91304)	-4.05629*** (0.82813)	-2.56248*** (0.91096)	-3.66271*** (0.88073)	-2.18059** (0.96761)
Observations	1457	1457	1457	1457	1457	1290	1290
R-squared	0.32	0.36	0.43	0.38	0.45	0.40	0.46
<i>Magnitude:</i>							
Standardized beta coefficients	-1.06	-4.15	-3.35	-3.70	-2.34	-3.37	-2.01
Mean of dependent variable	29.59	29.59	29.59	29.59	29.59	30.12	30.12
<i>Value of Biens nationaux per capita:</i>							
Biens nationaux	-0.021549** (0.0090495)	-0.046092*** (0.0093413)	-0.042247*** (0.0099617)	-0.038183*** (0.0096114)	-0.034237*** (0.0097924)	-0.036046*** (0.0099431)	-0.030983*** (0.010260)
Observations	1457	1457	1457	1457	1457	1290	1290
R-squared	0.32	0.36	0.43	0.38	0.45	0.39	0.46
<i>Magnitude:</i>							
Standardized beta coefficients	-1.50	-3.21	-2.94	-2.66	-2.38	-2.59	-2.22
Mean of dependent variable	29.59	29.59	29.59	29.59	29.59	30.12	30.12
<i>Percentage of land surface covered by the Biens Nationaux:</i>							
Biens Nationaux (% of land)	-0.35174* (0.20913)	-0.71310*** (0.20965)	-0.84649*** (0.29218)	-0.59469*** (0.21875)	-0.78630*** (0.29099)	-0.54091** (0.22666)	-0.66878** (0.31529)
Same controls as Table 1	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	532	532	532	532	532	472	472
R-squared	0.31	0.34	0.42	0.37	0.44	0.41	0.45
<i>Magnitude:</i>							
Standardized beta coefficients	-1.64	-3.33	-3.95	-2.78	-3.67	-2.60	-3.21
Mean of dependent variable	31.56	31.56	31.56	31.56	31.56	31.57	31.57

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 21: Instrumental variable estimates excluding districts with an urbanization rate above or equal to one third.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>PANEL A: Reduced-form:</i>							
Monasteries per capita (year 1200)	-43.9883*** (14.0017)	-67.1110*** (14.4285)	-41.1584*** (14.7281)	-55.6852*** (14.2525)	-35.5784** (14.1227)	-58.5645*** (15.7558)	-33.3953** (15.5407)
Observations	1697	1697	1697	1697	1697	1460	1460
R-squared	0.32	0.36	0.43	0.38	0.45	0.40	0.45
<i>PANEL B: Second stage:</i>							
log(biens nationaux)	-7.21979*** (2.06299)	-9.43794*** (2.30777)	-10.4418*** (3.76623)	-8.62985*** (2.67428)	-8.73268** (3.64882)	-9.13731*** (2.66495)	-7.20882** (3.53353)
<i>Magnitude:</i>							
Standardized beta coefficients	-6.59	-8.62	-9.53	-7.88	-7.97	-8.41	-6.63
Mean of dependent variable	29.59	29.59	29.59	29.59	29.59	30.12	30.12
AR p-value	0.000	0.000	0.005	0.001	0.015	0.001	0.040
tF adjusted 95% CI	[-11.3; -3.2]	[-14.0; -4.9]	[-17.8; -3.1]	[-13.9; -3.4]	[-15.9; -1.6]	[-14.4 ; -3.9]	[-14.1 ; -0.3]
<i>PANEL C: First stage:</i>							
Monasteries per capita (year 1200)	7.86143*** (0.76678)	7.01623*** (0.63292)	4.42850*** (0.49276)	5.94510*** (0.50897)	4.31193*** (0.45997)	6.43557*** (0.52865)	4.75064*** (0.48510)
Geographic controls		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Economic controls				✓	✓	✓	✓
Education controls						✓	✓
Region F.E.			✓		✓		✓
Year F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1457	1457	1457	1457	1457	1290	1290
Partial $R^2$	0.09	0.10	0.06	0.08	0.06	0.10	0.07
F-stat	105.11	122.89	80.77	136.44	87.88	148.20	95.91
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1							

## J Results using different measures of urbanization

Table 22: Reproducing the results from Table 1, column 7 using different measures of urbanisation.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
log(biens nationaux)	-4.43931*** (0.89143)	-4.09854*** (0.93176)	-4.16983*** (0.93868)	-4.20873*** (0.93030)	-3.08885*** (0.87571)
Urbanization rate	6.48900** (3.08668)				29.5923*** (5.65225)
Urbanization rate (>5,000h)		-9.29554*** (2.55507)			-32.8028*** (6.67408)
Urbanization rate (>10,000h)			-7.01818*** (2.46570)		2.94550 (6.70892)
Urbanization rate (>20,000h)				-7.50939*** (2.60929)	-0.18175 (4.42319)
Table 1 c.7 controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	2507	2507	2507	2507	2507
R-squared	0.41	0.41	0.41	0.41	0.43

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## K IV results with alternative measures of *biens nationaux*

Table 23: Instrumental variable estimates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
PANEL A: <i>Second stage</i> :							
Biens nationaux	-0.090419*** (0.020422)	-0.11076*** (0.020898)	-0.10568*** (0.023308)	-0.10037*** (0.021454)	-0.097032*** (0.022331)	-0.098118*** (0.023207)	-0.074229*** (0.024426)
<i>Magnitude:</i>							
Standardized beta coefficients	-5.97	-7.32	-6.98	-6.63	-6.41	-6.60	-5.00
Mean of dependent variable	31	31	31	31	31	31.6	31.6
AR p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.003
tF adjusted 95% CI	[-0.13;-0.05]	[-0.15;-0.07]	[-0.15;-0.06]	[-0.14;-0.06]	[-0.14;-0.05]	[-0.14 ; -0.05]	[-0.12 ; -0.03]
PANEL B: <i>First stage</i> :							
Monasteries per capita (year 1200)	733.761*** (69.9048)	680.774*** (67.9820)	569.474*** (41.4804)	636.446*** (56.5373)	571.883*** (41.3345)	633.125*** (60.1374)	548.006*** (43.5697)
Geographic controls		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Economic controls				✓	✓	✓	✓
Education controls						✓	✓
Region F.E.			✓		✓		✓
Year F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	2783	2783	2783	2783	2783	2507	2507
Partial $R^2$	0.14	0.13	0.12	0.13	0.13	0.12	0.11
F-stat	110.18	100.28	188.48	126.72	191.42	110.84	158.20
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1							

Table 24: Instrumental variable estimates


	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
PANEL A: <i>Second stage</i> :							
Biens Nationaux (% of land)	-0.32224 (0.37098)	-0.99666** (0.41002)	-1.09337** (0.47080)	-1.10070*** (0.40738)	-1.18894*** (0.44931)	-0.48497 (0.40359)	-0.39144 (0.50365)
<i>Magnitude:</i>							
Standardized beta coefficients	-1.79	-5.53	-6.07	-6.11	-6.60	-2.74	-2.21
Mean of dependent variable	30.97	30.97	30.97	30.97	30.97	31.16	31.16
tF adjusted 95% CI	0.389	0.016	0.018	0.006	0.007	0.231	0.443
tF <sub>bounds</sub>	[-1.07;0.42]	[-1.85;-0.15]	[-2.06;-0.12]	[-1.92;-0.28]	[-2.10;-0.28]	[-1.29 ; 0.32]	[-1.44 ; 0.65]
PANEL B: <i>First stage</i> :							
Monasteries per capita (year 1200)	51.5546*** (6.30341)	45.3706*** (6.42291)	38.5887*** (5.31127)	46.0762*** (5.85721)	41.0908*** (5.29776)	47.8877*** (6.16089)	39.0998*** (5.87491)
Geographic controls		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Economic controls				✓	✓	✓	✓
Education controls						✓	✓
Region F.E.			✓		✓		✓
Year F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1265	1265	1265	1265	1265	1157	1157
Partial $R^2$	0.09	0.08	0.07	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.07
F-stat	66.89	49.90	52.79	61.88	60.16	60.42	44.29
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1							

## L Sensitivity of our results to changes in our instrument

The instrumental variable used in the main text is the number of monasteries in the Year 1200 per capita. Appendix L.1 looks at different year thresholds. All reduced form and IV coefficients are statistically significant and stable, with the possible exception of the coefficients using the monasteries per capita in the year 1100. Appendix L.2 reconstructs our instrument as the sum of the inverse distances to monasteries. Appendix L.3 uses the number of monasteries in the year 1200 instead of the per capita version of that variable.

### L.1 Different year thresholds

Figure 20: Our results are robust to using different year thresholds for our IV.



*Note:* The left panel uses Monasteries per capita at different years (1100, 1125, ..., 1500) in the same reduced form regression as in Table 3, column 7, which includes our geographic, economic, and education controls as well as region fixed effects. The right panel uses Monasteries per capita at the same year thresholds to see how sensitive our instrumental estimates are to changes in the chosen date. The figure reports the 95% confidence intervals.

### L.2 Using the proximity to monasteries in 1200 as IV

We measure the proximity to monasteries as:

$$P_i = \sum_j \frac{1}{1 + D_{ij}}, \forall j \text{ s.t. } D_{ij} \leq 200km \quad (5)$$



Where  $P_i$  is our distance-weighted measure of proximity to monasteries existing in 1200 for district  $i$ .  $D_{ij}$  is the distance between district  $i$  and monastery  $j$  situated within 200km of the district. Any monastery within the district has a distance equal to 0. Hence a monastery in a district contributes 1 to  $P_i$ , a monastery 9km from the district's centroid contributes 0.1, etc. As it is very unlikely monasteries had properties further than 200km away, we restrict our measure of proximity to monasteries using that threshold. We add 1 to  $D_{ij}$  in the denominator to avoid dividing by 0. The results using this instrument are presented in Table 25.

Table 25: Reduced-form and IV estimates using our distance weighted measure of proximity to monasteries.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>PANEL A: Reduced-form:</i>							
Proximity to monasteries	-2.67779*** (0.68418)	-5.77113*** (0.68626)	-6.74315*** (0.76190)	-4.85921*** (0.70631)	-5.88745*** (0.76159)	-5.47807*** (0.82514)	-5.65465*** (0.88326)
Observations	3239	3239	3239	3239	3239	2867	2867
R-squared	0.28	0.36	0.40	0.36	0.41	0.37	0.42
<i>PANEL B: Second stage:</i>							
log(biens nationaux)	-6.16063*** (1.09238)	-10.3411*** (1.09633)	-12.7090*** (1.23101)	-9.36802*** (1.16922)	-11.4758*** (1.28610)	-9.82652*** (1.26713)	-10.8649*** (1.45469)
<i>Magnitude:</i>							
Standardized beta coefficients	-5.61	-9.41	-11.56	-8.52	-10.44	-8.98	-9.92
Mean of dependent variable	31	31	31	31	31	31.6	31.6
AR p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
<i>PANEL C: First stage:</i>							
Proximity to monasteries	0.62499*** (0.024131)	0.59741*** (0.024695)	0.59324*** (0.024271)	0.57553*** (0.026726)	0.57483*** (0.027626)	0.62197*** (0.027706)	0.59916*** (0.031572)
Geographic controls		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Economic controls				✓	✓	✓	✓
Education controls						✓	✓
Region F.E.			✓		✓		✓
Year F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	2783	2783	2783	2783	2783	2507	2507
Partial $R^2$	0.48	0.41	0.33	0.32	0.29	0.33	0.29
F-stat	670.79	585.21	597.45	463.73	432.96	503.95	360.15
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1							

### L.3 Results using the number of monasteries per district

Table 26: Reduced-form and instrumental variable estimates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>PANEL A: Reduced-form:</i>							
Number of monasteries (year 1200)	-0.95797*** (0.30141)	-1.59048*** (0.29728)	-1.53586*** (0.29051)	-1.09038*** (0.27101)	-1.32184*** (0.27169)	-0.96178*** (0.28015)	-1.03260*** (0.28137)
Observations	3239	3239	3239	3239	3239	2867	2867
R-squared	0.27	0.33	0.38	0.35	0.40	0.35	0.41
<i>PANEL B: Second stage:</i>							
log(biens nationaux)	-5.05008*** (1.27612)	-7.74742*** (1.34855)	-8.79282*** (1.49769)	-6.33911*** (1.58134)	-8.00673*** (1.54884)	-6.38574*** (1.70733)	-7.18804*** (1.70618)
<i>Magnitude:</i>							
Standardized beta coefficients	-4.59	-7.05	-8.00	-5.77	-7.28	-5.83	-6.57
Mean of dependent variable	31	31	31	31	31	31.6	31.6
AR p-values	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
<i>PANEL C: First stage:</i>							
Number of monasteries (year 1200)	0.22814*** (0.010625)	0.20350*** (0.010912)	0.18748*** (0.0087685)	0.16836*** (0.0092832)	0.17380*** (0.0080534)	0.16575*** (0.0092174)	0.16852*** (0.0086485)
Geographic controls		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Economic controls				✓	✓	✓	✓
Education controls						✓	✓
Region F.E.			✓		✓		✓
Year F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	2783	2783	2783	2783	2783	2507	2507
Partial $R^2$	0.17	0.15	0.16	0.12	0.15	0.11	0.14
F-stat	461.08	347.82	457.14	328.92	465.77	323.35	379.66
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1							

## M IV results including “Oath” as a control

Table 27: Reduced-form and instrumental variable estimates including as control.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
PANEL A: <i>Reduced-form:</i>							
Monasteries per capita (year 1200)	-31.4915*** (11.8195)	-47.6976*** (11.4381)	-42.5151*** (11.7453)	-41.5480*** (11.2099)	-42.6847*** (11.5106)	-32.3892*** (12.2704)	-27.4941** (12.3757)
Clergy's Oath	-29.9934*** (2.72457)	-27.1691*** (2.46346)	-23.0962*** (2.91545)	-26.7785*** (2.32590)	-23.1309*** (2.80046)	-26.4926*** (2.46219)	-21.8308*** (2.91661)
Observations	2879	2879	2879	2879	2879	2585	2585
R-squared	0.36	0.39	0.41	0.41	0.43	0.41	0.43
PANEL B: <i>Second stage:</i>							
log(biens nationaux)	-2.79572* (1.43385)	-4.81441*** (1.57812)	-4.87615*** (1.83565)	-4.12781** (1.65277)	-4.55653** (1.79703)	-3.32504* (1.81868)	-2.82880 (1.98828)
Clergy's Oath	-28.6531*** (2.71765)	-24.2605*** (2.68201)	-20.0273*** (3.03677)	-24.3189*** (2.56865)	-20.0149*** (3.00683)	-25.3778*** (2.71150)	-20.7229*** (3.09034)
<i>Magnitude:</i>							
Standardized beta coefficients	-2.45	-4.22	-4.28	-3.62	-4.00	-2.92	-2.48
Mean of dependent variable	31.02	31.02	31.02	31.02	31.02	31.83	31.83
AR p-value	0.053	0.003	0.010	0.013	0.013	0.068	0.160
PANEL C: <i>First stage:</i>							
Monasteries per capita (year 1200)	8.88915*** (0.51948)	7.92278*** (0.48914)	6.88178*** (0.40851)	7.43830*** (0.44397)	6.88114*** (0.39182)	7.32166*** (0.45751)	6.62292*** (0.41248)
Geographic controls		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Economic controls				✓	✓	✓	✓
Education controls						✓	✓
Region F.E.			✓		✓		✓
Year F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	2579	2579	2579	2579	2579	2327	2327
Partial $R^2$	0.12	0.11	0.10	0.11	0.11	0.10	0.10
F-stat	292.81	262.35	283.79	280.69	308.42	256.11	257.81
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1							

## N Instrumental variable results on religiosity

Table 28: Reduced-form and instrumental variable estimates on religiosity in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>PANEL A: Reduced-form:</i>							
Monasteries per capita (year 1200)	-148.786*** (43.3233)	-154.120*** (41.9555)	-118.770*** (41.6169)	-158.835*** (37.9109)	-119.749*** (41.0004)	-158.806*** (37.5143)	-129.795*** (42.4884)
Observations	191	191	191	191	191	191	191
R-squared	0.48	0.54	0.61	0.63	0.66	0.65	0.67
<i>PANEL B: Second stage:</i>							
log(biens nationaux)	-18.3639*** (5.61626)	-18.3203*** (4.57315)	-16.2433*** (4.48696)	-18.2327*** (4.34940)	-15.0328*** (4.59048)	-18.9134*** (4.82267)	-15.5136*** (4.68825)
<i>Magnitude:</i>							
Standardized beta coefficients	-15.98	-15.95	-14.14	-15.87	-13.08	-16.46	-13.50
Mean of dependent variable	52.72	52.72	52.72	52.72	52.72	52.72	52.72
AR p-value	0.014	0.003	0.015	0.000	0.012	0.000	0.010
tF adjusted 95% CI	[-37.3;0.5]	[-30.4;-6.2]	[-29.2;-3.3]	[-29.1;-7.3]	[-26.9;-3.2]	[-31.4;-6.5]	[-27.5 ; -3.5]
<i>PANEL C: First stage:</i>							
Monasteries per capita (year 1200)	6.91151*** (2.19039)	7.89125*** (1.86260)	7.15266*** (1.97493)	7.75894*** (1.68638)	6.97412*** (1.65305)	7.54362*** (1.76783)	7.54362*** (1.76783)
Geographic controls		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Economic controls				✓	✓	✓	✓
Data decade F.E.						✓	✓
Data type F.E.						✓	✓
Region F.E.			✓		✓		✓
Oath	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	168	168	168	168	168	168	168
Partial $R^2$	0.07	0.11	0.10	0.12	0.11	0.13	0.13
F-stat	9.96	17.95	13.12	21.17	17.80	18.21	18.21
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1							

Table 29: Reduced-form and instrumental variable estimates of the effect of land redistribution on religiosity in 1947.

	Men:				Women:			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
PANEL A: <i>Reduced-form:</i>								
Monasteries per capita (year 1200)	-119.008*** (31.3261)	-105.900*** (30.5276)	-108.139*** (36.0299)	-104.960*** (32.4298)	-136.711*** (34.0929)	-102.242*** (32.7354)	-123.849*** (38.4280)	-103.658*** (33.5549)
Observations	321	321	321	321	315	315	315	315
R-squared	0.43	0.52	0.46	0.54	0.42	0.54	0.47	0.56
PANEL B: <i>Second stage:</i>								
log(biens nationaux)	-13.5667*** (4.19542)	-16.6580*** (5.77271)	-13.3706*** (4.71344)	-16.1091*** (5.24389)	-14.0173*** (3.92042)	-13.7180*** (4.99944)	-13.7031*** (4.34891)	-13.5546*** (4.49749)
<i>Magnitude:</i>								
Standardized beta coefficients	-12.20	-14.98	-12.02	-14.49	-12.59	-12.32	-12.30	-12.17
Mean of dependent variable	29.85	29.85	29.85	29.85	49.24	49.24	49.24	49.24
AR p-value	0.000	0.001	0.003	0.001	0.000	0.004	0.002	0.002
tF adjusted 95% CI	[-22.5 ; -3.5]	[-29.6 ; -1.8]	[-23.2 ; -2.6]	[-26.2 ; -3.9]	[-23.3 ; -4.7]	[-26.7 ; -0.7]	[-23.9 ; -3.5]	[-24.3 ; -2.9]
PANEL C: <i>First stage:</i>								
Monasteries per capita (year 1200)	8.90905*** (1.81212)	6.05891*** (1.52286)	8.13863*** (1.67791)	6.39745*** (1.45635)	9.42440*** (1.78439)	6.52256*** (1.50293)	8.73539*** (1.60921)	7.01966*** (1.36564)
Wheat suitability			✓	✓			✓	✓
Ruggedness			✓	✓			✓	✓
Urbanisation rate			✓	✓			✓	✓
Region F.E.		✓		✓		✓		✓
Observations	286	286	286	286	281	281	281	281
Partial R <sup>2</sup>	0.11	0.06	0.11	0.09	0.12	0.07	0.12	0.10
F-stat	24.17	15.83	23.53	19.30	27.90	18.83	29.47	26.42
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1								

## O Data using 1947 data on mass attendance

Table 30: The effect of land redistribution on the percentage attending mass regularly.

<i>Messalisants:</i>	District Level:				Canton Level:			
	Men		Women		Men		Women	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Log value of Biens nationaux per capita:</i>								
log(biens nationaux)	-1.47639 (1.53728)	-2.52763 (1.90921)	-2.91522 (1.89595)	-3.34230* (1.76557)	-3.58892*** (1.04244)	-1.39610 (1.48101)	-5.70978*** (1.11531)	-1.36987 (1.38514)
Clergy's Oath	-39.6811*** (5.99455)	-35.1260*** (6.28253)	-40.7167*** (6.27671)	-35.5068*** (5.72659)	-31.6828*** (3.54099)	-26.2171*** (3.86012)	-30.6915*** (3.62647)	-22.7475*** (3.55798)
Observations	285	285	285	285	1670	1670	1670	1670
R-squared	0.39	0.49	0.38	0.55	0.25	0.36	0.26	0.43
<i>Magnitude:</i>								
Standardized beta coefficients	-1.34	-2.30	-2.65	-3.04	-3.27	-1.27	-5.20	-1.25
Mean of dependent variable	21.8	21.8	39.93	39.93	23.59	23.59	41.82	41.82
<i>Value of Biens nationaux per capita:</i>								
Biens nationaux	-0.026420* (0.013629)	-0.032022* (0.016366)	-0.048029*** (0.016809)	-0.043714** (0.016755)	-0.060589*** (0.011176)	-0.039485*** (0.013072)	-0.089663*** (0.012120)	-0.040236*** (0.011955)
Clergy's Oath	-39.6225*** (5.70066)	-35.7185*** (5.95009)	-40.8251*** (5.95115)	-36.2066*** (5.56695)	-32.0721*** (3.36464)	-25.8843*** (3.81522)	-31.5006*** (3.42780)	-22.3976*** (3.51239)
Observations	285	285	285	285	1670	1670	1670	1670
R-squared	0.39	0.49	0.39	0.55	0.27	0.36	0.27	0.43
<i>Magnitude:</i>								
Standardized beta coefficients	-1.84	-2.23	-3.34	-3.04	-4.07	-2.65	-6.03	-2.70
Mean of dependent variable	21.8	21.8	39.93	39.93	23.59	23.59	41.82	41.82
Wheat suitability		✓		✓		✓		✓
Ruggedness		✓		✓		✓		✓
Urbanisation rate		✓		✓				
Log(town size)						✓		✓
Region F.E.		✓		✓		✓		✓

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

*Note:* Standard errors are clustered at the department level when using the district level data and at the district level when using the canton level data.

Table 31: Reduced-form and instrumental variable estimates of the effect of land redistribution on mass attendance in 1947.

	Men:				Women:			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>PANEL A: Reduced-form:</i>								
Monasteries per capita (year 1200)	-64.2808** (24.3704)	-63.4398** (25.3203)	-60.2454** (26.7166)	-62.5280** (26.4467)	-80.4058*** (29.5385)	-63.9213** (26.8101)	-73.4129** (32.1051)	-64.9626** (27.6488)
Observations	320	320	320	320	320	320	320	320
R-squared	0.42	0.50	0.42	0.50	0.40	0.53	0.43	0.55
<i>PANEL B: Second stage:</i>								
log(biens nationaux)	-7.00155** (2.99300)	-9.53099** (4.41040)	-7.12166** (3.35120)	-10.8464*** (4.08983)	-9.03407*** (3.39920)	-9.81745** (4.40982)	-8.99244** (3.85805)	-9.78867** (4.14447)
<i>Magnitude:</i>								
Standardized beta coefficients	-6.36	-8.66	-6.47	-9.69	-8.21	-8.92	-8.17	-8.89
Mean of dependent variable	21.8	21.8	21.8	21.51	39.93	39.93	39.93	39.93
AR p-value	0.013	0.023	0.032	0.007	0.008	0.021	0.023	0.018
tF adjusted 95% CI	[-14.1 ; 0.1]	[-21.2 ; 2.1]	[-15.0 ; 0.7]	[-19.0 ; 0.6]	[-17.1 ; -1.0]	[-21.5 ; 1.8]	[-18.0 ; 0.0]	[-19.8 ; 0.2]
<i>PANEL C: First stage:</i>								
Monasteries per capita (year 1200)	9.08656*** (1.78752)	6.18101*** (1.50847)	8.25605*** (1.57983)	6.60219*** (1.34094)	9.05551*** (1.70634)	6.14646*** (1.45224)	8.18100*** (1.49905)	6.45574*** (1.28473)
Wheat suitability			✓	✓			✓	✓
Ruggedness			✓	✓			✓	✓
Urbanisation rate			✓	✓			✓	✓
Region F.E.		✓		✓		✓		✓
Observations	273	273	273	273	285	285	285	285
Partial $R^2$	0.11	0.07	0.12	0.09	0.11	0.06	0.11	0.08
F-stat	25.84	16.79	27.31	24.24	28.16	17.91	29.78	25.25

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

# P Baseline results on Protestantism

Table 32: The effect of land redistribution on Protestantism.

Treatment:	<i>Biens nationaux</i> × Year:				<i>log(Biens nationaux)</i> × Year:				<i>Biens Nationaux (% of land)</i> × Year:			
	<i>Whole sample</i>		<i>Restricted sample</i>		<i>Whole sample</i>		<i>Restricted sample</i>		<i>Whole sample</i>		<i>Restricted sample</i>	
	Weighted	Weighted	Weighted	Weighted	Weighted	Weighted	Weighted	Weighted	Weighted	Weighted	Weighted	Weighted
Year	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
17th century	0.00015 (0.00139)	0.00010 (0.00158)	0.00140 (0.00201)	0.00143 (0.00216)	-0.05592 (0.11566)	-0.03378 (0.12891)	0.06719 (0.18950)	0.12792 (0.20617)	0.01051 (0.02361)	-0.00353 (0.02148)	0.02397 (0.02850)	0.00931 (0.02541)
1780	0.00008 (0.00013)	0.00002 (0.00017)	0.00009 (0.00019)	-0.00000 (0.00022)	0.01289 (0.01381)	0.00633 (0.01418)	0.01760 (0.02023)	0.00693 (0.02123)	-0.00005 (0.00273)	-0.00152 (0.00353)	-0.00017 (0.00350)	-0.00179 (0.00418)
1790	0.00003 (0.00013)	-0.00003 (0.00016)	0.00001 (0.00019)	-0.00008 (0.00022)	0.01206 (0.01369)	0.00485 (0.01399)	0.01461 (0.02000)	0.00298 (0.02090)	0.00160 (0.00119)	0.00118 (0.00101)	0.00207 (0.00154)	0.00138 (0.00125)
1810	0.00064 (0.00087)	0.00127 (0.00104)	0.00240* (0.00131)	0.00276* (0.00149)	-0.00892 (0.08856)	0.06696 (0.09403)	0.13674 (0.13625)	0.22629 (0.15219)	-0.01320 (0.04052)	0.00813 (0.02315)	-0.01005 (0.05203)	0.01691 (0.02821)
1820	0.00089 (0.00096)	0.00159 (0.00113)	0.00279* (0.00144)	0.00323** (0.00161)	0.00642 (0.09459)	0.09299 (0.09982)	0.16617 (0.14577)	0.27369* (0.15978)	-0.01352 (0.04354)	0.01205 (0.02393)	-0.01124 (0.05586)	0.02141 (0.02922)
1830	0.00219 (0.00147)	0.00327* (0.00169)	0.00543** (0.00222)	0.00606** (0.00246)	0.05096 (0.14348)	0.19903 (0.14842)	0.31343 (0.22533)	0.50083** (0.24403)	0.00485 (0.05560)	0.03727 (0.02847)	0.01586 (0.07124)	0.05522 (0.03463)
1840	0.00253* (0.00151)	0.00379** (0.00175)	0.00611*** (0.00224)	0.00688*** (0.00247)	0.08331 (0.14461)	0.23655 (0.15090)	0.37353* (0.22161)	0.56364** (0.23835)	0.01944 (0.06605)	0.06162 (0.03762)	0.03567 (0.08511)	0.08449* (0.04431)
1850	0.00304* (0.00177)	0.00450** (0.00202)	0.00731*** (0.00259)	0.00811*** (0.00282)	0.12716 (0.16788)	0.29964* (0.17587)	0.48844* (0.25455)	0.69517** (0.27207)	0.02375 (0.07417)	0.07381* (0.04370)	0.04280 (0.09553)	0.10013* (0.05124)
1860	0.00344* (0.00192)	0.00504** (0.00227)	0.00797*** (0.00274)	0.00880*** (0.00307)	0.15702 (0.18313)	0.33611* (0.19735)	0.54932** (0.26872)	0.75348** (0.29534)	0.03228 (0.08225)	0.08447 (0.05375)	0.05328 (0.10612)	0.11230* (0.06299)
1870	0.00411* (0.00217)	0.00569** (0.00250)	0.00866*** (0.00304)	0.00937*** (0.00337)	0.20063 (0.20533)	0.38260* (0.21839)	0.60140** (0.30067)	0.79750** (0.32779)	0.11981*** (0.04098)	0.12774*** (0.04659)	0.16226*** (0.04825)	0.16073*** (0.05331)
1880	0.00465** (0.00231)	0.00617** (0.00262)	0.00917*** (0.00314)	0.00984*** (0.00348)	0.25392 (0.21197)	0.43170* (0.22505)	0.65228** (0.30675)	0.84685** (0.33459)	0.12670*** (0.04444)	0.13959*** (0.05011)	0.17362*** (0.05223)	0.17626*** (0.05682)
1890	0.00546** (0.00265)	0.00679** (0.00282)	0.00925*** (0.00321)	0.00991*** (0.00358)	0.30628 (0.22426)	0.47697** (0.23395)	0.65675** (0.31178)	0.85282** (0.34120)	0.13589*** (0.04791)	0.14916*** (0.05392)	0.17831*** (0.05708)	0.18287*** (0.06194)
1900	0.00584** (0.00283)	0.00718** (0.00295)	0.00966*** (0.00330)	0.01038*** (0.00367)	0.32836 (0.23191)	0.50016** (0.24175)	0.68838** (0.31598)	0.88673** (0.34873)	0.15269*** (0.04674)	0.16668*** (0.05074)	0.19992*** (0.05485)	0.20430*** (0.05729)
16th century × year	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Forbidden × year	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
District F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	6622	6622	4802	4802	6622	6622	4802	4802	2996	2996	2366	2366
R-squared	0.66	0.67	0.69	0.69	0.66	0.67	0.69	0.69	0.82	0.79	0.84	0.81

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

*Note:* The dependent variable in this table is the percentage of municipalities with a protestant temple. The restricted sample uses districts in which there were Protestant churches after the Reformation (during the 16th century). We excluded two districts, those of Lyon and Paris, because they were composed of only one municipality. Columns 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 and 12 are population weighted using the 1793 population figures. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.



# Q Results on Protestantism excluding Alsace and Lorraine

Table 33: The effect of land redistribution on Protestantism.


Treatment:	<i>Biens nationaux</i> × Year:				<i>log(Biens nationaux)</i> × Year:				<i>Biens Nationaux (% of land)</i> × Year:			
	<i>Whole sample</i>		<i>Restricted sample</i>		<i>Whole sample</i>		<i>Restricted sample</i>		<i>Whole sample</i>		<i>Restricted sample</i>	
	Weighted		Weighted		Weighted		Weighted		Weighted		Weighted	
Year	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
17th century	0.00019 (0.00140)	0.00015 (0.00160)	0.00150 (0.00203)	0.00157 (0.00219)	-0.05785 (0.11691)	-0.03512 (0.13038)	0.07088 (0.19138)	0.13547 (0.20940)	0.00971 (0.02426)	-0.00538 (0.02208)	0.02245 (0.02928)	0.00677 (0.02599)
1780	0.00006 (0.00013)	-0.00000 (0.00017)	0.00004 (0.00019)	-0.00004 (0.00022)	0.01392 (0.01398)	0.00737 (0.01436)	0.01751 (0.02039)	0.00693 (0.02157)	0.00219 (0.00164)	0.00171 (0.00138)	0.00259 (0.00219)	0.00189 (0.00176)
1790	0.00003 (0.00013)	-0.00003 (0.00016)	0.00001 (0.00019)	-0.00008 (0.00022)	0.01223 (0.01388)	0.00500 (0.01419)	0.01469 (0.02016)	0.00303 (0.02120)	0.00164 (0.00124)	0.00123 (0.00107)	0.00214 (0.00162)	0.00145 (0.00132)
1810	0.00071 (0.00087)	0.00138 (0.00105)	0.00255* (0.00132)	0.00299** (0.00151)	-0.00905 (0.08943)	0.06921 (0.09500)	0.14514 (0.13704)	0.24092 (0.15384)	-0.01747 (0.04213)	0.00477 (0.02498)	-0.01562 (0.05443)	0.01291 (0.03058)
1820	0.00099 (0.00097)	0.00175 (0.00114)	0.00300** (0.00145)	0.00354** (0.00162)	0.00682 (0.09555)	0.09692 (0.10089)	0.17699 (0.14662)	0.29333* (0.16129)	-0.02023 (0.04524)	0.00514 (0.02610)	-0.02002 (0.05841)	0.01315 (0.03210)
1830	0.00230 (0.00149)	0.00345** (0.00171)	0.00568** (0.00224)	0.00644** (0.00249)	0.04702 (0.14487)	0.20149 (0.14993)	0.32194 (0.22691)	0.52300** (0.24696)	-0.00227 (0.05761)	0.03030 (0.03027)	0.00640 (0.07416)	0.04673 (0.03685)
1840	0.00265* (0.00153)	0.00397** (0.00177)	0.00639*** (0.00226)	0.00729*** (0.00249)	0.08030 (0.14604)	0.23940 (0.15253)	0.38556* (0.22295)	0.59043** (0.24078)	0.01215 (0.06880)	0.05535 (0.04080)	0.02658 (0.08915)	0.07763 (0.04813)
1850	0.00320* (0.00178)	0.00473** (0.00204)	0.00766*** (0.00261)	0.00859*** (0.00285)	0.12605 (0.16956)	0.30541* (0.17774)	0.50570** (0.25593)	0.72922*** (0.27439)	0.01610 (0.07728)	0.06740 (0.04728)	0.03316 (0.10011)	0.09297* (0.05559)
1860	0.00360* (0.00194)	0.00526** (0.00229)	0.00832*** (0.00275)	0.00929*** (0.00310)	0.15613 (0.18514)	0.34209* (0.19977)	0.56741** (0.27015)	0.78812*** (0.29804)	0.02483 (0.08579)	0.07864 (0.05796)	0.04374 (0.11138)	0.10572 (0.06819)
1870	0.00428* (0.00219)	0.00592** (0.00253)	0.00905*** (0.00306)	0.00990*** (0.00340)	0.20079 (0.20760)	0.38910* (0.22097)	0.62310** (0.30227)	0.83679** (0.33079)	0.11551*** (0.04326)	0.12396** (0.04996)	0.15756*** (0.05132)	0.15698*** (0.05717)
1880	0.00481** (0.00233)	0.00639** (0.00265)	0.00955*** (0.00316)	0.01035*** (0.00352)	0.25224 (0.21428)	0.43604* (0.22768)	0.67420** (0.30841)	0.88608*** (0.33771)	0.12268*** (0.04679)	0.13647** (0.05360)	0.16973*** (0.05534)	0.17390*** (0.06062)
1890	0.00561** (0.00266)	0.00702** (0.00285)	0.00963*** (0.00323)	0.01041*** (0.00362)	0.30245 (0.22678)	0.48156** (0.23680)	0.67849** (0.31358)	0.89132** (0.34456)	0.13285*** (0.05029)	0.14742** (0.05734)	0.17502*** (0.06033)	0.18148*** (0.06582)
1900	0.00604** (0.00285)	0.00745** (0.00297)	0.01008*** (0.00332)	0.01092*** (0.00371)	0.32826 (0.23457)	0.50897** (0.24467)	0.71377** (0.31765)	0.92967*** (0.35189)	0.15069*** (0.04890)	0.16649*** (0.05357)	0.19787*** (0.05772)	0.20458*** (0.06040)
16th century × year	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Forbidden × year	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
District F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	6440	6440	4718	4718	6440	6440	4718	4718	2926	2926	2310	2310
R-squared	0.66	0.67	0.69	0.69	0.66	0.67	0.69	0.69	0.82	0.79	0.84	0.81

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

*Note:* The dependent variable in this table is the percentage of municipalities with a protestant temple. The restricted sample uses districts in which there were Protestant churches after the Reformation (during the 16th century). We excluded two districts, those of Lyon and Paris, because they were composed of only one municipality. Columns 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 and 12 are population weighted using the 1793 population figures. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.

## R Leave-one(two)-out confirmation routine for our results on Protestantism

Figure 21: Leave-one(two)-out results (Table 32, column 1 & 3).



The left panel of Figure 21 graphs the results of  $\frac{473^2+473}{2} = 112,101$  regressions. The right panel graphs the results of  $\frac{343^2+343}{2} = 58,996$  regressions.<sup>102</sup> Each regression reproduces the regression in Table 32, column 1 (left panel) & 3 (right panel) while removing either one or two observations. 99% of the coefficients fall within the dark blue range, and all coefficients fall within the light blue range. The black dashed line represents our original results in Table 32, column 1 or 3. The red and blue lines represent the range of the confidence intervals at the 90% and 95% levels, respectively, for all regressions. For the restricted sample, all of the regressions have at least 7 post-treatment coefficients significant at the 5% level. Using the whole sample, only 5 regressions do not have at least one post-treatment statistically significant at the 10% level. While 3.2% of regressions do not have a post-treatment coefficient significant at the 5% level, that number falls to 1.1% using the 6% threshold. All regressions leaving one observation out have at least one post-treatment significant at the 10% level. These results confirm that the effect of the *biens nationaux* on Protestantism is strongest when looking at the intensive margin.

<sup>102</sup> 475 is the number of districts when using the whole sample in Table 32. 343 is the number of districts using the restricted sample.